Privatisation of Public Sector Undertakings in India - A Case of Automobile Industry by Alam, Mohammed Firoz
PRIVATIS AnON OF PUBUC SECTOR 
UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA-
A CASE OF AUTOMOBILE INDUSTR Y 
ABSTRACT 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Boctot of 9l^iloiB(op]^ 
IN 
COMMERCE 
MOHAMMED FIROZ ALAM 
UNDm THE SUPERVISION OF 
PROP. N. MUSHTAQUE AHMAD 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
AUGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
A B S T R A C T 
Indus t r ia l i sa t ion , spec ia l ly after the 
I n d u s t r i a l Revolution in West European countries* came 
t o be recognised as a means of modern l i v i n g . 
Thereupon, a number of coun t r i e s s t a r t ed making planned 
e f f o r t s towards at taining t h e objec t ive of be t te r ways 
of l i v i n g . Industrial P o l i c i e s were evolved by the 
c o u n t r i e s , after taking i n t o account the socio-economic 
and p o l i t i c a l conditions. The Indus t r i a l Policy of any 
na t ion i s basically composed of two components - one i s 
t he philosophy of a given s o c i e t y t o shape indus t r i a l 
growth and the other i s the implementation which gives 
p r a c t i c a l shape to the philosophy of the society. I t 
can broadly be c lass i f ied i n t o ( i ) Capi ta l is t System 
( i i ) S o c i a l i s t i c Approach and ( i i i ) Mixed Economy 
Approach. 
The Fi rs t World War caused vulnerabi l i ty to t he 
Indian economy and the government resolved to examine 
the i n d u s t r i a l policy. Lord Hardinge, on November 26, 
1915, wrote to the Secre ta ry of the State, ' i t i s 
becoming increasingly c l ea r t h a t a def in i te and se l f -
conscious policy of improving the indus t r ia l c apab i l i -
t i e s of India will have t o be pursued after the war.' 
This led to the appointment of the Indian Indus t r i a l 
Commission in 1916. The pace of industrialisation 
was/ however/ not upto the mark to meet the grave 
challenges posed by increasing population of the 
country and the low per capita income. Infrastructure 
in fact/ needed the pivotal concern of the policy 
makers. The Russian revolution of 1917 also brought 
about economic revolution in the whole world. USSR made 
rapid industrial strides though it was all through 
regimentation/ suppression and appression. A large 
niamber of countries copied Russian model of development 
while many others who followed 'Mixed Economy' pattern 
in the name only also sided with Soviet Russia. Thus/ 
the world came to be divided into Capitalist and 
Socialist blocs. The socialist governments took all 
important economic activities under their control and 
practically left nothing to the private sector. The 
Indian National leaders in their freedom struggle had 
educated the masses about the colonial exploitation and 
contemplated faster rates of growth of industrialisa-
tion for achieving speedy development. After 
Independence in 1947/ therefore/ the government of 
India/ following Russian pattern of development/ took 
all such steps which brought all effective means of 
production and distribution under government control 
and regulation. 
with the passage of time all the PSUs in all 
the countries became inefficient because these 
countries enacted legislations favouring the work 
force. In the ultimate analysis, the governments lost 
millions and billions of dollars in the forms of not 
getting adequate returns on the capitals invested 
because of under utilisation of capacities, strikes, 
manhours lost, low productivity, shrinkage in excise 
duty and tax income to the exchequer etc. Besides, the 
SOEs created structural distortions in the economies of 
a number of countries, leading to many crises. 
Involvement of political parties made things so 
complicated, that almost all the SOEs, except for a 
few, became white elephants for their respective 
governments which ultimately placed them into private 
hands. Indeed, the process of privatization has been 
crisis-driven all over the world through the reasons 
behind, objectives to be attained and concerns of the 
political parties with respect to privatization in 
different countries have not been very much different . 
In terms of the IPR of 1956. PSUs were 
accorded 'commanding heights' and all important 
activities at the national level were entrusted to them 
while at the state level such activities were 
undertaken by the SLPSUs. It continued to be considered 
as 'Economic Constitution of India' and dominated in 
country's industrial scene till the end of the Seventh 
Five Year Plan. The field for the operation of the 
private sector was confined to the unorganized small 
and tiny sector where individuals could enage 
themselves in petty shop keeping or trading and 
manufacturing on a very small scale. For encouraging 
small scale industries the Government reserved certain 
items which could be produced only by the small-scale 
sector. 
The terms 'Public Sector', 'Public Enterprises' 
'Government Undertakings', 'State-Owned Enterprises' 
and 'Public Sector Undertakings' are used synonymously. 
In France Public Enterprises mean industrial and 
commercial undertakings of Government. In USA, Public 
Sector means all government agencies which are engaged 
in providing specific goods and services. In U.K. 
Public Corporations are the Public Enterprises. In 
Italy, Public Enterprises are those which are run 
either by local bodies or by Statement Government. 
Late 'Eighties' and early 'Nineties' witnessed 
such unprecedented changes in the world which nobody 
could have even dreamt of. Dismembeirment of USSR, 
demolition of Berlin Wall and reunification of the two 
Germanies are but a few outstanding examples of such 
changes. In view of these sweeping changes India/ as 
many other countries of the world/ passed the 
Industrial Policy Amendment Act of July 24, 19 91 and 
declared NIP. The basic philosophy hidden behind this 
policy is summarized as 'continuity with changes'. The 
government took a series of initiatives in respect of 
the policies related to the areas : (a) Industrial 
Licensing (b) Foreign Investment (c) Foreign Technology 
Agreement (d) Public Sector Policy (e) MRTP Act (f) 
Small and Tiny Sector. 
In relation to the Public Sector Undertakings 
the NIP clearly stated that in order to raise resources 
and encourage wider public participation a part of the 
Government's holdings in the public sector would be 
offered to the mutual funds, financial institutions, 
the general public and workers. 
The worthwhileness of the PSUs in India had 
been a bone of contention from the very beginning. Some 
of the PSUs which earned huge profits were actually 
monopoly profits and due to inter-government 
departmental transfers rather than their efficient 
performance in the real sense of term while the 
aggregate sura of money invested in them amounted to 
Rs. 1,78,628 crores as on March 31, 1996. 
While commenting on the performance of any 
business organisation financial aspect comes to the 
force. Though a number of PSUs are not business 
concerns in the strict sense of the term but their 
financial aspect can not be ignored. In a mixed economy 
where private sector is also allowed to operate and 
compete with PSUs simultaneously this aspect occupies 
all the more importance. Judging against this 
background, financial performance of a large number of 
PSUs has not only been satisfactory but majority of 
them have proved to be an utter failure. 
After the implementation of a number of 
liberalisation measures, situation has radically 
changed even for those PSUs which had been earning 
profit mostly either because of their monopoly rights 
or under government protection. Again the years 1993-94 
and 1994-95 were the boom years for the Indian econc»ny 
as a whole. During these two years many of the loss-
making undertaking have also shown profits. The 
situation for 1995-96 and 1996-97, for which the data 
are not available, will surely be quite different. 
In order to be fair and objective it would be 
necessary to take into account the obligation of Public 
Enterprises which transcends the concepts of production 
and p r o f i t s . Given tha t , the performance of public 
e n t e r p r i s e s e i ther a t micro, or a t macro l eve l , has t o 
be evaluated keeping in view the contr ibut ions made by 
them in discharging t h e i r socio-economic obl igat ion, 
development of backward regions , provision of public 
u t i l i t y serv ices , se l l ing basic inputs or products a t 
administered prices e t c . There i s no denying the fac t 
t h a t a l l t h i s has been poss ib le despite several 
handicaps from which Public Enterpr ises suffer such as 
l oca t i ona l disadvantages in some cases , very high 
i n i t i a l cap i ta l investments in o the r s , having to do 
with technology which was not necessar i ly among the 
be s t ava i l ab le , cost of learning and development and 
presence of large number of s icks un i t s taken over from 
the p r i v a t e sector e t c . All t h i s may be t rue but the 
cos t s involved in the PSUs far outweight than the 
b e n e f i t s . 
The government could not curb enormous wasteful 
expendi ture , put an end t o the subsidies amounting t o 
b i l l i o n s of rupees and huge PSU losses r e su l t i ng in 
l a rge budgetary d e f i c i t s . To reduce such gaps year 
a f t e r year , the sources of sof t loan, ava i l ab le 
e a r l i e r , dried up and most of the borrowing was 
a v a i l a b l e only on commercial terms. The in t ens i ty of 
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debt burden can be imagined from the fact that it has 
gone up to the level of over Rs. 2,02,972 crores uto 
September 1992 and the internal burden exceeds at about 
Rs. 3,55,800 crores. It takes more than one-fourth of 
the GDP to service our external debts. The Government 
of India had no option but to tighten its belts on PSU 
losses and non-essential expenditures. Simultaneously, 
International Aid Agencies had been pressing hard for 
structural adjustments in the economy so that the 
country may be able to pay its external debts without 
much difficulty. 
Privatization in the world started from the 
beginning of ' Eighties', though a few countries started 
it much earlier, with a view to increase productivity 
through efficient utilisation of material and human 
resources, widening the share of ownership of economic 
assets and getting rid of political entrepreneurs. The 
champions of privatization were Mrs. Margaret Thatcher 
of the United Kingdom and Ex-President Ronald Reagon of 
the United States of America. Globally, privatization 
has been adopted as one of the major policy 
instruments. It has been taken up in more than fifty 
countries ranging over the industrial countries of the 
West, centrally planned economies of the Europe and 
newly industrialized nations of the Asia-Pacific 
Region. Even the debt ridden nations of Latin America 
and South Asia* including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka and a host of third World Countries, 
have been swept through the wave of privatization. 
I The Government of India declared New Industrial 
Policy which opted for radical changes from the policy 
pursued until then. The NIP, in fact scrapped control 
through licensing, except in some strategic areas like 
defence, production of Coal, petroleum oil, drugs and a 
few luxurious items. It diluted the MRTP Act, 1969 to 
enable large industrial houses to invest their 
surpluses and enhance foreign equity participation from 
40 per cent to 51 per cent, proposed divestiture of 20 
per cent of Public Shares in some of the PSUs, announced 
deregulation of a large number industries to free them 
from the shackles of bureaucratic control,dereserved a 
large number of items so far reserved for small-scale 
industrial sector and opened its doors to the foreign 
firms to encourage ccHnpetition. 
Privatization is specifically defined as the 
government-initiated transfer of assets, operations, 
rights and activities from the public to the private 
sector through a variety of means. On the other hand, 
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the divestiture of small equity stakes to private 
sector investors or the sale of shares to mutual funds 
or other institutions controlled by the government 
without any significant change in the level of 
government control or managerial freedom does not 
constitute privatization. But the process does include 
contracting out to the private sector those services 
which had, historically/ been performed by the public 
sector and the provision and financing of new 
infrastructure projects. 
Initially, government of India selected Power 
Telecom, Banking, Airlines and Oil & Gas sectors for 
privatization. The process of privatization in India 
was compared with a number of other countries. In order 
to facilitate sector-wise comparisons an overall 
achievement rating was derived from four criteria 
evaluated on a five-point scale where 1 stood for 
completely regulated and 5 implied completely 
competitive. By comparing each sector's performance 
against a publicly stated objective of the government, 
it was possible to assign a rating to the present 
status of privatization in each of these sectors. Then, 
to benchmark the performance against the global 
experience, India's overall performance was compared to 
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those of the economies of six countries two each from 
Western Europe, the Americas and Asia-U.K. Portugal/ 
Mexico, Argentina, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Based on a number of key privatization 
parameters such as the governments defined objectives, 
the political will, the timescales involved, the 
objectives achieved the methods employed etc., India's 
performance has been very poor. During the last 15 
years most of Britains nationalised industries and 
utilities have been privatised and the total proceeds 
now exceed $ 95 billion, Argentina collected $ 22 
billion while India has been able to raise about $ 3 
billion by auctioning off 0.65 per cent of government 
investments in the public sector in the four rounds of 
disinvestment that have taken place since 1992. Under 
the present circumstances, privatization is an economic 
must but political impossibility because it needs hard 
decisions. 
The present study titled, 'PRIVATIZATION OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA - A CASE OF 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY' is an attempt to examine the need, 
objectives, methods employed and achievement of targets 
since the initiation of the process of privatization of 
PSUs in India. The study is based on secondary sources 
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of information and, to some extent, on primary sources 
in the sense that points of view of Government 
officials, academicians and professionals on different 
aspects of privatization have also been considered and 
included in the text without mentioning their names .^  
The study is divided into six chapters. 
As industrial development of any country is the 
outcome of its Industrial Policy, the first chapter 
deals with the IPRs of 1948, 1956 and subsequent 
Industrial Policy Statements alongwith the changes 
brought therein by different governments at the Centre 
at the time of their rule in the country. It was all 
the more necessary because the basic document was that 
of 1948 and the IPR of 1956 was only more refined and 
sharp in giving all important economic activities to 
the government grip. Further, IPR of 1956, also used to 
be called 'Economic Constitution of India' by some 
nationalists, dominated the Indian Industrial scene 
till the late 'Eighties'. 
Chapter second examines the growth of Central 
Public Sector Undertakings in particular and State 
Level Public Sector Undertakings in general right from 
the initiation of planning process in the country in 
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1951 to the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan. SLPSUSs 
have not been discussed in greater details because of 
two reasons. Firstly, it was not necessary as the 
States of the country have, by and large, followed the 
policy of the Central Government in this respect. 
Secondly, the data in respect of SLPSUs, if collected 
and analysed, would have been quite unwidely. 
Chapter Third dwells upon the performance 
evaluation of Central PSUs by applying different 
parameters. In addition to their overall assessment,the 
chapter also analyses in detail the performance of 
manufacturing and service group of PSUs separately. It 
also brings to light the 'top ten' profit-making and 
loss-incurring PSUs because it is these PSUs which are 
responsible for more than sixty per cent profits of all 
the PSUs and account for roughly fifty per cent of the 
total losses suffered by them. 
The Fourth Chapter examines the concepts, 
objectives techniques, modalities and experiences of 
different countries in relation to privatisation. It is 
here that privatization at micro and macro levels has 
been discussed alongwith a sample of eleven countries 
selected from the developed West, earstwhile USSR and 
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developing countries including the newly industrialised 
nations of South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region. 
Also, privatization process of India has been compared 
with six selected countries on a five-point scale. 
The Fifth Chapter gives a comprehensive account 
of Indian Automobile Industry in its historical 
perspective. Alongwith old and established automobile 
manufacturers like Hindustan Motor Limited, Premier 
Automobile Limited, Tata Engineering and Locomotive 
Company Limited and Mahindra & Mahindra Limited, 
performance of Maruti Udyog Ltd. has been evaluated. 
After privatization of MUL in June 1992, a number of 
reputed international automobile manufacturers like 
Daewoo and Hyundai Motors of South Korea, Honda Motors 
and Mitsubishi of Japan, Daimler Benz and BMW of 
Germany, Frezer Nash and Concept Auto of the U.K. and 
Ford and General Motors of the USA etc. have signed 
joint ventures with their Indian counterparts and very 
soon plan to introduce their fuel efficient vehicles in 
Indian market which will lead to cut-throat 
competition. All these things have been discussed in 
this chapter. 
The Sixth and final chapter, as usual, gives 
summary and findings of the work. Some of the 
15 
suggestions given are really very challenging and 
require strong political will and hard decisions on the 
part of the government if privatization is to prove 
success in India. The researcher will feel his labour 
amply rewarded if this work stimulates further interest 
among those who are not tired of life and love 
learning. 
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P R E F A C E 
Privatization in the world started from the 
beginning of 'Eighties', though a few countries started 
it much earlier, with a view to increase productivity 
through efficient government revenues, reducing 
budgetary deficits, widening the share of ownership of 
economic assets and getting rid of political 
entrepreneurs. The champions of privatization were Mrs. 
Margaret Thatcher of United Kingdom and Ex-President 
Ronald Reagon of United States of America. Globally, 
privatization has been adopted as one of the major 
policy instruments. It has been taken up in more than 
fifty countries ranging over the industrial countries 
of the West, centrally planned economies of the Europe 
and newly industrialized nations of Asia-Pacific 
Region. Even the debt ridden nations of Latin America 
and South Asia, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, SriLanka and a host of third world countries, 
have been swept through the wave of privatization. 
On "ominous Monday", October 19, 1987, 
privatization experienced a trauma in financial 
markets. It is true that some governments, postponed 
their plans for the sale of State Owned Enterprises and 
some big buyers of privatized companies saw the fall of 
their shares in value below their original purchase 
prices, but in the months following the governments did 
not abandon their privatization programmes. 
In fact, phenomenal growth of the state-owned 
sector since 1960 was more due to the colonial 
experience where bulk of the economic activities were 
directed by the foreign administrators. After 
independence, the motive of the private sector was 
suspected because of its emergence from foreign control 
of industrial and agricultural development. Capitalism 
of the colonial powers gave birth to socialism. State 
ownership of the sectors was thought to be the only way 
to preserve economic independence in the face, of a 
perceived threat of neo-colonialism. Many SOEs were 
direct government initiatives. National security 
considerations provided a logical basis for governments 
to intervene in the production and control of 
'strategic' goods and services. 
In my countries, it was government's idea that 
the private sector had neither the capital to run the 
factories efficiently nor the managerial and technical 
skills to establish new ones, where these industries 
were especially designed as part of an import 
substitution programme. Public enterprises with the 
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prime objective of promoting and protecting the public 
cause and social welfare activities were set up 
selectively as per the situation or location. 
World-wide, at the beginning of 1980s, PSUs were 
estimated to account for 10 per cent of GDP at factor 
cost. 
Public Enterprises have no definition wich is 
agreed upon universally. On the basis of the state of 
the development of a country, control of the means of 
production and the government's commitment to State 
ownership, State-Owned Enterprises have taken a wide 
variety of forms over the years. They are categorized as; 
(1) Enterprises wholly owned and operated by the State. 
In some cases are to be capital and/or technology 
intensive operation which is regarded as essential to 
economic progress or to national security. 
(2)Enterprises partially owned by the State and 
partially by private sector investors : This categoryof 
enterprises is termed as 'parastatals' . 
Initially,it was thought the dominance of 
public sector over private sector will positively 
contribute to the speedy development and modernization 
of the country. Contrary to the expectations, real 
problems started when take off was achieved. Their 
Vll 
overall performance resulted in a significant 
contribution to budget deficits, an adverse impact 
on balance of payments and international competitive-
ness and a low, even negative rate of return on capital 
invested. If some of the PSUs earned profits that was 
more due to their monopoly position or government's 
protection rather than due to their own efficiency. 
Consequently, denationalization, a particular form of 
privatization, started to proceed in both developed and 
under-developed countries neglecting the politico-
ideological persuation. 
The concept of privatization is not new. Adam 
Smith used it as early as in 1762 in his writings. It 
is defined as the transfer of activity,function octhe 
whole organization from public to private sector. In 
other words, privatization is defined as the emergence 
of a new culture in the society which is guided by the 
competition, marketization and efficiency for a better 
economic decision making. The activities which are 
needed for privatization include liquidation, total 
denationalization, creation of joint ventures, worker's 
cooperatives, contracting out to private agencies, 
leasing and financial restructuring. 
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The closure of Public ErKkerprises in Africa, 
divestiture of ownership in Uli[., deregulation of 
economoic order of the US^FL under Gorbachev's 
leadership, debt equity swaps .^i-n Latin America and 
finally the denationalization i^n Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
and other Asian countries are t^e suitable examples of 
universal appeal of privatization. 
Despite the socio-economic and the political 
ideologies of the governments ^ ^oncerned, the wave of 
privatization has swept over <^fferent parts of the 
globe. There is an important relationship between the 
wider issue of economic deregulation and privatization, 
various aspects of deregulation such as abolition of 
import controls, price liberalization, deregulation of 
factor markets, affect direct^ ly or indirectly the 
competitive environment in whictx the firms operate. The 
distinction between their naturjC and effect is clear, 
but hardly there is logical perception for their 
connection. However, to identic the separate effects 
of deregulation and privatizatipn on performance is a 
very difficult job. On the .(Whole, privatization, 
liberalization and deregulation^ must be seen as the 
efforts to strengthen the State. 
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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY : 
One of the main objectives of the study is to 
discuss thread bare the factors which prompted 
privatization of PSU throughout the world and India. 
Experiences of a number of countries ranging from the 
developed West to earstwhile Socialist nations as well 
as from developing countries including the newly 
industrialised nations of South-East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific Region are studied in sufficient detail. In 
Indian context, circvimstances which led to the 
declaration of NIP on July 24, 1991 and a number of 
economic reforms related thereto and initiated 
thereafter have been fully examined. Disinvestment of 
PSU shares, their economic compulsion and political 
indifference have also been fully discussed. 
HYPOTHESIS : 
I had to test only one hypothesis regarding the 
genesis, performance and continuance of the dominance 
of the PSUs in India. It was, in a nutshell, that PSUs 
cannot bring about overall speed industrialization, 
without creating structural distortions in the economy. 
For this, I had to trace the circumstances of their 
origins and factors behind setting up of PSUs all over 
the world particularly, the earstwhile socialist 
countries. In doing so I reached the condusion that the 
origin and growth of PSUs in almost all the countries, 
and for that matter in India, was alright. With the 
passage of time, however, their overall performance 
constantly deteriorated every where with a difference 
of degree alone. The Governments and the public at 
large became fed up with them as they consumed enormous 
public funds with results hardly commensurate with 
investments sunk in them. 
The unprecedented changes witnessed in the late 
'Eighties' and early 'Nineties' left no alternative 
with the Governments except to entrust their PSUs to 
private hands in different forms. More than fifty 
countries of the world have either already implemented 
their privatization programmes or are in the process of 
implementing them. This, in itself/ proves the 
hypothesis that PSUs, in general, have failed in 
delivering goods giving way to their privatization 
every where. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY : 
The data, for the present study, have been 
collected basically from the secondary sources. 
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statistical data on different issues published by the 
World Bank/ International Monetary Fund, Government of 
India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Ministries of 
Finance, Industry and Labour, Reserve Bank of India, 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, a number of 
professional bodies such as Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, All India Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, leading Dailies like the 
Economic Times, The Financial Express, The Hindustan 
Times, The Times of India have been studied for latest 
information on the subject. Detailed discussions with a 
number of Government officials, exports from different 
PSUs, professionals and academicians were other major 
sources of information. 
In order to have a clear picture of privatiza-
tion in global perspective, privatization programmes of 
different countries have been discussed. Comprehensive 
and consolidated tables of privatization experiences of 
a number of nations have been formulated to give a 
concise picture at a glance. 
In Indian context, overall performance of PSUs 
has been evaluated with reference to their production, 
sales, profitability and ratios of gross and net 
profits to capital employed. Assessment of 
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manufacturing and service groups of PSUs has been 
separately attempted. No formal questionnaires were 
prepared as it was difficult to get such questionnaires 
filled by senior executives and government officials. 
However, many important issues were personally 
discussed with them and their viewpoints noted down 
without mentioning their names. 
SCHEME OF WORK : 
The present work entitled, 'Privatization of 
Public Sector Undertakings in India - A Case of 
Automobile Industry' has been divided into six 
chapters. Chapter one deals with the IPRs of 1948, 1956 
and subsequent policy statements alongwith the changes 
brought therein by the country. It was necessary 
because industrial development of any country is the 
outcome of its Industrial Policy. Further, IPR of 1956, 
also used to be called 'Economic Constitution of India' 
by some nationalists, dominated the Indian industrial 
scene till the late 'Eighties'. 
Chapter Second examines the growth of Central 
Public Sector Undertakings in particular and State 
Level Public Sector Undertakings in general right from 
the initiation of Planning process in the country in 
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1951 to the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan. SLPSUs 
have not been discussed in greater details because of 
two reasons. Firstly, it was not necessary as the 
States of the country have, by and large, followed the 
policy of the Central Government of SLPSUs, if 
collected and analysed, would have been quite unwieldy. 
Chapter third dwells upon the performance 
evaluation of Central PSUs by applying different 
parameters. In addition to their overall assessment, 
the chapter also analyses in detail the performance of 
manufacturing and service group of PSUs separately. It 
also brings to light the 'top ten' profit-making and 
loss-incurring PSUs because it is these PSUs which are 
responsible for more than sixty per cent profits of all 
the PSUs and account for more than fifty per cent of 
the total losses suffered by them. 
The Fourth chapter examines the concepts, 
techniques, modalities and experiences of different 
countries in relation to privatization. It is here that 
privatization at micro and macro levels has been 
discussed alongwith a sample of eleven countries 
selected from the developed West, former socialist 
block and developing countries including the newly 
industrialised nations of South-East Asia and the Asia-
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Pacific Region. The objectives, policy concerns and 
methods adopted by these countries have also been 
discussed. 
The fifth chapter gives a comprehensive account 
of Automobile Industry in its historical perspective, 
alongwith old and established automobile Indian 
manufacturers like Hindustan Motor Limited, Premier 
Automobile Limited, Tata Engineering and Locomotive 
Company and Mahindra & Mahindra, performance of Maruti 
Udyog Ltd. has been evaluated. After privatization of 
MUL in June 1992, a number of international automobile 
manufacturers like Daewoo and Hyundai Motors of South 
Korea, Honda Motors and Mitsubishi of Japan, Daimler 
Benz and BMW of Germany, Prezer Nash and Concept Auto 
of the U.K. and Ford and General Motors of the USA etc. 
have signed Joint Ventures with their Indian Counter-
parts and very soon plan to introduce their fuel-
efficient vehicles in Indian market which will lead to 
cut-throat competition. All these things have been 
discussed in this chapter. 
The Sixth and final chapter, as usual, gives 
summary and findings of the work. Some of the 
suggestions, if implemented, will prove beneficial for 
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the country as well as the consumers. If it happens, I 
will feel fully satisfied. 
REVIEW OF LITERATORE : 
The literature available on different aspects 
of privatization is immense and still growing rapidly. 
Some of the titles which were selected for the 
background study are given here. Hanke (1987) and Savas 
2 
(1987) have discussed the basic theory of privatization 
practical aspects towards successful privatization, 
foundations of privatization and planning for privati-
3 
zation while Pirie (1988) has analysed twenty one 
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techniques of privatization. Cook and Kirkpatric (1988) 
have given detailed accounts of the issues and 
procedures of privatization and its experience in 
various African countries, Chile, Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
Ramanadham (1989) has analysed privatization 
experience of the U.K. as well as seventeen other 
countries. He has also produced two edited volumes 
(1992&93) da privatization. In the first volume, twenty 
four contributors have analysed privatization 
experience of different countries of the world while in 
the second volume 'eighteen contributors have examined 
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the hurdles and impact of p r iva t i za t ion on the 
economies of a number of count r ies . Gouri and Mohnot 
have produced two edited Volumes (1991) on the theme of 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n . Contributors to Gouri 's book° have 
discussed emerging i ssues of p r iva t i za t ion and i t s 
pol icy parameters with spec ia l reference t o the Asia-
Paci f ic Region. The country papers review PSU reforms 
undertaken and experiences of different countr ies in 
g 
r e l a t i o n to p r i v a t i z a t i o n . In Mohnot's volume, the 
contr ibutors dwell upon the pros and cons of p r i v a t i -
zat ion and suggest an exploratory plan for undertaking 
p r iva t i za t ion in India . 
•}° Cristopher (1992) has given a detailed account 
of economic structure of privatization alongwith many 
case studies from a number of developing countries. 
Jugdish Prakash in his edited book (1992) discusses the 
economic necessity, rationale, myths and realities of 
privatization. Suddar Datta's edited book (1993) 
presents a good debate on economics and politics of 
privatization. 
13 Nandal in his own book (1994) examines 
worldwide trends in privatization, its relevance to 
Indian context and achievements in reforms required in 
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relation to privatization in different areas. 
14 
Brahmachari in his book (1995) is very critical of the 
performance of PSUs in India and draws lessons from 
France and Malaysia for privatization process in India. 
I hope that this presentation will enable the 
prospective researchers to read the matter with 
pleasure and without any felt pressure on their minds. 
If it does, I shall feel amply rewarded for the pains I 
have taken. 
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CHAPTER-I 
INDDSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA 
Long ago industrialisation came to be 
recognised as a means of modern living-especially after 
the Industrial Revolution in West European countries. 
Thereupon, a number of countries started making planned 
efforts towards attaining the objective of better ways 
of living. Industrial policies were evolved by various 
countries. 
The 'Industrial Policy' of any nation is 
basically composed of two components - one is the 
philosophy of a given society to shape industrial 
growth and the other is the implementation which gives 
the practical shape to the philosophy of the society. 
The first component of industrial policy is the 
philosophy which consists of an approach to* and 
objectives of industrial development. The approach can 
broadly be classified into three categories. 
The first category is capitalism or capitalis-
tic economy which is based upon the faith in the 
private property and market orientation of the use of 
resources or in other words, it is an economic system 
in which all the means of production are privately 
owned. It encourages competition and private initiative 
and lays its foundation on 'survival of the fittest'. 
But there are many limitations associated with this 
system. Under the system, the society comes to be 
divided into 'Haves', and 'Have nets'. This artificial 
division created social tension. As a result, a large 
part of the world population got disappointed with 
capitalistic system and adopted an alternative form of 
economic system known as a socialistic economic system. 
Socialism or Socialistic Economy believes in 
socialization of all the resources or all the means of 
production. It is an economic system in which all the 
means of production are owned only by the Government. 
The Government itself decides the use of every econcMiiic 
factor/service and directs all the households and the 
firms. This type of economic system was first of all 
adopted by the Soviet Union and few other countries in 
Eastern Europe like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Bulgaria. In Latin America (Cuba), and in 
Asia, China, North Korea, Vietnam had followed the 
Soviet Union and adopted Socialism as the form of 
economic system. Recently, China and other socialist 
countries have permitted private property on a limited 
scale. 
The afore-mentioned system ensures economic 
equality and all the available resources are put to 
their optimum use but it eliminates private enterprise 
and initiative. Above all, this system is totalitarian 
in nature and characterized by rigid controls, even 
then it does promote economic growth, equality and 
stability. Though theoretically quite good, the system 
could not work for a long time as the handful people 
responsible for putting the system into practice used 
it for their own ends at the cost of common people. The 
people at large got disgruntled with the system. 
Consequently, all East European countries and the newly 
independent Republics of the earstwhile USSR, which 
organized themselves into the Commonwealth of 
Independent State (CIS), gave up socialism. China, 
Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are the only countries 
which are still continuing with socialism. 
As an alternative to the capitalist and 
Socialist system, a system wherein the private 
enterprises were allowed to work, make their own 
decisions and grow and simultaneously, the Governments 
were also empowered to play an important role in 
promoting economic development of their countries, was 
evolved. In doing so, the governments owned the mean of 
production, participated in decision making and gave a 
general direction to the private enterprises for the 
overall economic development of their countries. The 
system came to be known as Mixed Economic System. 
The Mixed Economy, as mentioned above, is a 
combination of both the capitalistic economy and the 
socialist economy. This economic system has been 
functioning in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepalt 
Italy, Sweden, Nigeria, Egypt etc. Under the system, 
private property is allowed and the entrepreneurs are 
free to choose their lines of production . In India all 
concerns belonging to Tatas, Birlas, Modies, Dalmias 
and so on are privately owned while the Government has 
also actively participated, owned, controlled and 
managed various production units like the Steel 
Authority of India Ltd. CSAIL), National Textiles 
Corporation (NTC). Air India, State Bank of India 
(SBI), Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), Modern 
Bakeries and hundreds of other units which constitute 
the Public Sector of the economy. The tremendous growth 
of PSUs in these countries was firstly due to the fact 
that such undertakings required huge investments which 
only the Governments could provide. Secondly, while 
from the Society's point of view the PSUs were of 
immense importance, private' enterprises were not 
interested in them because of low rate of return. 
Pre-independence industrial policy was the 
conscious adoption of a mixed economy that represented, 
in general, the continuity of British and Pre-British 
tradition. In British India the Industrial Policy was 
practically confined to major public utilities to 
fulfil the government requirements of defence and 
industrial goods. The Policy in India was in complete 
harmony with the law of comparative advantage which 
meant that the Indian economy should be confined for 
ever to agricultural and extractive industries. The 
early industrial policy of the British Government has 
been aptly summed up by Vera Anstey as follows : 
"It was thought inevitable that India should 
remain predominantly agricultural, whilst the 
Government wished to avoid both the active encourage-
ment of industries (like the cotton mill industry) that 
competed with powerful English interests and increased 
State expenditure. Hence, even at the end of the 
nineteenth century, all that the government did, was to 
provide a certain amount of technical and industrial 
education and attempted to collect an industrial 
information." 
In 1905 though the Department of Commerce was 
established by the Government to encourage industria-
lization in the country, no serious efforts were made 
in the real sense of the term. In 1907, Sir John 
Hewett, a member of the department held a conference in 
Nainital and it was agreed that loans and grants be 
provided to various industrial concerns/ especially 
sugar factories in Kanpur. The government of Madras 
also succeeded in producing aluminium hollowware, in 
developing handloom weaving and in introducing chrome 
process of manufacturing leather. 
The First World War caused vulnerability to the 
Indian economy and the government resolved to examine 
the industrial policy. Lord Hardinge on 26th November 
1915 wrote to the Secretary of the State : 'It is 
becoming increasingly clear that a definite and self 
conscious policy of improving the industrial capabili-
ties of India will have to be pursued after the war. 
This led to the appointment of the Indian Industrial 
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Commission in 1916. 
The Industrial Commission in its report/ after 
a scholarly analysis of the Indian Industrial Scene/ 
recommended a very active policy of government 
encouragement of industry. Among its recommendations 
was one on the national necessity of establishing 
certain key industries, such as, magnetos, incandes-
cent lamps ferrotungsten, high speed steel. 
graphite crucible/ special forms of porcelain for 
insulators, chemical glass, certain types of heavy 
chemicals, rubber and vulcanite. It added that where 
secret or very specialised processes of manufacture are 
involved government should take steps to facilitate 
their introduction and make the administrative and 
scientific and technical staff abundant and capable 
enough to take the new jobs consequent on the adoption 
of the recommendations of the commission. The report 
even urged, 'direct financial aid', which might take 
the form of guarantee of dividends, loans of money, 
undertaking to purchase output or contribution to share 
capital. 
In 1937, the Congress President Mr. Subhash 
Chandra Bose called a conference of Provincial 
Ministers of Industries where the Congress Party was in 
power to consider the question of economic 
development. The conference emphasized the need for 
rapid industrialization and drew up a comprehensive 
plan for the overall industrial growth and development 
of the country. This ultimately gave birth to the 
National Planning Committee under the Chairmanship of 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The committee categorized 
industries into defence, key and public utility, and 
recommended that they be owned and operated by the 
state. The public utility, owned by central, provincial 
and local governments, were to cover distribution of 
electricity and gas, public transport and communica-
tion, water supply and sanitation. The key industries, 
among others, included power generation, fuel, 
including coal, mineral oil and natural gases, machine 
tools industry for making machinery and machinery 
parts, locomotives, wagons, automobiles, aircrafts and 
the like, metals, ferrous and non-ferrous heavy and 
fine chemicals including dyes, fertilizers and 
refractories. 
T\;o years later the second World War broke out 
and nothing happened during this time and the policy of 
industrialization remained unchanged. The slow pace of 
industrialization was not upto the mark to face the 
grave challenges posed by the increasing population of 
the country and low per capita income. Infrastructure 
needed the pivotal concern of the policy makers. As 
soon as the Congress Party, led by Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru, came to power in 1947, it contemplated for a 
fast growth rate for building up of the infrastructure. 
Thus, it was only after the independence that the 
development of basic and strategic industries was taken 
up in a systematic and planned manner . To meet the 
infrastructural development and other necessities 
congress has to lay down a policy contained in the IPR 
of 1948 which is reproduced below : 
Government of India Resolution on Industrial Policy 
dated the 6th April, 1948 
The Government of India have given careful 
thought to the economic problems facing the country. 
The nation has now set itself to establish a social 
order where justice and equality of opportunity shall 
be secured to all the people. The immediate objective 
is to provide educational facilities and health 
services on a much wider scale, and to promote a rapid 
rise in the standard of living of the people by 
exploiting the latent resources of the country, 
increasing production and offering opportunities to 
all for employment in the service of the community. 
For this purpose, careful planning and integrated 
effort over the whole field of national activity are 
necessary; and the Government of India propose to 
establish a National Planning Commission to formulate 
programmes of development and to secure their 
execution. The present statement, however, confines 
itself to Government's policy in the industrial field. 
Any improvement in the economic conditions of 
the country postulates an increase in national wealth; 
a mere redistribution of existing wealth would make no 
essential difference to the people and would merely 
mean the distribution of poverty. A dynamic national 
policy must, therefore, be directed to a continuous 
increase in production by all possible means, side by 
side with measures to secure its equitable 
distribution. In the present state of the nation's 
economy, when the mass of the people are below the 
subsistence level, the emphasis should be on the 
expansion of production, both agricultural and 
industrial; and in particular on the production of 
capital equipment, of goods satisfying the basic needs 
of the people, and of commodities the export of which 
will increase earnings of foreign exchange. 
The problem of State participation in Industry 
and the conditions in which private enterprise should 
be allowed to operate must be judged in this context. 
There can be no doubt that the State must play a 
progressively active role in the development of 
industries, but ability to achieve the main objectives 
should determine the immediate extent of State 
responsibility and the limits to private enterprise. 
Under present conditions, the mechanism and the 
resources of the State may not permit it to function 
forthwith in Industry as weidely as may be desirable. 
The Government of India are taking steps to remedy the 
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situation; in particular, they are considering steps 
to create a body of men trained in business methods 
and management. They feel/ however, that for some time 
to come, the State could contribute more quickly to 
the increase of national wealth by expanding its 
present activities wherever it is already operating 
and by concentrating on new units of production in 
other fields, rather than on acquiring and running 
existing units. Meanwhile, private enterprise, 
properly directed and regulated, has a valuable role 
to play. 
On these considerations, the Government have 
decided that the manufacture of arms and ammunition, 
the production and control of atomic energy, and the 
ownership and management of railway transport should 
be the exclusive monopoly of the Central Government. 
Further, in any emergency, the Government would ha/^  
always have the power to take over any industry vital 
for national defence. In the case of the following 
industries, the State — which in this context, 
includes Central, Provincial and State Governments and 
other Public Authorities like Municipal Corporations— 
will be exclusively responsible for the establishment 
of new undertakings, except where, in the national 
interest, the State itself finds it necessary to 
secure the co-operation of private enterprise subject 
to such control and regulation as the Central 
Government may prescribe : 
(1) Coal (the Indian Coalfields Committee's 
proposals will be generally followed) . 
(2) Iron and Steel. 
(3) Aircraft Manufacture. 
(4) Shipbuilding. 
(5) Manufacture of telephone, telegraph and 
wireless apparatus, excluding radio receiving 
sets. 
(6) Mineral Oils. 
While the inherent right of the State to 
require any existing industrial undertaking will 
always remain, and will be exercised whenever the 
public interest requires it. Government have decided 
to let existing undertakings in these fields develop 
for a period of ten years, during which they will be 
allowed all facilities for efficient working and 
reasonable expansion. At the end of this period, the 
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whole matter will be reviewed and a decision taken in 
the light of circumstances obtaining at the time. If 
it is decided that the State should acquire any unit, 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
will be observed and compensation will be awarded on a 
fair and equitable basis. 
Management of State enterprise will, as a 
rule, be through the medium of public corporations 
under the statutory control of the Central Government, 
who will assume such powers as may be necessary to 
ensure this. 
The Government of India have recently 
promulgated a measure for the control by the State of 
the generation and distribution of electric power. 
This industry will continue to be regulated in terms 
of this measure. 
The rest of the industrial field will normally 
be open to private enterprise, individual as well as 
co-operative. The State will also progressively 
participate in this field; nor will it hesitate to 
intervene whenever the progress of an industry under 
private enterprise is unsatisfactory. The Central 
Government have already embarked on enterprises like 
large river-valley developments, which are multi-
purpose projects of great magnitude, involving 
extensive generation of hydro-electric power and 
irrigation on a vast scale, and are calculated in a 
comparatively short time to change the entire face of 
large areas in this country. Projects like the Damodar 
Valley Scheme, the Kosi Reservoir, the Hirakud Dam, 
etc., are in a class by themselves and can stand 
comparison with any of the major schemes in America or 
elsewhere. The Central Government have also undertaken 
the production of fertilizer on a very large scale and 
have in view other enterprises like the manufacture of 
essential drugs, and of synthetic oil from coal; many 
Provincial and State Governments are also proceeding 
on similar lines. 
There are certain basic industries of 
importance, apart from those mentioned in paragraph 4, 
the planning and regulation of which by the Central 
Government is necessary in the national interest. The 
following industries whose location must be governed 
by economic factors of all-India import, or which 
require considerable investment or a high degree of 
technical skill, will be the subject of a Central 
regulation and control : 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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Salt. 
Automobiles and tractors. 
Prime Movers. 
Electric Engineering. 
Other heavy machinery. 
Machine tools. 
Heavy chemicals, fertilizers and pharmaceuti-
cals and drugs. 
Electro-chemical industries. 
Non-ferrous metals. 
Rubber Manufactures. 
Power and industrial alcohol. 
Cotton and woollen textiles. 
Cement. 
Sugar. 
Paper and newsprint. 
Air and Sea Transport. 
Minerals.? 
Industries related to defence. 
The above list cannot obviously be of an 
exhaustive nature. The Government of India, while 
retaining the ultimate direction over this field of 
industry, will consult the Governments of the 
Provinces and States at all stages and fully associate 
them in the formulation and execution of plans. 
Besides these Governments, representatives of Industry 
and Labour will also be associated with the Central 
Government in the Industrial Advisory council and 
other bodies which they propose to establish, as 
recommended by the Industries Conference. 
Cottage and small-scale industries have a very 
important role in the national economy, offering as 
they do scope for individual, village or co-operative 
enterprise and means for the rehabilitation of 
displaced persons. These industries are particularly 
suited for the better utilisation of local resources 
and for the achievement of local self-sufficiency in 
respect of certain types of essential consumer goods 
like food, cloth and agricultural implements. The 
healthy expansion of cottage and small-scale 
industries depends upon a number of factors like the 
provision of raw materials, cheap power, technical 
advice, organised marketing of their produce, and, 
where necessary, safeguards against intensive 
competition by large-scale manufacture, as well as on 
the education of the worker in the use of the best 
available technique. Most of these fall in the 
Provincial sphere and are receiving the attention of 
the Governments of the Provinces and the States. The 
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Resolution of the Industries Conference has requested 
the Central Government to investigate how far and in 
what manner these industries can be coordinated and 
integrated with large scale industries. The Government 
of India accept this recommendation. It will be 
examined, for example, how the textile mill industry 
can be made complementary to, rather than competitive 
with the handloom industry, which is the country's 
largest and best organised cottage industry. In 
certain other lines of production, like agricultural 
implements, textile accessories, and parts of machine 
tools, it should be possible to produce components on 
a cottage industry scale and assemble these into their 
final product at a factory. It will also be 
investigated how far industries at present highly 
centralised could be decentralised with advantage. 
The Resolution of the Industries Conference 
has recommended that Government should establish a 
Cottage Industries Board for the fostering of small 
scale industries. The Government of India accept this 
recommendation and propose to create suitable 
machinery to implement it. A Cottage and Small-scale 
Industries Directorate will also be set up within the 
Directorate General of Industries and Supplies. 
One of the main objectives will be to give a 
distinctly co-operative bias to this field of 
industry. During and before the last war, even a 
predominantly agricultural country like China showed 
what could be done in this respect, and her mobile 
industrial co-operative units were of outstanding 
assistance in her struggle against Japan. The present 
international situation is likely to lessen to a 
marked degree our chances of getting capital goods for 
large-scale industry, and the leeway must be made up 
by having recourse to small-size industrial 
co-operatives throughout the country. 
The Government, however, recognise that their 
objective, viz., securing the maximum increase in 
production, will not be realised merely by prescribing 
the respective spheres of the State and of private 
enterprise in Industry; it is equally essential to 
ensure the fullest co-operation between labour and 
management and the maintenance of stable and friendly 
relations between them. A Resolution on this subject 
was unanimously passed by the Industries Conference 
which was held in December last. Amongst other things, 
the Resolution states : 
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".... The system of remuneration to capital as 
well as labour must be so devised that, while in the 
interests of the consumers and the primary producers, 
excessive profits should be prevented by suitable 
methods of taxation and otherwise, both will share 
the product of their common effort, after making 
provision for payment of fair wages to labour, a fair 
return on capital employed in the industry and 
reasonable reserves for the maintenance and expansion 
of the undertaking." 
Government accept this Resolution. They also consider 
that labour's share of the profits should be on a 
sliding scale normally varying with production. They 
propose in addition to the over-all regulation of 
industry by the State to establish machinery for 
advising on fair wages, fair remuneration for capital, 
and conditions of labour. They will also take steps to 
associate labour in all matters concerning industrial 
production. 
The machinery which Government propose to set 
up will function at different levels, central, 
regional and unit. At the Centre, there will be a 
Central Advisory Council, which will cover the entire 
field of industry, and will have under it 
Committees for each major industry. These Committees 
may be split up into sub-committees dealing with 
specific questions relating to the industry, e.g., 
production, industrial relations, wage fixation, and 
distribution of profits. The regional machinery under 
the Provincial Governments will be Provincial Advisory 
Boards which, like the Central Advisory Council, will 
cover the entire field of industry within the 
province; they will have under them the Provincial 
Committees for each major industry. The Provincial 
Committees may also be split up into various 
sub-committees dealing with specific questions 
relating to production, wage fixation and industrial 
relations. Below the Provincial Committees will come 
the Works Committees and the Production Committees 
attached to each major industrial establishment. 
The Works Committees and the Production 
Committees will be bipartite in character, consisting 
of representatives of employers and workers only, in 
equal numbers. All other Committees will be 
tripartite, with representatives of Government 
employers and workers. 
15 
Government hope that the machinery proposed 
will substantially reduce the volume of industrial 
disputes. In the case of unresolved conflicts, 
Government trust that management and labour will, in 
their own interests and in the larger interests of the 
country, agree to settle them through recognised 
channels of conciliation and arbitration, which will 
be provided by Government. The Industrial Relations 
Machinery, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, is 
being strengthened, and permanent Industrial Tribunals 
are being established for dealing with major disputes. 
The Government of India are also taking 
special steps to improve industrial housing as quickly 
as possible. A scheme for the construction of one 
million workers' houses in ten years is under 
contemplation, and a Housing Board is being 
constituted for this purpose. The cost will be shared 
in suitable proportions between Government, employers 
and labour, the share of labour being recovered in the 
form of a reasonable rent. 
In order to ensure quick decisions on the 
various matters arising out of the Industrial Truce 
Resolution, Government are appointing a special 
officer. 
The Government of India agree with the view of 
the Industries Conference that, while it should be 
recognised that participation of foreign capital and 
enterprise, particularly as regards industrial 
technique and knowledge, will be of value to the rapid 
industrialisation of the country, it is necessary that 
the conditions under which they may participate in 
Indian industry should be carefully regulated in the 
national interest. Suitable legislation will be 
introduced for this purpose. Such legislation will 
provide for the scrutiny and approval by the Central 
Government of every individual case of participation 
of foreign capital and management in industry. It will 
provide that, as a rule, the major interest in 
ownership, and effective control, should always be in 
the Indian hands; but power will be taken to deal with 
exceptional cases in a manner calculated to serve the 
national interest. In all cases, however, the training 
of suitable Indian personnel for the purpose of 
eventually replacing foreign experts will be insisted 
upon. 
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The Government of India are fully alive to 
their direct responsibility for the development of 
those industries which they have found necessary to 
reserve exclusively for State enterprise. They are 
equally redy to extend their assistance to private or 
co-operative enterprise in the rest of the industrial 
field, and in particular, by removing transport 
difficulties and by facilitating the import of 
essential raw materials to the maximum possible 
extent. The tariff policy of Government will be 
designed to prevent unfair foreign competition and to 
promote the utilisation of India's resources without 
imposing unjustifiable burdens on the consumer. The 
system of taxation will be reviewed and readjusted 
where necessary to encourage saving and productive 
investment and to prevent undue concentration of 
wealth in a small section of the population. 
The Government of India hope that this 
elucidation of their intensions of fundamental aspects 
of industrial policy will remove all misapprehensions, 
and they are confident that a joint and intensive 
effort will now be made by labour, capital and the 
general public, which will pave the way for the rapid 
industrialisation of the country. 
A careful perusal of the Industrial Policy 
Statement reveals that it contemplated a mixed econcsay 
reserving a sphere for the public sector and another 
for the private sector. The Industries were divided 
into four broad castegories: (a) the manufacture of 
arms and ammunitions, production and control of atomic 
energy and ownership and control of railway transport 
were to be the exclusive monopoly of the Central 
Government, (b) the second category covered coal, iron 
& steel, aircraft manufacture, ship-building and 
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manufacture of telephones, telegraph and wireless 
apparatus excluding radio receiving sets and mineral 
oils and new industries in these fields could 
henceforth be undertaken only by the state, (c) the 
third category covered industries of such basic 
importance that Central Government would feel it 
necessary to plan and regulate them; it consisted of 
industries like salt, automobiles, tractors, prime 
movers, electric engineering, heavy machinery, machine 
tools, heavy chemicals, fertilizers, electro-chemical 
industries, non-ferrous metals, rubber manufactures, 
power and industrial alcohol, cotton and woollen 
textiles, cement, sugar, paper and newsprint, air and 
sea transport, minerals and industries relating to 
defence (d) remainder of the industrial field was left 
open to the private enterprise, individual as well as 
cooperative. 
Thus, after the IPR of 1948, the field for the 
operation of the private sector was confined to the 
unorganized small and tiny sector where individuals 
could engage themselves in petty shop keeping or 
trading and manufacturing on a very small-scale. 
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Similarly, while the Government recognized the need 
for securing the participation of foreign capital and 
enterprises for fostering the pace of industrializa-
tion in the country but it was made amply clear that, 
'as a rule, the major interest in ownership and 
effective control should always be in the Indian 
hands. In all cases, however, the training of suitable 
Indian personnel for the purpose of eventually 
replacing foreign experts will be insisted upon. 
Since the adoption of IPR of 1948, significant 
developments had taken place in the country. 
Firstly, the country had adopted its own constitution 
on January 26, 1950 which guaranteed certain 
fundamental rights and laid down Directive Principles 
of State Policy, the First Five Year Plan had been 
completed and, thus, planning had proceeded on an 
organized basis and finally the Parliament, after 
Pandit Nehru's visit to the USSR in 1954, had adopted 
'socialist pattern of society' as the basic aim of 
social and economic policy. All these developments 
called for a new IPR which was announced on April 30, 
1956 which is reproduced below : 
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Government of India, Industrial Policy Resolution 
New Delhi, the 30th April, 1956 
The Government of India set out in their 
Resolution dated the 6th April, 1948, the policy which 
they proposed to pursue in the industrial field. The 
Resolution emphasised the importance to the economy of 
securing a continuous increase in production and its 
equitable distribution, and pointed out that the State 
must play a progressively active role in the 
development of industries. It laid down that besides 
arms and ammunition, atomic energy and railway 
transport, which would be the monopoly of the Central 
Government the State would be exclusively responsible 
for the establishment of new undertakings in six basic 
industries — except where, in the national interest, 
the State itself found it necessary to secure the 
co-operation of private enterprise. The rest of the 
industrial field was left open to private enterprise 
thought it was made clear that the State would also 
progressively participate in this field. 
2. Eight years have passed since this declaration 
on industrial policy. These eight years have witnessed 
many important changes and developments in India. The 
Constitution of India has been enacted, guaranteeing 
certain Fundamental Rights and enunciating Directive 
Principles of State Policy. Planning has proceeded on 
an organised basis, and the first Five Year Plan has 
recently been completed. Parliament has accepted the 
socialist pattern of society as the objective of 
social and economic policy. These important 
developments necessitate a fresh statement of 
industrial policy, more particularly as the second 
Five Year Plan will soon be placed before the country. 
This policy must be governed by the principles laid 
down in the Constitution, the objective of socialism, 
and the experience gained during these years. 
3. The Constitution of India, in its preamble, 
has declared that it aims at securing for all its 
citizens -
"JUSTICE, Social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith 
and worship; 
EQUALITY of Status and of opportunity; and to 
promote among them all; 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the 
nation." 
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In its Directive Principles of State Policy, it is 
stated that :-
"The State shall strive to promote the welfare 
of the people by securing and protecting as 
effectively as it may a social order in which justice 
social, economic and political, shall inform all the 
institutions of the national life." 
Further that -
"The State shall, in particular, direct its 
policy towards securing -
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have 
the right to an adequate means of livelihood; 
(b) that the ownership and control of the material 
resources of the community are so distributed 
as best to subserve the common good; 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does 
not result in the concentration of wealth and 
means of production to the common detriment; 
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for 
both men and women; 
(e) that the health and strength of workers, men 
and women, and the tender age of children are 
not abused and that citizens are not forced by 
economic necessity to enter avocations 
unsuited to their age or strength; 
(f) that childhood and youth are protected against 
exploitation and against moral and material 
abandonment." 
4. These basic and general principles were given 
a more precise direction when Parliament accepted in 
December, 1954, the socialist pattern of society as 
the objective of social and economic policy. 
Industrial policy, as other policies, must therefore 
be governed by these principles and directions. 
5. In order to realise this objective, it is 
essential to accelerate the rate of economic growth 
and to speed up industrialisation and, in particular, 
to develop heavy industries and machine making 
industries, to expand the public sector, and to build 
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up a large and growing co-operative sector. These 
provide the economic foundations for increasing 
opportunities for gainful employment and improving 
living standards and working conditions for the mass 
of the people. Equally, it is urgent, to reduce 
disparities in income and wealth which exist today, to 
prevent private monopolies and the concentration of 
economic power in different fields in the hands of 
small numbers of individuals. Accordingly, the State 
will progressively assume a predominant and direct 
responsibility for setting up new industrial 
undertakings and for developing transport facilities. 
It will also undertake State trading on an increasing 
scale. At the same time, as an agency for planned 
national development, in the context of the country's 
expanding economy, the private sector will have the 
opportunity to develop and expand. The principle of 
co-operation should be applied wherever possible and a 
steadily increasing proportion of the activities of 
the private sector developed along co-operative 
lines. 
6. The adoption of the socialist pattern of 
society as the national objective, as well as the need 
for planned and rapid development, require that all 
industries of basic and strategic importance, or in 
the nature of public utility services, should be in 
the public sector. Other industries which are 
essential and require investment on a scale which only 
the State, in present circumstances, could provide, 
have also to be in the public sector. The State has 
therefore to assume direct responsibility for the 
future development of industries over a wider area. 
Nevertheless, there are limiting factors which make it 
necessary at this stage for the State to define the 
field in which it will undertake sole responsibility 
for further development, and to make a selection of 
industries in the development of which it will play a 
dominant role. After considering all aspects of the 
problem, in consultation with the Planning Commission, 
the Government oif India have decided to classify 
industries into three categories, having regard to the 
part which the State would play in each of them. These 
categories will inevitably overlap to some extent and 
too great a rigidity might defeat the purpose in view. 
But the basic principles and objectives have always to 
be kept in view and the general directions hereafter 
referred to be followed. It should also be remembered 
that it is always open to the State to undertake any 
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type of industrial production. 
7. In the first category will be industries the 
future development of which will be the exclusive 
responsibility of the State. The second category will 
consist of industries, which will be progressively 
State-owned and in which the State will therefore 
generally take the initiative in establishing new 
undertakings, but in which private enterprise will 
also be expected to supplement the effort of the 
State. The third category will include all the 
remaining industries, and their future development 
will, in general, be left to the initiative and 
enterprise of the private sector. 
8. Industries in the first category have been 
listed in Schedule A of this Resolution. All new units 
in these industries, save where their establishment in 
the private sector has already been approved, will be 
set up only by the State. This does not preclude the 
expansion of the existing privately owned units, or 
the possibility of the State securing the co-operation 
of private enterprise in the establishment of new 
units when the national interests so require. Railways 
and air transport, arms and ammunition and atomic 
energy will, however, be developed as Central 
Government monopolies. Whenever co-operation with 
private enterprise is necessary, the State will 
ensure, either through majority participation in the 
capital or otherwise, that it has the requisite powers 
to guide the policy and control the operations of the 
undertakings. 
9. Industries in the second category will be 
those listed in Schedule B. With a view to acclerating 
their future development, the State will increasingly 
establish new undertakings in these industries. At the 
same time private enterprise will also have the 
opportunity to develop in this field, either on its 
own or with State participation. 
10. All the remaining industries will fall in the 
third category, and it is expected that their 
development will be undertaken ordinarily through the 
initiative and ,enterprise of the private sector, 
though it will he open to the State to start any 
industry even in this category. It will be the policy 
of the State to facilitate and encourage the 
development of these industries in the private sector, 
in accordance with the programmes formulated in 
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successive Five Year Plans, by ensuring the 
development of transport, power and other services, 
and by appropriate fiscal and other measures. The 
State will continue to foster institution to provide 
financial aid to these industries and special 
assistance will be given to enterprises organised on 
co-operative lines for industrial and agricultural 
purposes. In suitable cases, the State may also grant 
financial assistance to the private sector. Such 
assistance, especially when the amount involved is 
substantial, will preferably be in the form of 
participation in equity capital, though it may also be 
in part in the form of debenture capital. 
11. Industrial undertakings in the private sector 
have necessarily to fit into the framework of the 
social and economic policy of the State and will be 
subject to control and regulation in terms of the 
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and other 
relevant legislation. The Government of India, 
however, recognise that it would, in general, be 
desirable to allow such undertakings to develop with 
as much freedom as possible, consistent with the 
targets and objectives of the national plan. When 
there exist in the same industry both privately and 
publicly owned units, it would continue to be the 
policy of the State to give fair and non-discrimina-
tory treatment to both of them. 
12. The division of industries into separate 
categories does not imply that they are being placed 
in water-tight compartments. Inevitably, there will 
not only be an area of overlapping but also a great 
deal of dovetailing between industries in the private 
and the public sectors. It will be open to the State 
to start any industry not included in Schedule A and 
Schedule B when the needs of planning so require or 
there are other important reasons for it. In 
appropriate cases, privately owned units may be 
permitted to produce an item falling within Schedule A 
for meeting their own requirements or as by-products. 
There will be ordinarily no bar to small privately 
owned units undertaking production, such as the making 
of launches and other light-craft, generation of power 
for local needs and small scale mining. Further, heavy 
industries in the public sector may obtain some of 
their requirements of lighter components from the 
private sector, while the private sector in turn would 
rely for many of its needs on the public sector. The 
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same principle would apply with even greater force to 
the relationship between large scale and small scale 
industries. 
13. The Government of India would, in this 
context, stress the role of cottage and village and 
small scale industries in the development of the 
national economy. In relation to some of the problems 
that need urgent solutions, they offer some distinct 
advantages. They provide immediate large scale 
employment; they offer a method of ensuring a more 
equitable distribution of the national income and they 
facilitate an effective mobilisation of resources of 
capital and, skill which might otherwise remain 
unutilised. Some of the problems that unplanned 
urbanisation tends to create will be avoided by the 
establishment of small centres of industrial 
production all over the country. 
14. The State has been following a policy of 
supporting cottage and village and small scale 
industries by restricting the volume of production in 
the large scale sector, by differential taxation, or 
by direct subsidies. While such measures will continue 
to be taken, whenever necessary, the aim of the State 
Policy will be to ensure that the decentralised sector 
acquires sufficient vitality to be self-supporting and 
its development is integrated with that of large scale 
industry. The State will, therefore, concentrate on 
measures designed to improve the competitive strength 
of the small scale producer. For this it is essential 
that the technique of production should be constantly 
improved and modernised, the pace of transformation 
being regulated so as to avoid, as far as possible, 
technological unemployment. Lack of technical and 
financial assistance, of suitable working accommoda-
tion and inadequacy of facilities for repair and 
maintenance are among the serious handicaps of small 
scale producers. A start has been made with the 
establishment of industrial estates and rural 
community workshops to make good these deficiencies. 
The extension of rural electrification and the 
availability of power at prices which the workers can 
afford will also be of considerable help. Many of the 
activities relating to small scale production will be 
greatly helped by the organisation of industrial 
co-operatives. Such co-operatives should be encouraged 
in every way and the State should give constant 
attention to the development of cottage and village 
and small scale industry. 
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15. In order that industrialisation may benefit 
the economy of the country as a whole, it is important 
that disparities in levels of development between 
different regions should be progressively reduced. The 
lack of industries in different parts of the country 
is very often determined by factors such as the 
availability of the necessary raw materials or other 
natural resources. A concentration of industries in 
certain areas has also been due to the ready 
availability of power, water supply and transport 
facilities which have been developed there. It is one 
of the aims of national planning to ensure that these 
facilities are steadily made available to areas which 
are at present lagging behind industrially or where 
there is greater need for providing opportunities for 
employment, provided the location is otherwise 
suitable. Only by securing a balanced and co-ordinated 
development of the industrial and the agricultural 
economy in each region, can the entire country attain 
higher standards of living. 
16. This programme of industrial development will 
make large demands on the country's resources of 
technical and managerial personnel. To meet these 
rapidly growing needs for the expansion of the public 
sector and for the development of village and small 
scale industries, proper managerial and technical 
cadres in the public services are being established. 
Steps are also being taken to meet shortages at 
supervisory levels, to organise apparenticeship 
schemes of training on a large scale both in public 
and in private enterprises, and to extend training 
facilities in business management in universities and 
other institutions. 
17. It is necessary that proper amenities and 
incentives should be provided for all those engaged in 
industry. The living and working conditions of workers 
should be improved and their standard of efficiency 
raised. The maintenance of industrial peace is one of 
the prime requisites of industrial progress. In a 
socialist democracy labour is a partner in the common 
task of development and should participate in it with 
enthusiasm. Some laws governing industrial relations 
have been enacted and a broad common ' approach has 
developed with the growing recognition of the 
obligation of both management and labour. There should 
be joint consultation and workers and technicians 
should, wherever possible, be associated progressively 
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in management. Enterprises in the public sector have 
to set an example in this respect. 
18. With the growing participation of the State in 
industry and trade, the manner in which these 
activities should be conducted and managed assumes 
considerable importance. Speedy decisions and a 
willingness to assume responsibility are essential if 
these enterprises are to succeed. For this, wherever 
possible, there should be decentralisation of 
authority and their management should be along 
business lines. It is to be expected that public 
enterprises will augment the revenues of the State and 
provide resources for further development in fresh 
fields. But such enterprises may sometimes incur 
losses. Public enterprises have to be judged by their 
total results and in their working they should have 
the largest possible measure of freedom. 
19. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 dealt 
with a number of other subjects which have since been 
covered by suitable legislation or by authoritative 
statements of policy. The division of responsibility 
between the Central Government and the State 
Governments in regard to industries has been set out 
in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 
The Prime Minister, in his statement in Parliament on 
the 6th April, 1949, has enunciated the policy of the 
State in regard to foreign capital. It is, therefore, 
not necessary to deal with these subjects in this 
resolution. 
20. The Government of India trust that this 
restatement of their Industrial Policy will receive 
the support of all sections of the people and promote 
the rapid industrialisation of the country. 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Arms and ammunition and allied items of 
defence equipment. 
2. Atomic energy. 
3. Iron and steel. 
4. Heavy castings and forgings of iron and 
steel. 
27 
5. Heavy plant and machinery required for iron 
and steel production, for mining, for machine 
tool manufacture and for such other basic 
industries as may be specified by the Central 
Government. 
6. Heavy electrical plant including large 
hydraulic and steam turbines. 
7. Coal and lignite. 
8. Mineral soils. 
9. Mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, 
gypsum, sulphur, gold and diamond. 
10. Mining and processing of copper, lead, zinc, 
tin, molybdenum and wolfram. 
11. Minerals specif iied in the Schedule to the 
Atomic Energy (Control of Production and Use) 
Order, 1953. 
12. Aircraft. 
13. Air transport. 
14. Railway transport. 
15. Shipbuilding. 
16. Telephones and t e l e p h o n e c a b l e s , t e l e g r a p h and 
w i r e l e s s appa ra tus (exc lud ing r a d i o r e c e i v i n g 
s e t s ) . 
17 . Generation and d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y . 
SCHEDULE B 
1 . All o ther m i n e r a l s excep t "minor m i n e r a l s " a s 
defined in S e c t i o n 3 of t h e M i n e r a l s 
Concession Ru les , 1949. 
2 . Aluminium and o t h e r non- fe r rous me ta l s n o t 
included in Schedule ' A ' . 
3 . Machine t o o l s . 
4 . Fe r ro -a l l oys and t o o l s t e e l s . 
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5. Basic and intermediate products required by 
chemical industries such as the manufacture of 
drugs, dyestuffs and plastics. 
6. Antibiotics and other essential drugs. 
7. Fertilizers. 
8. Synthetic rubber. 
9. Carbonisation of coal. 
10. Chemical pulp. 
11. Road transport. 
12. Sea transport. 
A close look at the IPR of 1956 reveals that 
the division of industries into three categories as 
against four in 1948/ bore a close resemblance to the 
earlier classification but they were more sharply 
defined and were definitely far more broad in coverage 
with regard to the role of the State in owning, 
regulating and exercising effective control over the 
industrial structure of the country. 
Schedule A covered all those industries which 
were to be the exclusive responsibility of the State 
while Schedule B contained all those industries which 
were to be progressively State-owned and in which the 
state would generally set up new undertakings but in 
which private sector industries would be expected only 
to supplement the efforts of the state Schedule C 
covered the remaining industrial field which would, in 
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general/ be left to the initiative and enterprise of 
the private sector. Schedule A covered seventeen 
industries while Schedule B covered twelve industries. 
It is to be noted here that Schedule C industries, left to 
the operation of the private sector could not be 
freely started and operated by the private sector. All 
these industries had to be fitted into the framework 
of the Social and economic policy of the State and 
were to be governed by the provisions of the 
industries (Development & Regulation) At, 1951, and in 
terms of other relevant legislations. Thus, the State 
reserved the right to enter into category C industries 
also when the needs of planning or some other 
important reasons, required the State to do so. It has 
rightly been remarked by Gunnar Myrdal that taking a 
good hard look at what, in fact has happened in India 
over the last decade and a half, it is evident that 
public and private enterprises have not remained in 
the categories prescribed by the industrial policy 
Resolution". 
The IPR of 1956 expressed clear doubts in the 
ability of the private sector to bring about faster 
economic growth and development in the country. The 
public sector was accorded' commanding heights' while 
the private sector was relegated to the background. 
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The so-called private sector became a sort of 
residuary legatee. Economic development was more 
g 
explicitly equated with State enterprise. Though, on 
the face of it, public sector in terms of the 
provisions of the IPR, 1956 was not to develop as a 
rival but create congenial conditions and 
infrastructure which would facilitate the growth of 
the private sector, later developments, through 
bureaucratic controls and regulations, made it 
difficult for the Private sector to grow. The 
supporters of the commanding heights of the public 
sector were of the view that 'the IPR of 1956 set out 
some of the Principles of Nehru's philosophy though it 
retained sufficient ambivalence to placate the 
9 
uncommitted elements. 
Their view is based on the facts that licences 
were, later on, issued to the private sector in the 
areas which were reserved for the expansion of public 
sector. In our opinion this was more due to the 
compelling circumstances rather than encouraging the 
private sector enterprises. If the private sector 
investments zoomed in the wake of rapid public sector 
expansion it was more on account of boosting the 
growth of public sector (many of the private sector 
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u n i t s were obliged to supply components and inputs for 
the growth of the PSUs) r a t h e r than the Governments' 
sympathetic a t t i t ude towards i t . 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMEWT-1977 
In March 1977# the Jana ta Party assumed power 
in the Centre, replaced the Congress Government which 
had been rul ing the country s ince independence. The 
Janata Government, on December 1, 1977, announced i t s 
I n d u s t r i a l Policy Statement, 1977. 
The Policy s ta ted t h a t the Government policy 
in the f i e l d of industry had been governed by the IPR, 
1956. Despite some des i rab le elements i t has created 
some d i s t o r t i o n s , v i z . , unemployment has increased, 
t h e r e i s not more than t h r e e t o four per cent growth 
in i n d u s t r i a l output every year , i n d u s t r i a l sickness 
has widespread, some of the major i ndus t r i e s are worst 
a f fec ted , rural-urban d i f ferences have widened and the 
r a t e of investment has become s t agnan t . Therefore, the 
i n d u s t r i a l policy concentrated on the following: 
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL SCALE SECTOR : The main t h r u s t of 
the Janata Government I n d u s t r i a l Policy was expressed 
in the following words : 'So f a r , the indus t r ia l 
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policy has mainly emphasized on large industries, 
cottage industries have been neglected and small scale 
industries were having minor role So, the main 
thrust will be on effective promotion of cottage and 
small scale industries which are distributed 
throughout the rural areas and small towns. 
Government's policy was that whatever can be produced 
through small and cottage industries must only be so 
produced.' 
The small-scale industries were classified 
into the following three categories : 
(a) Cottage and household industries which provide 
employment on a wide scale. 
(b) Tiny sector incorporating investment in 
industrial units in equipments and machinery 
upto Rs. 1 lakh and situated in towns having a 
population of less than 50,000. 
(c) Small scale industries having Rs. 10 lakhs and 
in case of ancillaries upto Rs. 15 lakhs in 
fixed capital investment. 
The Janata Party, thus, decided to develop all 
the three categories simultaneously. They were 
classified for designing policy measures for each 
category. The measures suggested for their promotion 
were as follows : 
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(i) Only 180 items were in the list of reserva-
tions for SSI Sector which were expanded 
further upto 807 items in May 1978. 
(ii) In each district an agency called 'District 
Industries Centre" (DIG) was set up for the 
development of small scale and cottage 
industries. The agency provided a support and 
rendered the services needed by the 
industries. A separate wing of IDBI dealt with 
the credit requirements by these small scale 
and cottage industries. 
(iii) To ensure effective approach for the develop-
ment and widespread application of technology 
for small industries, so as to improve 
productivity and earning capacity of workers, 
special arrangements were made in this regard. 
(iv) The Janata government proposed to renovate the 
Khadi and village Industries Commission so 
that the small scale industries could enlarge 
their areas of operations. The government also 
proposed to increase the production of 
footwear and soaps, through these industries. 
Khadi was given a special place (Polyster 
Khadi, Nai Khadi) so that productivity and earnings of 
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Khadi weavers could be improved. 
Areas for Large Scale Sector : 
According to the Industrial Policy Statement, 
1977, role of large scale industries was to fulfil the 
basic needs of the masses through wide dispersal of 
small scale and village industries and strengthen the 
agricultural sector. 
In accordance with the Industrial policy 
Statement the following areas for large scale 
industries were prescribed. 
(a) Basic industries, which can provide infra-
structural development and the development of 
small scale and village industries such as 
steel, cement, oil refineries and non-ferrous 
metals. 
(b) Capital goods industries which can meet the 
requirements of small scale and village 
industries. 
(c) High technology industries giving large scale 
production and related to agricultural and 
small scale industries as fertilizers, 
pesticides and petro-chemicals. 
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(d) Other industries which were not included in 
the items of small-scale industries but were 
necessary for the economic development, such 
machine tools, organic and inorganic 
chemicals. 
Expanding role of the Public Sector : 
The policy stated that public sector will not 
only be the producer of essential and strategic goods 
but it would act as a force on essential supplies to 
the consumers. Public Sector would provide help in 
terms of technical and managerial expertise to the 
small-scale and cottage industries for their proper 
growth. 
Promotion of Technological Self-reliance : 
The Industrial Policy Statement recognized the 
necessity of continued inflow of technology in 
sophisticated areas where Indian technical skills and 
technology were not suitably developed. 
Approach Towards Foreign Collaboration : 
It emphasised that in the areas where 
technical know-how is not needed, foreign collabora-
tion would not be renewed and in case of ownership and 
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effective control, the Statement endorsed the earlier 
stand that it should be in Indian hands. Government 
may consider the areas exceptionally which are export-
oriented and/or having sophisticated technology. In 
hundred per cent export oriented cases the government 
may consider even a fully foreign ovmed company. 
Approach Towards Large Business Houses i 
As the large business houses growth was not in 
proportion to the size of their internally generated 
resources and they were relying mainly on public 
financial institutions and banks, the policy was 
reversed and these houses were required to rely on 
their own resources for their new projects and 
expansion works. The funds of the public financial 
institutions were largely to be available for small-
scale industries. In capital investment field large 
industries were dominant, so preference was given to 
medium entrepreneurs and public sector corporations so 
that there was no concentration of economic power. 
Approach Towards Sick Units : 
Selective approach was made towards sick 
industrial units. It proposed that while the govern-
ment could not ignore the necessity to secure 
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employment, the cost of their maintenance was also 
considsered. In many cases, public funds in large 
amounts had been invested in the sick units even then 
they incurred losses so more funds from public 
exchequer were fed to these units but it could not go 
indefinitely. 
The main contribution of the 1977 Industrial 
Policy Statement was to expand the list of 180 items 
reserved for the SSI Sector to 807 items. It failed to 
impose a ban on multinationals or Indian big business 
houses to produce items of common consumption such as 
breads, biscuits, toffees, footwear, leather products 
etc. Further, the large industrial houses also did not 
relish the idea that such units would have to rely on 
their internally generated resources for financing new 
projects or expansion of their existing units. This 
proved to be a big blow to them as they had built up 
their empires by using the funds provided by the 
financial institutions and banks. After three years in 
1980, the Congress (I) Party dethroned the Janata 
Party which led to the announcement of the new 
Industrial Policy Statement in 1980. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY STATEMENT, 1980 : 
The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 stated 
that the 1956 policy reflects the value system of our 
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country and has shown the constructive flexibility. In 
terms of the 1980 Industrial Policy Resolution/ the 
task of raising the pillars of economic infrastructure 
in the country was entrusted to the public sector for 
reasons of its greater reliability, for the very large 
investments required and the lower gestation period of 
the projects crucial for economic development. The 
1956 Resolution, therefore, forms the basis of this 
Industrial Policy Statement which suggested the 
following measures : 
Effective Operational Management of the Public Sector; 
It was accepted in 1980 statement that there 
has been an erosion of faith in the public sector in 
recent years due to its poor performances and 
inefficiency. So, the government decided to revive the 
efficiency of the public sector. 
EconCTPJc Federalism and Integrated Industrial Develop-
ment : 
The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 also 
brought the new concept of economic federalism and 
integrated industrial development. It specifically 
stated that the government would reverse the last 
three years trends of creating artificial division of 
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large and small sectors/ which were misconcepted to 
create an interest of conflict, the concept of setting 
economic federalism by setting different nucleus 
plants in each district which were recognized by the 
government as industrially backward districts and thus 
to generate as many ancillaries, small and cottage 
industries in the districts as possible was emphasised. 
Redefining of Small Units : 
For boosting up the development of small 
industries the government decided : 
(1) To increase the investment limit of tiny 
industrial units from Rs. one lakh to Rs. two 
lakhs. 
(2) The limit of investment for small-scale 
industries unit was raised from Rs. 10 lakhs 
to Rs. 20 lakhs. 
(3) In case of ancillaries/ limit of investment 
was increased from Rs. 15 lakhs to Rs. 25 
lakhs. 
Removal of Regional Imbalances : 
To correct imbalance in regional development 
and disproportionate dispersal of industries, setting 
up of new units in industrially backward areas was 
encouraged. 
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Promotion of Industries in Rural Areas : 
The Industrial Policy Statement also stated 
the need to promote suitable industries in rural areas 
so as to provide employment in the areas and to 
increase the per capita income of the villagers. 
Handlooms/ handicrafts and Khadi were given special 
attention for the faster growth of village industries. 
Automatic Expansion : 
Extension and simplification of the facilities 
of automatic expansion were specially given attention 
for large scale industries. These industries were 
those included in first schedule of Industries 
(Development & Regulation) Act of 1951. 
Reqularization of Unauthorized Excess Capacity : 
It stated procedure for regularizing the 
unauthorized excess capacity. FERA and MRTP companies 
were specially considered selectively for regularizing 
unauthorized capacity in excess of the licensed 
capacity. 
Industrial Sickness : 
Regarding the industrial sickness the 1980 
Industrial Policy Statement recognized the fact of 
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mis-management and financial improprieties in a large 
number of industrial units which kept them sick. The 
government decided to deal with the phenomenon with a 
firm hand. 
In the case of existing sick undertakings 
which showed adequate potential for revival/ it would 
be the policy of government to encourage their merger 
with healthy units which were capable of managing the 
sick undertakings and restoring their giability. For 
this purpose the existing tax concession under Section 
72-A of the Income Tax Act would be made more 
liberally available to amalgamation proposals which 
would serve the purpose of revival of sick units. 
Management of sick units would be taken over only in 
exceptional cases on grounds of public interest where 
other means for the revival of sick undertakings were 
not considered feasible. 
The Industrial Policy (1980) was guided merely 
by considerations of growth. It liberalised licensing 
for large and big business but by blurring the 
distinction between small scale and large scale 
industries it seeks to promote the latter at the cost 
of the former. Broadly speaking, the Industrial Policy 
choose a more capital-intensive path of development and 
12 thus, it under played the employment objective. 
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LIBERALIZATION MEASURES, 1985 
Soon after resuming the office, the then Prime 
Minister Late Mr. Rajeev Gandhi's Government declared 
the liberalization of licensing policy in favour of 
the large industries and they were freed from the 
provisions of the MRTP and FERA Acts. Some of the 
important features of the Industrial Policy Statement, 
1985 were as follows : 
a) Liberalization of Licensed Capacity : 
Policy changes of 1985 made the industries to 
stand at place where they could grow with a rapid 
pace, achieve economies of scale and undergo 
modernization thus setting some latest technologies. 
The scheme for re-endorsement of capacity was 
liberalized. Increase was granted to those units which 
were paying attention to the economies of scale and 
due to modernization a 49 per cent rise in capacity 
was allowed to them. On 30th January, 1986 the 
Government delicensed 23 industries to which 
provisions of the MRTP and FERA Acts applied. 
Delicensing was, however, proposed only for those 
undertakings which were in centrally approved backward 
areas. 
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b) Concept of Broad-Banding Introduced : 
Keeping in view the market demand/ the concept 
of broad banding was developed to enhance production 
and give flexibility to the manufacturers to adjust 
their product-mix. It was introduced to a large number 
of items/ some of these were machine tools, motorized 
two-wheelers and four-wheelers, paper and pulp, 
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, petro-chemicals and 
entertainment electronics. Basic advantage of this 
concept was that licenses issued in terms of broad 
categories would enable the undertakings to produce 
any of the items covered so that total production 
should not exceed the licensed capacity. 
c) Raising Asset Limits of MRTP Companies : 
The assets limit of the companies which were 
under MRTP Act was raised from Rs. 20 crores to Rs.lOO 
crores. This enabled 112 companies to come out of 
range of the MRTP Act. In May 1985, twenty seven 
industries were exempted from the application of 
Section 22A of the MRTP Act and thereupon 22 of these 
industries were delicensed from the MRTP and FERA 
Acts. 
Again, the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Affairs was to clear the licensing proposals of those 
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companies which were having an investment of Rs. 50 
crores against the earlier limit of Rs. 20 crores. 
d) Attitudes towards small-scale Sector Dnits : 
Investment limits of the small-scale 
industrial units and ancillaries were enhanced from 
Rs. 20 lakhs to 25 lakhs and from Rs. 35 lakhs to Rs. 
45 lakhs respectively. Further/ nearly 200 items which 
were on the reservation list were dereserved and were 
made open for medium and large scale sectors. 
It will be clear from the foregoing discussion 
that the number of industries requiring compulsory 
licensing was reduced from 56 to 26. Non-MRTP and Non-
FERA Companies were required to obtain industrial 
licenses under IDRA for projects involving investment 
in fixed assets upto Rs. 50 crore if they were located 
in lintrally declared backward areas and Rs. 15 crores 
if they were located in non-backward area. The 
delicensed sector under new dispensation was extended 
to units importing upto 30% of their is put needs 
against 15% in the past. This was a case where import 
liberalisation was combined with industrial liberali-
sation to a good effect. Furthermore/ income tax 
relief under section 80-HH (20% deduction of net 
profit upto 10 years) and section 80-1 (25% deduction 
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of profit upto 8 years) were made available 
cumulatively to industrial undertakings established in 
notified backward districts. 
NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY - 1990 : 
The Janata Dal Government announced its 
Industrial Policy Statement on May 31, 1990/ which 
gave a fresh direction to the industries and tried to 
generate more employment, show cross-sectional distri-
bution of industries in rural areas and enhance the 
contribution of small-scale industries to exports. 
Specifically, the following measures were taken for 
the above mentioned purposes: 
(1) The investment limit for small-scale 
industries was raised from Rs. 35 lakhs to Rs. 
60 lakhs, whereas for ancillary units it was 
raised from Rs. 45 lakhs to Rs. 75 lakhs. The 
small-scale units which were to undertake 30 
per cent of their annual production for export 
by the end of the third year, were permitted 
to step up their investment in plant and 
machinery to Rs. 75 lakhs. 
(2) For tiny units investment limit was increased 
from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 5 lakhs. 
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(3) Products manufactured in small-scale sector 
would be taken into account to increase the 
competitiveness in the market. So, programme 
for modernization and upgradation of 
technology would be implemented. For achieving 
this objective, a number of technology 
centres, tool rooms, process and product 
development centres and testing centres were 
to be set up under the roof of an apex 
technology development centre in Small 
Industries Development Organization. 
a) A new apex bank named SIDBI would be established 
to assess the adequate and timely flow of money to 
the small-scale industries. The major task of the 
SIDBI formed and other commercial banks/financial 
institutions would be to channelize the need-
based high flow of credit in terms of working 
capital or loan to the tiny and rural industries. 
b) An exercise would be undertaken to identify 
locations in rural areas endowed with adequate 
power supply and intensive compaign would be 
launched to attract suitable entrepreneurs and 
provide all other inputs to foster small-scale and 
tiny industries. Similarly, industries which were 
not energy intensive would be identified for 
proliferation in rural area, where power supply 
was at that time a constraint. 
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c) Small-scale industries which were subjected to a 
large number of Acts/Laws, thus having a lot of 
complaints and were maintaining a number of 
registers particularly in the field of labour 
legislation were to be freed from bureaucratic 
controls so that unnecessary interference did not 
come in the way of development and growth of those 
industries. 
Agro-based rural Industries : 
(4) The roles of the KVIC (Khadi & Village 
Industries Commission) and KVI (Khadi & 
Village Industries) would be enhanced and 
expanded and these organisations were to be 
strengthened to discharge their responsibilities 
more effectively to assist the artisans 
engaged in the rural and cottage industries. 
Special marketing organizations at the Centre 
and State levels would be set up to market 
their products and to get adequate supply of 
raw materials. Besides, special training, 
concessional credits and free consultancy to 
groups of aritsans would be provided. 
(5) Greater success had been achieved in agro-
processing industries where growers and 
processors were integrated, as in the case of 
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sugar. In other agro-based industries closer 
links must be forged between growers and 
processors units. Industrial policy would 
promote those projects which were organized in 
close cooperation on the basis of joint 
ownership. If the growers wanted to set up a 
processing unit they would be assisted within 
the framework of cooperative units and 
financial assistance and better technology 
would be given to the growers to enhance their 
agricultural production. 
(6) High priority would be given to the agro-
processing industries in credit allocation 
from the financial institutions. 
Procedare for Industrial Approvals : 
It was perceived that Indian Industries must 
be kept at a place where they could compete in the 
international market by releasing them from the 
unnecessary bureaucratic shackles and reducing the 
clearance required by government. So, the Government 
decided to examine the large projects in view of 
resource constraints while decision for medium sized 
investments would be left to the entrepreneurs. To 
achieve the above mentioned goals following points 
were considered : 
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7) Location Policy and Environmental Clearance : The 
policy applied only to those industries which would be 
set up or were at that time in and around the 
metropolitan with a population of above four millions. 
For these cities location would not be permissible 
within 20 kms, calculated from the periphery of the 
metropolitan area. The non-polluting industries such 
as electronics, computer software and printing were 
excluded from the policy. 
8) Export-oriented Units ; 100 per cent export 
oriented units (EOUs) having as upper investment limit 
of 75 crores, and units to be associated with Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) were delicensed under the 
scheme. But 836 items reserved in the small-scale 
sector would continue. 
9) Delicensing : 
( i ) All the new un i t s upto an investment in a s s e t s 
upto Rs. 25 crores in non-backward areas and 
Rs. 75 crores in Government recobackward areas 
were exempted from obtaining a l icense or 
reg i s t ra t ion under the po l icy . 
( i i ) Import of Capital Goods : For the import of 
Capital Goods, an entrepreneur was allowed t o 
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import upto a landed value of 30 per cent of 
the total value of plant and machinery for the 
unit. 
(iii) Import of Raw-materials and Components : For 
the import of raw materials and components, it 
was permitted upto a landed value of 30 per 
cent of the ex-factory value of annual 
production (excluding the excise duty on the 
items of production and raw materials and 
components on OGL). 
(iv) Foreign collaboration : If transfer of 
technology was needed and it was necessary, 
entrepreneur could conclude an agreement with 
the collaborator, without any clearance from 
the government having a provision that royalty 
payment must not exceed five per cent on 
domestic sales and eight per cent on exports. 
(v) Foreign Investment : Considering the need for 
inflow of the effective technology, investment 
upto 40 per cent of equity was allowed on an 
automatic basis. 
It will be observed from the foregoing 
discussion that the 19 90 Industrial policy tried to 
boost up the growth of small-scale sector as well as 
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made an effort to permit blanket liberalisation with a 
view to accelerate the growth of the medium and large-
scale sector. It also gave an unfettered right to 
conclude foreign collaborations in case the royalty 
payment did not exceed 5 per cent on domestic sales 
and 8 per cent on exports. The entrepreneur could 
import capital goods upto a landed value of 30 per 
cent of the total value of plant and machinery 
required for the unit. Similarly, imports of raw 
materials and components were also permitted upto 
landed value of 3 per cent of the ex-factory value of 
annual production. It would not include raw materials 
and components on open general licence. Thus, the 
same unit could claim import licence for Capital 
goods as well as raw materials and components. Due to 
the adverse balance of payment situation, the 
industrial policy added to the burden of imports. 
Moreover 100 per cent Export Oriented Units (EOUs) and 
units to be set up in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
were delicensed under the scheme up to an investment 
limit of Rs. 75 crores. This reopened the import 
window under the title of export promotion. Thus the 
upshot of the entire criticism of the 1990 Industrial 
Policy was that whereas it aimed to promote small 
scale and agro-based industries, it did not provide 
adequate safeguards against encroachments by the large 
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business houses and multinationals which grabbed the 
market share of small-scale sector in mass consumption 
goods and seriously jeopardised the employment 
generation of the SSI Sector. 
NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY - 1991 : 
A sweeping change in the form of 'New 
Industrial Policy' was announced by Indian Government 
on July 24, 1991. The basic philosophy hidden behind 
this policy is siommarized as 'continuity with change' . 
The main objectives of the policy are : 
(i) To consolidate the strengths built up during 
the last four decades of economic planning and 
to build on the gains already made. 
(ii) To correct the distortions or weaknesses that 
may have crept in the industrial structure as 
it has developed over the last four decades. 
(iii) To maintain a sustained growth in the produc-
tivity and gainful employments/ and 
(iv) To attain international competitiveness. 
For attaining the aforementioned objectives 
following two factors will be kept in mind. 
(a) The need to preserve environment. 
(b) The need to ensure the efficient use of 
available resources. 
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Policy Measures : 
According to the objectives, government took a 
series of initiatives in respect of the policies 
related to the following areas : 
(A) Industrial Licensing 
(B) Foreign Investment 
(C) Foreign Technology Agreement 
(D) Public Sector Policy 
(E) MRTP Act 
(F) Small and Tiny Sector. 
(A) Industrial Licensing Policy : 
In Industrial licensing area, government's 
role was to exercise control, to provide help and 
guidance by making essential decisions and eliminate 
the delay which needed bold and imaginative decisions 
to remove the restraints on capacity creation (Keeping 
in mind the national interests of the country). 
(i) Industrial licensing will be abolished for all 
projects except for a number of industries related to 
strategic concerns and security, social reasons, 
hazardous chemicals, overriding environmental issues 
and items of elitist consumption. 
(ii) Only a group of six industries where security and 
strategic concerns predominate will be reserved 
exclusively for the public sector. 
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(a) where foreign exchange availability is ensured 
through foreign equity. 
(b) if the CIF value of imported capital goods 
required is less than 25 per cent of the total 
value of plant and equipment, upto a maximum 
value of Rs. 2 crores. 
(iii) In locations other than cities having more than 
one million population industrial approval would not 
be required from the government except for the 
industries which requires compulsory licensing. 
(iv) Except non-polluting industries, other industries 
would be located outside 25 kms of the periphery, 
neglecting prior designated industrial areas. 
(v) The mandatory convertibility clause for new 
projects would not be applicable for term loans from 
the financial institutions. 
(B) Foreign Investment : 
(i) In order to invite foreign investment in high 
priority Indsutries 34 such industries were 
recognized. Such priority is given when the foreign 
equity covers the Foreign Exchange requirements on 
capital goods. 
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(ii) For the export promotion of Indian products in 
international market, the government would encourage 
the foreign trading companies to assist the Indian 
export companies in export activities. 
(iii) A Board having special power will be constituted 
to negotiate with large international firms and 
approve direct foreign investment in selected areas. 
(C) Foreign Technology Agreement : 
(i) To give a desired level of technical injection in 
high priority industries, government would provide an 
automatic permission of foreign technology upto a 
lumpsum payment of Rs. 1 crore. 5 per cent royalty for 
domestic sales and 8 per cent for exports, subjected 
to total payment of 8 per cent of sales over a 
ten-year period from date of agreement or seven-year 
from the commencement of production. 
(ii) Similar facilities would be available for other 
industries if the agreement is not bound to the 
expenditure of free foreign exchange. Indian companies 
are to negotiate with their foreign counterparts about 
their terms of technology as it will be fit for their 
own commercial judgement. 
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(D) Public Sector Policy : 
The public enterprises have shown a very low 
rate of return on the Capital Investment. This has 
inhibited their ability to regenerate themselves in 
terms of new investments as well as in technology 
development. The result is that many of the public 
enterprises have become a burden rather than being an 
asset to the Government. The original concept of the 
public sector has also under gone considerable 
dilution. The most striking example is the take over 
of sick units from the private sector. This category 
of public sector units accounts for almost one third 
of the total losses of Central Public Sector 
Enterprises. Another Category of Public enterprises, 
which does not fit into the original idea of the 
public sector being at the Commanding heights of the 
economy, is the plethora of public enterprises which 
are in the consumer goods and services sectors. 
It is time therefore that the Government adopt 
a new approach to public enterprises. Units which may 
be faltering at present but are potentially viable, 
must be restructured and given a new lease of life. 
The priority areas for growth of public enterprises in 
the future will be the following : 
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(a) Essential infrastructure goods and services. 
(b) Exploration and Exploitation of oil and 
mineral resources. 
(c) Technology development and building of 
manufacturing capabilities in areas which are 
crucial in the long-term development of the 
economy and where private sector investment is 
inadequate. 
(d) Manufacture of products where strategic 
considerations predominate such as defence 
equipment. 
(i) Portfolio of public sector investment will be 
reviewed with a view to focus the public 
sector on strategic, high-each and essential 
infrastructure whereas some reservation for 
the public sector is being retained there 
would be no bar for areas of exclusivity to be 
opened up to the private sector selectively. 
Similarly, the public sector will also be 
allowed entry in the areas not reserved for 
it. 
(ii) Public enterprises which are chronically sick 
and which are unlikely to be turned around 
will, for the formulation of revival/ 
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rehabilitation scheme, be referred to the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruc-
tion. 
(iii) In order to raise resources and encourage 
wider public participation, a part of the 
government's share holding in the public 
sector would be offered to mutual funds, 
financial institutions, general public and 
workers. 
(iv) Boards of public sector companies would be made 
more professional and given greater powers. 
(v) There will be greater thrust on performance 
improvement through the Memorandom of under-
standing (MOU) system through which manage-
ments would be granted greater autonomy and 
will be held accountable. Technical expertise 
on the part of the Government would be 
upgraded to make the MOU negotiations and 
implementation more effective. 
(vi) To facilitate a fuller discussion on 
performance, the MOU signed between Government 
and the public enterprise would be placed in 
parliament. While focussing on major 
management issues, this would also help place 
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matters on day to day operations of public 
enterprises in their correct perspective. 
(E) Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP 
Act) : 
The complexity was increased due to growing 
structure of industries and the need was to attain 
economies of scale to get higher productivity and 
competition in the market. So, it was decided that 
threshold limit of assets of MRTP and other dominant 
companies will be removed which were earlier governed 
by the MRTP ACt - through the interference of 
government on its investment decisions. 
With this change, the government's approval 
will not be required for establishment of new 
undertakings, expansion, merger, amalgamation and 
takeover of existing firms. Emphasis would be fully 
concentrated on the control and regulation of 
monopolistic, restrictive and unfair trade practices. 
List of Industries in Respect of Which Industrial 
Licensing will be cqnpulsory : 
1. Coals and lignite 
2. Petroleum (other than crude) and its distillation 
products. 
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3. Distillation and brewing of alcoholic drinks. 
4. Sugar 
5. Animal fats and oils 
6. Cigars and Cigarettes of tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes. 
7. Asbestos and Asbestos-based products 
8. Plywood, and decorative vaneers and other wood 
based products such as particle board, medium 
density board block board. 
9. Raw hides and skins, leather, chamois leather and 
patent leather. 
10. Tanned or dressed furskins 
11. Motor cars 
12. Paper and newsprint except bagasse-based units 
13. Electronic aerospace and defence equipments of all 
types. 
14. Industrial explosives, including detonating fuse, 
safety use, gun powder, nitrocellulose and 
matches. 
15. Hazardous chemicals 
16. Drugs and pharmaceuticals (According to drug policy) 
17. Entertainment Electronics (VCRs, Colour TVs, CD 
Players, Tape Recorders). 
18. White goods (Domestic refrigerators). Domestic 
Dish, Washing Machines, Programmable domestic 
washing machines, microwave ovens. Air 
conditioners). 
NOTE : The compulsory licensing provisions will not 
be applied for the small scale units for any 
items reserved for exclusive manufacture in 
the sector. 
Proposed list of Industries reserved for the public 
sector : 
1. arms and ammunitions and allied items of defence 
equipments defence aircrafts and warships. 
2. Atomic Energy 
3. Coal and lignite 
4. Mineral oils 
5. Minerals specified in the schedule of atomic 
energy (Control of production and use) order 1953. 
6. Railway Transport. 
Having excunined both the aspects of the 
meaning of the term 'Industrial Policy', IPRs of 1948 
and 1956 in particular and a number of subsequent 
Industrial Policy Statements, most of which centred 
round the IPR of 1956 in letter and spirit, we now 
turn to discuss the type of industrial development the 
country had upto the end of the 'Eighties'. Briefly, 
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Indian Government exactly upto the mid-eighties 
accorded commanding heights to the PSUs by investing 
huge public funds in them and extending their 
activities to almost every sphere of life. Despite 
constructive criticism in the Parliament and outside 
the PSUs failed to provide reasonable rate of return 
on the invested funds and the 'Public Sector' in a 
whole proved to be a white elephant to the Government. 
It is against this background that the following 
chapter examines the growth and development of PSUs 
through various Five Year Plans. 
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CHAPTER - II 
GROWTH OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS - HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
It has been mentioned in the previous chapter 
that industrial development of any nation depends, to 
a large extent, on its 'Industrial Policy' and, as 
such, India is no exception to this general rule. 
Though efforts were made several times towards this 
end but nothing concrete could be done in the matter 
till the country became independent in 1947. It was in 
1948 that the first Industrial Policy Resolution was 
passed which empowered the Government to play an 
active part in the field of industrial development. As 
many other countries of the world, India was also so 
much influenced by the 'Socialistic Philosophy' of 
development that in 1954 the country adopted 
'Democratic Socialism' and in 1956 passed another IPR 
which gave absolute powers to the Government regarding 
the starting, taking over, managing, controlling and 
participating in any kind of industry it deemed fit. 
The terms 'Public Sector', Public Enterprises' 
Government Undertakings', State-owned Enterprises' and 
'Public Undertakings' are used synonymously. In 
France, Public Enterprises mean industrial and 
commercial undertakings of the Government. In USA, 
Public Sector means all government agencies which are 
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engaged in providing specific goods and services. In 
U.K. Public Corporations are the public enterprises. 
In Italy, public enterprises are those which are run 
either by local bodies or by State Government. 
According to A.H. Hanson/ public enterprises mean 
state ownership and operation of industrial* agricul-
2 tural, financial and commercial undertakings. Similar 
definitions by a number of authors of books and 
encyclopaedias and development organizations may be 
given but the gist is almost the same. In India, 
Public Sector Enterprises include Departmental 
Undertakings, Corporations and Public Limited 
Companied. However, in our discussion we shall 
concentrate on the performance and problems of non-
departmental undertakings of the Central Government 
which are named as industrial and commercial 
undertakings though they have entered the field of 
production and distribution of consumer goods as well. 
Another reason for our concentration on industrial and 
commercial undertakings of the Central Government is 
that the Ministry of Finance (Bureau of Public Enter-
prises), Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and 
Commerce Year Book of Public Sector all publish data 
on the aforementioned undertakings and leave out the 
departmental undertakings. 
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Original of Public Sector Undertakings : 
U.K. is birth place of Public Corporation - an 
oldest form of public sector enterprises. In 1908, the 
Port of London Authority was established as a 
Prototype of a 20th Century Public Corporation. In 
1919, Electricity Commission and Forestry Commission 
were constituted. In between 1926 and 1949 the 
important corporations established or nationalized 
were British Broadcasting Corporation (1926); London 
Passenger Transport Board (1933), National Coal Board 
(1946), Iron & Steel Corporation and the British Steel 
Corporation (1949). The British pattern of corporation 
has been corporate body created by public authority 
with defined powers and functions, and financially 
independent. It is administered by a board appointed 
by the public authority, to which it is answerable. 
Its capital structure and financial operations are 
similar to those of public company but its stock 
holders retain no equity interests and deprived of 
3 
voting rights and power of appointment of the board. 
Thus, as held by justice K.K. Mathews a public 
corporation is a legal entity established normally by 
Parliament and always under legal authority, usually 
in the form of special statute, charged with the duty 
of carrying out specified government functions in the 
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national interest, those functions being confined to a 
comparatively restricted field and subject to control 
by the executive while the Corporation remains 
justifically an independent entity not directly 
4 
responsible to Parliament." 
In the earstwhile USSR, another type of PSUs 
developed. It was all through nationalization and 
there was no provision of private enterprises in the 
economy. The large number of production and distribu-
tion came under the state ownership, management and 
control, thus putting an end to the private sector for 
all practical purposes. Industrial management, 
transport and trade was not directly conducted by 
Ministries or Government Departments of Local Soviets, 
but by independent Public Corporation. The speed of 
nationalization began in 1918 when the entire economy 
came under the state ownership. There, the Five Year 
Plans started in 1927. In 1932, the peoples 
commissariats were set up and thereupon totalitarian 
type of Corporations grew throughout the country. 
China and Yugoslavia, influenced by the Russian 
experiences and following its footsteps, took over 
management and control of all sorts of industries. The 
USSR, as a nation, however, collapsed in 1991 giving 
birth to various Central Asian Independent Republics. 
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In the United States of America the scope of 
public sector enterprises is very much limited. The 
first PSU was established in 1930 when postal system 
was directly owned by the State Government. There/ the 
people still debate about the share or position of 
PUSs in the economy. Actually they do not like PSUs 
except a few permitted by law. 
PSU's in Developing Nations : 
With the advent of steam power Europeans 
started developing naval power and the Muslims 
(Ottoman Empire) were relegated to the background. 
After getting upper hand. West European countries 
started developing machines to be used in the process 
of manufacturing replacing, to a large extent, manual 
labour. It gave rise to mechanization which led to 
mass-scale production. The enterprising spirit and 
keen competition, amongst Britain, France, Spain, 
Portugal, Germany, Holland and Italy etc. compelled 
them to search for new areas for new materials which 
could keep the wheels of their machines move. In that 
competition the West European countries, one after the 
other, colonized the whole world for their benefit. In 
addition to procuring raw materials for their hoone 
industries, these countries killed the industries of 
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all 'present developing nations'. For centuries 
together the foreign rule over Asian, African and 
Latin American countries kept them only primary 
commodity producing countries. These masters exploited 
the labour and raw materials from these countries and 
sold their manufactured products in the same market at 
very exorbitant rates. Of course. Railways and Roads 
and other means of communications were developed in 
these countries but that was more for looting these 
countries rather than for the benefit of local 
population. 
As Adam Smith, the father of Economics, had 
advocated free economy (laissez faire) there were no 
restrictions on the movements of goods, services or 
personnel. In exchange for their manufactures these 
countries enmassed huge quantities of gold and silver 
(only gold and silver coins were in circulation) in 
their home lands and out of their contempt for the 
prectous metals, did not allow them to move out of 
their treasuries which led not only to the world-wide 
depression of the 'Thirties' but to the ultimate 
collapse of the bullion standards. It may also be-
mentioned here that these restrictions on the movement 
of the gold and silver were the main economic reasons 
which led to the outbreak of World War II in September 
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1939. This iS/ in summary, how the world poverty was 
created. 
The independence movements of the mid-
twentieth century resulted in granting of independence 
to these countries by the aforementioned colonial 
powers. After getting independence the governments of 
developing countries started paying proper attention 
to the development strategies suitable for their 
r 
countries. In general, these countries came under the 
influence of communism and embarked upon socialistic 
approach in their development planning process. 
Following the earstwhile Russian model, these 
i 
developing nations practically killed the private 
initiative. Naturally, for the provision of basic 
facilities huge investments were required which, under 
the circumstances, the private sector was not ready to 
undertake. India, being leader of the developing world 
and very much influenced by the Russian industrial 
development/ accorded commandjag heights to the PSUs 
in its development process after Pandit Nehru's Visit 
to the Soviet Union in 1954. 
In historical perspective, in the middle era, 
India was centre of attention of all eyes in the West 
and it was known as Golden Bird. It was famous for its 
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steel and clothing. The iron pillor in Delhi near 
'Qutub Minar' baffled many metallurgists as to how a 
pillor of this huge size and rustless quality could 
have been cast in those far off days. During that era, 
Decca Muslin was very favourite of western women. In 
the later part of the Medieval Period, mining also 
came in the ambit of state activity and a number of 
state monopolies such as manufacture of all kinds of 
ammunition, particularly lead and salt petre were 
created. The royal workshops occupied an important 
place in the economy. No single unit in the private 
enterprise was big enough in size which could be 
compared to the Royal Workshop, in equipment and 
organization also, the private enterprise units were a 
poor match to the 'Karkhanas*. The whole medieval 
India was somehow or the other engaged in production 
of consumer goods as well as arms and ammunitions. 
The basis for public enterprises was started 
by two groups before independence. One was British 
government and the other Indian National Congress in 
the colour of Swadeshi Movement. British government 
never thought for the industrial development in India 
as they, in fact, destroyed the industry of the 
country by exporting raw materials like jute, cotton, 
tea and oil seeds etc. to Britain which enabled it to 
7 
capture a place in the world trade. 
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In fact, the first World War blockaded the 
supply and Naval warfare needed by the Britishers and 
they thought for the Indian industrialization. Thus, 
they set up the ammunition and ordinance factories 
which safeguarded their trade routes. In 1916 Indian 
Industrial Commission recommended : ' It is vital, 
therefore, for government to establish those 
industries whose absence exposes us to grave danger in 
o 
times of war' . In the light of these recommendations, 
the British government started ordinance factories and 
took over the management of Indian Railways in 1922. 
Later, second World War made them more expanded. Some 
new industries were started according to the supply of 
their war needs, then the industries for manufacturing 
ferrous and non-ferrous alloys and metals, diesel 
engines, bicycles, sewing machines, machine tools and 
centering tools were set up granting protection to 
some of these. 'Planning and Development' department 
was established in 1945. The industrial policy 
statement by Lord Wavell described that all ordinance 
factories, public utilities, railways and basic 
industries should be nationalized if the private 
capital is not coming forward. The mixed sector 
constituted the industries like shipping, locomotives 
and shipment while aircrafts, tractors, automobiles. 
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iron and steel and electric machinery were included in 
the State Sector. 
The Swadeshi Movement in which Indian National 
Congress drew the experts from different provinces to 
think over 'National Reconstructions and Social 
Planning', agreed that the national problems do not 
have their concrete solution on the provincial basis. 
In 1938 a conference of Provincial Ministers of 
Industries was held to seriously consider the national 
issues like removal of mass povertyi unemployment 
national defence and rapid pace of economic growth. A 
National Planning Committee was also formed under the 
chairmanship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The committee 
came to the conclusion that the abovementioned 
national problems can only be solved through a 
comprehensive scheme of rapid industrialization. The 
committee classified the industries into the following 
three categories : 
(i) Defence, (ii) Key, and (iii) Public Utilities. 
(i) Defence industries should be under public 
sector to maintain secrecy and stop the 
external aggression. 
(ii) Key industries may be either state regulated 
or state-owned. 
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(iii) Public utility industries should fall under 
the category of State Enterprises. 
Individual and group efforts were going on 
preparing plans and schemes for the overall rapid 
development of the country/ while Bombay Plan of 
industrialists contemplated for doubling the per 
capita income over the next fifteen years. Shri M.N. 
Roy prepared a comprehensive plan known as 'Peoples 
Plan/ for rapid agricultural development of the 
country. Apart from these various other schemes and 
plans were also put forward but shortly India achieved 
her independence in 1947 and destiny of the country 
came in the hands of the Indian Government. 
A few industries like departmental underta-
kings were set up before independence. They were under 
public sector as they were important from the defence 
and strategic points of view and could not be given in 
the hands of private people. These industries were : 
(i) Garden Reach Workshop Limited (1934) 
(ii) Mazagon Dock Limited (1934) 
(iii) Moghul Line Limited (1938) 
(iv) Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited (1943) 
(v) National Newsprints and Paper Limited (1947). 
Besides these five nationalized undertakings 
some new units were also set up. The first public 
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sector undertaking which was set up after independence 
in August 1950 is Indian Rare Earths Limited. Its 
function was to recover uranium and thorium contained 
in minerals. The second PSU set up after independence 
was the Indian Telephone Industries Limited. After 
these 14 PSUs were set up during the First Five Year 
Plan. Thereafter, acting upon the Industrial Policy 
Resolution, 1956 which dominated the Indian planning 
process upto the last of 'Eighties' the government set 
up 246 PSUs upto the beginning of the 'Nineties', 
whose working was entrusted to the Bureau of Public 
9 
Enterprises. 
As already mentioned, PSUs originated in the 
U.K. in the 'twenties' and soon spread not only to 
other West European countries and the USSR but also to 
the USA. Basically, these corporations were 
established by the governments of these countries to 
embark upon those activities which were essential but 
simultaneously required huge investments which the 
private sector was not ready to undertake in view of 
low or no rate of return on their investments. The 
mid-twentieth century national movements and the 
consequent grant of independence to a number of Asian, 
African and Latin American countries induced these 
newly independent countries to set up same types of 
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Public Corporations in their countries with some 
modifications. In fact, these PSUs were set up by the 
developing countries as tools of economic growth. 
Thus, nations all over the world regardless of size 
and ideology, have increasingly availed of public 
enterprises as an instrument for social and economic 
development. 
It has already been pointed out that, like 
other colonies, India was also extensively exploited bY 
the Britishers so much so that at the time of 
independence its economy was very weak and trembling. 
Our planners adopted the mid-way between capitalism 
and socialism known as 'Mixed Economy' wherein private 
as well as public sector could coexist and work 
together for the overall industrial development of the 
country. As a matter of fact, exigencies of the time 
were such that there was no other alternative for the 
country except to adopt the 'Mixed Economy'. Thus, the 
following two types of PSUs were set up : 
(a) PSUs under the Central Government, 
(b) PSUs under the State Governments. 
(a) PSUs under the Central Government : 
The PSUs in the Indian economy have registered 
a phenomenal growth since independence. Table No. 2.1 
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TABLE NO. 2.1 
NuBber of PSOs and Investment aade in them during different 
plans 
SI. At the beginning 
No. of Plan 
No.of PSUs added Total investment 
PSUs During the (Rs. in crore) 
Plan. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
First (1.4.51) 
Second (1.4.56) 
Third (1.4.61) 
Fourth (1.4.69) 
Fifth (1.4.74) 
Sixth (1.4.80) 
Seventh (1.4.85) 
Eighth (1.4.92) 
As on 31.3.93 
As on 31.3.94 
As on 31.3.95 
As on 31.3.96 
5 
21 
47 
84 
122 
179 
221 
246 
245 
246 
245 
243 
16 
26 
37 
38 
57 
42 
25 
-1 
0 
-1 
-2 
29 
81 
948 
3897 
6237 
18150 
42673 
135445 
146971 
159307 
173292 
178628 
SOURCE: Public Enterprises Survey 1992-93, 1995-96, Volxime 1, 
Govt, of India, Ministry of Industry, Department of 
Public Enterprises, New Delhi, P. 6. 
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presents data regarding the number of PSUs including 
the departmental undertakings and the money invested 
in them during the plan period while Table No. 2.2 is 
concerned with all non-departmental industrial and 
commercial undertakings of the Central Government set 
up during different plans and their growth. The number 
of PSUs under the Central Government was only five at 
the beginning of First Five Year Plan, i.e. on April 
1, 1951 with a total investment of Rs. 29 crores. 
Growth of investment in PSUs right from the initiation 
of the First Five Year Plan to March 31, 1996 has been 
shown in Chart No.2.1. in fact, the First Five Year 
Plan was a rehabilitation and reconstruction plan' for 
the partition-torn economy of the country. As such, 
pace of industrial progress was very slow. The 
expansion of PSUs started from 1956 Industrial Policy 
Resolution. It is, indeed, this IPR of 1956 which 
assigned the role of 'commanding heights' to the PSUs 
and continued to be considered as the 'economic 
constitution of India' and dominated the economic 
scence of the country atleast upto 1985 when late 
Rajiv Gandhi started the process of liberalization. 
The Second Five Year Plan document claimed that the 
growth of PSUs would accelerate the rate of economic 
growth, speed up industrialization, ensure equitable 
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TABLE NO. 2.2 
Growth Public Sector undertakings during Plan Period 
SI. At the Beginning No. of Rate of Growth % Increase 
No. of Plan PSUs 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
31.03.1990 
31.03.1992 
5 
21 
48 
85 
122 
186 
221 
244 
246 
-
4 Times 
2 Times 
2 Times 
1.5 Times 
1.5 Times 
1.3 Times 
-
-
-
320.00 
128.57 
77.08 
43.53 
52.45 
25.27 
-
-
SOURCE ; Annual Reports on working of Industrial and Commercial 
undertakings of Central Government and Commerce Year 
Book of Public Sector 1984-85, Economic Survey, 
1991-92 and 1992-93. 
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CHART NO. 2 . 1 
GROWTH OF INVESTMENT 
IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
INVESTMENT IN CRORES OF RUPEES 
No. of 
PSUs 
As on 
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SOURCE: P u b l i c En te rp r i ses Survey, Bureau of Pub l i c E n t e r p r i s e s , 
Ministry_of- Indus t ry , Government of I n d i a . New D e l h i , 
1995-96. 
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distribution, remove disparities in income and wealth, 
prevent concentration of economic power in the hands 
of a few, promote balanced regional development and 
provide essential supplies to the consumers. 
As per details given in Table 2.1 during the 
First Five Year Plan (1.4.1951 to 31.03.1956) sixteen 
new PSUs were set up with an investment of Rs. 52 
crores. In fact, Indian Rare Earths Ltd. and Indian 
Telephone Industries Ltd. were established by the 
Central Government after the attainment of 
independence but before launching of the First Five 
Year Plan on April 1, 1951. Fourteen industries were 
either started or taken over during the First Five 
Year Plan period. Some of them included Hindustan 
Cables Ltd., Hindustan Salt Ltd., National Industrial 
Development Corporation Ltd., Bharat Electronics Ltd., 
Hindustan Antibiotics Limited and Hindustan 
Insecticides Limited etc. 
During the Second Five Year Plan period twenty 
six new PSUs were established with an estimated 
investment of Rs. 867 crores. These PSUs included 
Pyrites/ Phosphates and Chemicals Limited, Hindustan 
Organic Chemicals Limited, Hindustan Teleprinters 
Limited, Tungbhadra Steel Products Limited, Shipping 
Corporation of India Limited, National Instruments 
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Limited, thei'Mandya National Paper Mills Limited/ 
Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, Jessop & Co., 
Limited, Rehabi l i ta t ion Indust r ies Corporation 
Limited, Central Warehousing Corporation, the S ta te 
Trading Corporation of India Limited e t c . 
During the Third and Fourth Five Year Plan 
periods thir ty-seven and t h i r t y - e i g h t h PSUs were se t 
up by the Central Government with respec t ive 
investments of Rs. 2949 and Rs. 2340 crores . Some of 
the important PSUs of t he Third Plan were National 
Seeds Corporation Limited, F e r t i l i z e r Corporation of 
India Limited, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
Limited, Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of 
India Limited, Bharat Earth Movers Limited, Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited, Modern Food Industr ies Limited, 
Food Corporation of India Ltd. , Bharat Heavy 
E l e c t r i c a l s Limited, Mining and Allied Machinary 
Corporation Limited, Tr iven i St ructura ls Limited, 
Cement Corporation of India Limited, Sambhar Sa l t 
Limited, Instrumentation Limited, Cochin Ref iner ies 
Limited, Hydro Carbons India Limited, Indian Oil 
Blending Limited, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, 
Madras Refineries Limited, Bridge and Roof Corporation 
( India) Limited, Engineers India Limited, Bharat 
Alumini\im Corporation Limited, Metal Scrap Trade 
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Corporation Limited, Hindustan Steel Works Corporation 
Limited, Handicrafts and Handlooms Exports Corporation 
of India Limited etc. while those set up during the 
Fourth Plan period included State Farms Corporation 
Limited, Cahsew Corporation of India Ltd., Mica 
Trading Corporation of India Ltd., Projects and 
Equipment Corporation Limited, Tea Trading 
Corporation of India Limited, Mishra Dhatu Nigam 
Limited, Bharat Dynamics Limited, Bharat Pumps and 
Compressors Limited, Richardson & Cruddas (1972) Ltd., 
Scooters India Limited, Bharat Wagon and Engineering 
Company Limited, Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited, 
Nagaland Pulp and Paper Company Limited. Bharat 
Opthalmic Glass Limited, Tannery & Footwear 
Corporation of India Limited, Water and Power Consul-
tancy Services (India) Limited, Rural Electrification 
Corporation Limited, I.B.P. Company Limited, Indian 
Petro-chemicals Corporation Limited, Cochin Shipyard 
Limited, Delhi Transport Corporation Ltd., Artificial 
Limps Manufacturing Corporation of India Ltd., Bharat 
Cooking Coal Limited, Bharat Gold Mines Limited, 
Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited, Steel 
Authority of India Limited, Metallurgical and 
Engineering Consultants (India) Limited, Cotton 
Corporation of India Limited, Jute Corporation of 
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India Limited, Air India Charters Limited, Interna-
tional Airports Authority of India Limited, Hotel 
Corporation of India Limited, Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation Ltd., National Insurance 
Company Limited, New India Assurance Company Limited, 
United India Insurance Company Limited etc. 
The Fifth Five Year Plan period witnessed the 
highest number of PSUs (57) set up by the Central 
Government with an estimated investment of Rs. 11913 
crores. These PSUs included. National Fertilizers 
Limited, Smith Stanistreet and Pharmaceuticals 
Limited, Hindustan Fertilizers Corporation Limited, 
Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited, Projects 
and Development India Limited, Punjab Maize Products 
Limited, Rajasthan Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Limited, 
U.P. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Company Limited, Trade 
Fair Authority of India Limited, Telecommunications 
Consultants (India) Limited, Braitliwaites and Company 
Limited, Burn Standard Company Limited, Bharat Brakes 
and Valves Limited, H.M.T. (International) Limited, 
Lagan Jute Machinery Company India, Bharat Leather 
Corporation Limited, National Film Development 
Corporation Limited, National Hydro Electric Power 
Corporation Limited, National Thermal Power Corpora-
tion Limited/ North Eastern Electric Power Corporation 
Limited/ Bongaigaon Refinery and Petro-chemicals 
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Limited, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, Indian 
Railway Construction Company Limited, Rail India 
Technical & Economic Services Limited, Dredging 
Corporation of India Limited, Indian Road Construction 
Corporation Limited, Central Coalfields Limited, 
Central Mini Planning & Design Institute Limited, Coal 
India Limited, Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Western 
Coalfields Limited, Kudremukh Iron Ore Company 
Limited, Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited, Bharat 
Refractories Limited, Manganese Ore (India) Limited, 
IISCO Ujjain Pipe and Foundary Company Limited, 
Sponge Iron India Limited, Central Cottage Industries 
Corporation India Limited, North Eastern Handicrafts 
and Handloom Development Corporation Limited, NTC 
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Mahe) Limited, 
NTC (Delhi, Punjab & Rajasthan) Limited, NTC 
(Maharashtra North) Limited, NTC (Gujarat) Limited, 
NTC (Madhya Pradesh) Limited, NTC (Tamil Nadu and 
Pondicherry) Limited, NTC (Uttar Pradesh) Limited, NTC 
(West Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa) Limited , 
C.M.C. Limited, Electronics Trade and Technology 
Development Corporation Limited, Semi Conductor 
Complex Limited, Central Electronics Limited etc. 
The total number of PSUs set up by the Central 
Government came down to forty-two during the Sixth 
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Plan period with an investment of Rs. 24523 crores. 
These PSUs included. Southern Pesticides Corporation 
Limited, Goa Antibiotics & Pharmaceuticals Limited, 
Karnataka Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Limited, 
Paradeep Phosphates Limited, Bengal Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals Limited, Bengal Immunity Limited, 
Cardamom Trading Corporation of India Limited, 
Educational Consultants (India) Limited, Hindustan 
Vegetable Oils Corporation Limited. North Eastern 
Regional Agricultural Marketing Corporation Limited, 
Hospital Services Consultancy Corporation (India) 
Limited, Bharat Process & Mechanical Engineers Limited 
Weighbird (India) Limited, Maruti Udyog Limited, HMT 
Bearings Limited, National Bicycle Corporation of 
India Limited, Rajasthan Electronics and Instrtiments 
Limited, Cycle Corporation of India Limited, Hindustan 
Newsprinting Limited, Dcunodara Cement and Slag 
Limited, Tyre Corporation of India Limited, Oil India 
Limited, Gas Authority of India Limited, National 
Aluminium Company Limited, Neelanchal Ispat Nigam 
Limited, Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited, Vijaynagar 
Steel Limited, National Jute Manufacturing Corporation 
Limited, Brushware Limited, The British India 
Corporation Limited, The Elgin Mills Company Limited, 
National Handlooms Development Corporation Limited etc. 
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During the Seventh Five Year Plan the 
Government set up twenty-five PSUs with an estimated 
investment of Rs- 92772 crores. The PSUs included/ 
Bharat Bhari Udyog Nigam Limited, Bharat Yantra Nigam 
Limited, Indian Railway Finance Corporation Limited, 
Nuclear Power Corporation Limited, Hindustan Packaging 
Company Limited, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited, Pawan Hans Limited, 
Northern Coal Fields Limited, South Eastern Coal 
Fields Limited, Power Finance Corporation Limited, 
Tamil Nadu Tele-communications Limited, Nathpa Jhakri 
Power Corporation Limited, Tehri Hydro Development 
Corporation Limited, Container Corporation of India 
Limited, Bharat Immunologicals & Biological Corpora-
tion Limited, J&K Mineral Development Corporation 
Limited, Manipur State Drug & Pharmaceuticals Limited, 
Donyi Polo Ashok Hotel Corporation Limited, National 
Power Transmission Corporation Limited, etc. 
It brought the total number of PSUs to 246 and 
total investment in them to Rs. 135445 crores. 
It appears from the above table that no new 
PSUs were set up during the Eighth Plan period though 
investments in the already set up PSUs had to be made 
for renewals, replacement and modernizing them. In 
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In fact the worthwhileness of these PSUs had been 
questioned in view of their poor performance. 
Moreover, some of the PSUs which earned huge profits 
were actually monopoly profits and due to inter 
government departmental transfers rather than their 
actual performance in the real sense of term while the 
aggregate sum of money invested in them amounted to 
Rs. 178628 crores as on March 31, 1996. Again with the 
poor record of performance Indian PSUs had practically 
covered all segments of the Indian economy leaving no 
room for the growth of private sector. Fortunately, 
with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union almost all 
the socialist countries said goodbye to the government 
management and control of these public corporations 
and resorted to the market-oriented mechanism. The 
Government of India also, for the first time after 
independence, announced liberalization measures and 
integration of Indian economy with the world economy 
in July 1991. 
(b) PSUs Under the State Government : 
The table 2.3 presents data regarding the 
State Public Sector Undertakings during plan period, 
the number of Indian State-level public sector 
undertakings (SLPSUs) were only 32 during the first 
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TABLE NO. 2.3 
Growth of SLPSUs during the Five Year Plan Period 
State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Manipur 
Meghalaya 
Mizoram 
Nagaland 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Total 
I 
3 
.-
3 
-
-
-
-
-
2 
7 
3 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
3 
-
1 
1 
-
6 
1 
32 
II 
6 
-
5 
3 
-
-
-
1 
-
5 
4 
-
4 
-
-
-
-
3 
3 
6 
4 
-
6 
3 
53 
III 
6 
-
9 
5 
-
6 
1 
1 
2 
9 
14 
5 
13 
-
-
-
1 
4 
3 
6 
8 
-
10 
6 
109 
IV 
7 
-
9 
13 
-
10 
6 
2 
5 
15 
23 
9 
12 
2 
2 
-
2 
3 
6 
7 
9 
1 
14 
11 
168 
V 
6 
2 
7 
17 
2 
19 
6 
7 
6 
13 
28 
8 
11 
2 
3 
-
1 
11 
6 
8 
10 
3 
11 
18 
205 
VI 
6 
1 
10 
7 
3 
13 
6 
6 
1 
9 
15 
9 
7 
3 
3 
1 
1 
8 
5 
8 
10 
2 
10 
14 
158 
VII 
2 
-
-
2 
2 
-
3 
-
-
-
3 
-
3 
1 
1 
2 
-
1 
2 
-
2 
1 
4 
— 
29 
Total 
36 
3 
43 
47 
7 
48 
22 
17 
16 
58 
90 
32 
51 
8 
9 
3 
5 
33 
25 
36 
44 
7 
61 
53 
784 
SOURCE ; Data Bank of SLPE, Institute of Public Enterprises, 
Hyderabad. 
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Five Year Plan period out of which 7 were in 
Karnataka, 6 in Uttar Pradesh, 3 each in Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Kerala and Orissa, 2 in Jammu & 
Kashmir and one each in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. During the 
Second Plan period total number of SLPSUs was 53 out 
of which six each were in Andhra Pradesh, U.P. and 
Rajasthan, five each in Assam and Karnataka; four each 
in Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, three each in 
Bihar, Orissa, Punjab and West Bengal and one in 
Himachal Pradesh. 
During the Third Plan period the number of 
SLPSUs increased to 109. Out of these, fourteen such 
units were set up by Kerala, thirteen by Maharashtra, 
ten by U.P., nine each by Assam and Karnataka, eighth 
by Tamil Nadu, six each by the States of Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and West Bengal; five each 
by Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, four by Orissa, three by 
Punjab, two by Jammu and Kashmir and one each by the 
States of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Nagaland. 
During the Fourth Five Year Plan period the 
number of SLPSUs set up in different states increased 
to 178. Of these, 23 units were set up by Kerala, 15 
by Karnataka, 14 by Uttar Pradesh, 13 by Bihar, 12 by 
Maharashtra, 11 by West Bengal, 10 by Gujarat, 9 each 
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by Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, 7 by Andhra 
Pradesh, 6 each by Haryana and Punjab, 5 by Jammu and 
Kashmir; 3 by Orissa, 2 each by Himachal Pradesh, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and one by Tripura. 
Likewise, during the Fifth Five Year Plan period the 
number of SLPSUs increased to 205. Of these SLPSUs, 28 
such units were set up by Kerala, 19 by Gujarat, 18 by 
West Bengal, 17 by Bihar, 13 by Karnataka, 11 each by 
Maharashtra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh 10 by Tamil 
Nadu, 8 each by Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, 7 each 
by Assam and Himachal Pradesh, 6 each by Andhra 
Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab, 3 each 
by Meghalaya and Tripura, 2 each by Arunachal Pradesh, 
Goa and Manipur and one by Nagaland. 
During the Sixth Five Year Plan period, the 
total number of SLPSUs came down to 158, the statewise 
distribution is: 15 units in Kerala, 14 in West 
Bengal, 13 in Gujarat, 10 each in Assam, Tamil Nadu 
and Uttar Pradesh; 9 each in Karnataka and Madhya 
Pradesh, 8 each in Orissa and Rajasthan; 7 each in 
Bihar and Maharashtra, 6 each in Andhra Pradesh, 
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh; 5 in Punjab; 3 each in 
Manipur and Meghalaya; 2 in Tripura and one each in 
Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Mizoram and 
Nagaland. During Seventh Five Year Plan period the 
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number of SLPSUs substantially came down to 29. Of 
these, Uttar Pradesh set up 4 such units while 
Haryana/ Karnataka and Maharashtra set up 3 units each 
followed by Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Mizoram, 
Punjab and Tamil Nadu which set up 2 units each. 
Meghalaya and Tripura set up one unit each. 
It will be further seen from Table No. 2.3 
that total number of SLPSUs upto the end of Seventh 
Five Year Plan was 784 with the highest such units 
being located in Kerala followed by Uttar Pradesh, 
Karnataka, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar, 
Tamil Nadu and Assam. 
Table number 2.4 sets out data of the SLPSUs 
by sectors - broadly divided into commercial, 
development and welfare. Of the 754 reporting SLPSUs 
371 were commercial SLPSUs while 290 and 93 belonged 
to development and welfare sectors respectively. 
Having traced the origin and growth of PSUs in 
the U.K. and elsewhere, we have examined their history 
of growth in Indian perspective in the present 
chapter. The IPR of 1956 dominated the Indian 
industrial scene for about four decades and the 
successive Five Year Plans accorded the PSUs 
•commanding heights'. The Indian States, following the 
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TABLE NO. 2.4 
Distribution of State Public Enterprises by Sectors 
State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Janunu & Kashmir 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Manipur 
Meghalaya 
MizOram 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Total 
Commercial 
13 
1 
21 
21 
4 
25 
11 
11 
9 
13 
63 
11 
20 
3 
5 
-
15 
7 
19 
20 
5 
21 
31 
371 
Sector 
Development 
19 
2 
16 
20 
3 
21 
8 
6 
7 
31 
17 
10 
19 
3 
4 
2 
16 
14 
13 
21 
1 
24 
22 
290 
Welfare 
4 
-
6 
6 
-
2 
3 
-
-
5 
10 
11 
12 
2 
— 
1 
2 
4 
4 
3 
1 
16 
— 
93 
Total 
36 
3 
43 
47 
7 
48 
22 
17 
16 
58 
90 
32 
8 
8 
9 
5 
33 
25 
36 
44 
7 
61 
53 
754 
SOURCE : Same as Table No. 2.3. 
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footsteps of the Central Government in this regard, 
spent enormous resources for getting up and running 
the SLPSUs. How far they have contributed to the 
country's industrial development will be examined in 
the following chapter which deals with the performance 
of PSUs. 
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CHAPTER - I I I 
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS 
In t h e f o r e g o i n g c h a p t e r we had r emarked t h a t 
t h e S t a t e s of t h e I n d i a n Union f o l l o w i n g t h e f o o t s t e p s 
of t h e C e n t r a l Government w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
expans ion of P u b l i c S e c t o r U n d e r t a k i n g s , s p e n t 
enormous s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s f o r s e t t i n g up S t a t e Leve l 
P u b l i c S e c t o r U n d e r t a k i n g s f o r c o v e r i n g up a l m o s t 
eve ry a s p e c t of economic a c t i v i t y f . How f a r t h e PSUs i n 
t h e C e n t r a l S e c t o r b e e n a b l e t o a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d 
r e s u l t s forms t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of t h i s c h a p t e r . ' T h e 
pe r fo rmance of t h e PSUs has been examined i n r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e p h y s i c a l t a r g e t s , f i n a n c i a l e v a l u a t i o n and 
t h e i r o v e r a l l a s s e s s m e n t ! Combined a s w e l l a s s e p a r a t e 
pe r fo rmance of M a n u f a c t u r i n g and S e r v i c e Group of 
e n t e r p r i s e s h a s b e e n f u l l y examined a l o n g w i t h t h e t o p 
t e n p r o f i t e a r n i n g and l o s s - m a k i n g e n t e r p r i s e s . 
I The Department of Public Enterprises m o n i t o r s h a l f -
y e a r l y p e r f o r m a n c e of PSUs based on f l a s h r e s u l t s 
r e p o r t e d by t h e m . I t i n fo rms t h e g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t 
t h e i r c o n s o l i d a t e d p e r f o r m a n c e so t h a t e a r l y a c t i o n 
cou ld be t a k e n f o r i m p r o v i n g t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of l o s s 
making PSUs a s w e l l a s o t h e r PSUs w h e r e v e r n e e d e d . S e t 
up i n l a t e 1 9 7 9 , t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s e a r l y w a r n i n g sy s t em 
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of reporting on performance has the twin objectives of 
(a) creating an awareness among the public enterprises 
to establish benchmarks for their own performance 
appraisal and (b) keeping the Government informed well 
in time of the state of affairs in the public 
enterprises so that suitable corrective measures are 
taken when needed. 
The PSUs are required to furnish information 
relating to certain selected indicators of performance 
to the Department at the end of each quarter. These 
indicators include (i) quantitative production data in 
respect of major items (ii) sales value, (iii) capital 
employed (iv) gross profit (v) provision for deprecia-
tion, interest and tax (vi) net profit and (vii) 
inventory levels. These data, when consolidated, 
enable a quick assessment of the performance of the 
public sector undertakings over a certain period. In 
addition they indicate the trend, when compared to the 
position in the corresponding period of the previous 
year, leading to diagnostic studies of the problems 
faced by them and setting in motion remedial steps 
necessary to correct the situation. 
PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE 
The development and growth of PSUs in India 
has been a continuous process right from the 
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initiation of planning in 1951 to the end of the 
Seventh Five Year Plan. Again, the Government of India 
did not strictly follow the IPR of 1956 and tried to 
tighten its grip over the whole economy of the country 
despite the fact that it encountered failures on many 
fronts. Hence, comparable data regarding the physical 
performance of this PSUs are not available in 
continuous basis. Moreover, their performance has been 
changing in accordance with the overall state of the 
nation's economy itself. In certain years the PSUs 
have performed well while in other years they have 
presented a dismal picture. Again, product/item-wise 
pattern of production of these PSUs has also been 
mixed. Figures in respect of production and 
achievement of targets in some major sectors are 
furnished in Table 3.1 from 1982 to 1995 with 
intermittent gaps. 
It will be seen from the above table that for 
the year 1982 the production target fixed for Steel 
Ingots was 3851 thousand tonnes while actual 
production was 3075 thousand tonnes bringing the 
percentage target utilisation to 79.84. In 1986, the 
percentage target utilisation came to 74.6. However, 
in 1988 percentage target utilisation of steel ingot 
considerably improved to 91.5. But again in 1989 the 
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percentage target utilisation came down to 83.00. For 
the remaining three years the percentage target 
utilisation was over 90 with slight variations here 
and there. 
It is also clear from afore-mentioned table 
that the Saleable steel target for the year 1982 was 
fixed at 3052 thousand tonnes whereas actual produc-
tion was 2553 thousand tonnes bringing the variation 
over previous year to -3.36 per cent. In 1986, 
variation over the previous year slightly decreased to 
-2.87 per cent. However, in 1988 the percentage 
variation over previous year was highly impressive, 
that is, 15.98 per cent. But again in 1989, the 
percentage variation over previous year came down to 
-7.4 per cent. For the remaining three years, 
variations over the previous years were positive 
though not uniform. In case of lignite, targets 
achieved were more than 90 per cent for the years 1986 
and 1992. For the rest of the five years targets 
achieved were more than hundred per cent. 
It may also to added here that performance 
with respect to physical production for the industry 
as a whole is quite different from the individual 
manufacturing units in any industry. It is true in 
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many cases that while many individual factories have 
faired quite well the industry as a whole has been 
incurring losses over the years. For example, 
production of ingots and saleable steel (IISCO), 
Blister Copper (Hindustan Copper Ltd.) Raw Material 
(NEC), Generation of Electricity (NTPC), Cryocontai-
ners (IBP Company), Grease (lOBL). Penicillin 
(Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd.), Tablets (Karnataka 
Antibiotics, Maharashtra antibiotics and Indian Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals Ltd.) Vials & Chemicals (IDPL), 
Hydro sets (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.), Equipment 
& Structures (Heavy Engg. Corpn.), Micro Computer 
(Senil Conductor Complex), two-wheelers, three-
wheelers & fans (Scooters India Ltd.) off shore 
(Mazagaon Dock Ltd.), Bailey (Garden Reach) and 
footwears (TAFCO) recorded improvement of over 20 per 
cent as compared to the corresponding period of last 
year. However, short fall in production of over 20 per 
cent was recorded in super alloys and special metal 
(MIDHANI), LPG valves (IPB Co.) Crude thruput 
(Hindustan Petroleum), Nitrogenous fertilizers (FACT & 
NFL), Tablets (Orissa Drugs and Southern Pesticides), 
Capsules (Maharashtra Antibiotics and Karnataka 
Antibiotics), Sera & Vaccine (BIL), Thermal Sets 
(BHEL), Wagons (Burn standard) and Castings (HEC) . 
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As for the production of gold, the target for 
1986 was fixed at 448.0 kgs. whereas actual production 
was 409.7 kgs bringing the target utilisation to 91.5 
per cent. In 1988, the actual production of 454 kgs. 
exceeded the target of 426 kgs bringing the percentage 
utilisation of target to 106.6. In 1989 percentage 
utilisation of target came down to 85.3 but again in 
1991 it considerably improved to 98.8 per cent. 
However, in 1992, the percentage utilisation of target 
declined to 81.2. Figures for actual production as 
well as for targets for 1995 are not available. 
Target for petroleum crude (ONGC) for the year 
1982 was fixed 82320 million metric tonnes whereas 
actual production amounted to 8417 million metric 
tonnes, thus exceeding the target by 97 million metric 
tonnes. This trend of exceeding the targets continued 
upto the year 1988. For the remaining four years, the 
target utilisation has been in the vicinity of 95 per 
cent with slight variations. 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
While commenting on the performance of any 
business organisation financial aspect comes to the 
fore. Though a number of PSUs are not business 
concerns in the strict sense of the term but their 
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financial aspect cannot be ignored. In a mixed economy 
where private sector is also allowed to operate and 
compete with PSUs simultaneously this aspect occupies 
all the more importance Judging against this 
background, financial performance of a large number of 
PSUs has not only been not satisfactory but many of 
them have proved to be an utter failure. Table No. 3.2 
sets out data of Indian Central PSUs regarding their 
financial performance. 
First Five Year Plan Period (1951-1956) : 
It is easy to measure the performance of 
private sector units in terms of net profit for loss 
because in their case, maximization of profit is one 
of the main objectives, if not the sole aim. This 
standard of comparison fails miserably in the case of 
Public Sector Undertakings as they are supposed to 
provide healthy infrastructural facilities necessary 
for the overall economic development of a country and 
maximisation of monetary profit occupies only a 
secondary position. These undertakings were frequently 
started in those areas where profitability was low and 
2 gestation period long. 
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Second Five Year Plan Period (1956-1961) : 
During this plan period, the net profit after 
tax of PSUs amounted to Rs. 8 crores and the rate of 
return or net profit to capital Employed was 3.35 per 
cent. The total number of PSUs set up during the Plan 
period amounted to twenty six while the amount of 
capital sunk in them was of the order of Rs. 239 
crores. The pre-tax gross profit amounted to Rs. 13.2 
crores and the ratio of gross profit to capital 
employed worked out to 5.52 per cent. 
Third Five Year Plan Period (1961-1966) : 
During this plan period, the losses of PSUs 
amounted to Rs. 47.19 crores and the rate of return on 
capital employed was 2.90 per cent. In all, thirty 
seven new PSUs were set up during this period bringing 
the total nximber of central PSUs to 84. The total 
amount of capital employed in these undertakings 
amounted to Rs. 1627.22 crores. The Plan period was 
unusual in the sense that the Indian economy was in 
the grip of recession and shortages. Secondly, 
Indo-Pak war of 1965 plagued the Indian economy for 
many years to come. The planning process itself had to 
be discontinued and consequently three Annual Plans 
had to be taken up. Figures for pre-tax gross and net 
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profits as well as the ratio of gross profit to 
capital employed or net profit to capital employed 
with respect to the PSUs for this period are not 
available. For the first time after the initiation of 
planning in the country, the PSUs suffered losses. 
Annual Plans (1966-1969) : 
During the three-year period of Annual Plans, 
the losses of the PSUs, amounted to Rs. 1027.9 crores 
and the rate of return was -36.63 per cent on capital 
employed. The PSUs continued to incur huge losses 
during the three annual plan period. 
Fourth Five Year Plan Period (1969-1974) : 
During this plan, the PSUs showed continuous 
losses during the first three years of the plan. The 
net rate of return on capital employed was also 
negative. However, last two years of the plan were 
good in the sense that the PSUs showed net profits as 
well as positive rates of net return on the capital 
employed. 
Fifth Five Year Plan Period (1974-1979) : 
During the first three years of the Fifth 
Plan, the PSUs earned profits. They showed profits of 
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Rs. 184 crores, 129 crores and 184 crores during the 
years 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 respectively, while 
during the last two years, that is, 1977-78 and 
1978-79 losses of the order of Rs. 92 crores and Rs.40 
crores were suffered. The rates of return on capital 
employed of these undertakings were 2.8 per cent, 1.5 
per cent, 1.7 per cent -0.8 per cent and -0.3 per cent 
respectively over the same period. During the Annual 
Plan period of 1979-80, the PSUs made losses to the 
tune of Rs. 47 crores and the rate of return on 
capital employed was -0.3 per cent. 
Sixth Five Year Plan Period (1980-1985) : 
During the first four years of this plan 
period, the PSUs showed profits of Rs. 446 crores, 
Rs. 618 crores, Rs. 240 crores and Rs. 909 crores in 
1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 respectively. 
However, during the concluding year of the Plan 
these undertakings incurred losses of Rs. 203 crores. 
The rate of return on capital employed of these 
undertakings came to -1.1, 2.0, 2.3, 0.8 and 2.5 per 
cent respectively over the plan period. 
Seventh Five Year Plan Period (1985-90) : 
During this plan period, the PSUs showed 
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profits of 1^172 crores, Rs. 1,771 crores, Rs. 2,030 
crores, Rs. 2,993 crores and Rs. 3,789 crores in 
1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 
respectively. The rates of return of these PSUs worked 
out to 2.8, 3.4, 3.6, 4.4 and 4.5 per cent 
respectively over the same period. It is to be noted 
here that the rates of returns on capital employed 
showed considerable improvement in comparison to the 
previous plans. 
during 1990-91, the PSU again showed profit 
Rs. 2,368 crores with a rate of return of 2.3 per cent 
on capital employed. The results of the Annual Plan of 
1991-92 were also encouraging and the working PSUs 
showed a profit of Rs. 2,355 crores was Rs. 13 crores 
less in comparison to the previous Annual Plan. The 
rate of return on capital employed was also little 
less than that witnessed in 1990-91. However, during 
1991-92, nine PSUs showed improvement in their 
financial performance over 1990-91. 
Eighth Five Year Plan Period (1992-1997) : 
During the first three years of the Eighth 
Plan, that is, for 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 the 
PSUs earned profits, of Rs. 3,271 crores, Rs. 4,435 
crores, Rs.7,217 crores & Rs.9,878 crores respectively with annual 
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rates of return of 2.3,2.8,4.5 and 5.7 per cent over the 
same period. 
The afore-mentioned review of the financial 
performance of the central PSUs brings to light many 
important issues. Firstly, the overall performance of 
these PSUs has not only been not satisfactory but, in 
same cases, very much disturbing. In a mixed economy 
wherein Private Sector undertakings are also allowed 
to operate and compete with the PSUs their (PSUs') 
performance cannot be evaluate in isolation. A large 
number of them made continuous losses over the plan 
period some them of undoubtedly made profits of a high 
order but, for the most part, their profits have been 
the monopoly profits as no private sector undertakings 
were allowed to compete in their field. 
Another factor for their profits is the inter-
Departmental transfers in addition to the export 
income from a number of developing countries to which 
these PSUs supply goods at much higher rates than the 
domestic prices. Except for these factors applicable 
only to many PSUs, the performance of other PSUs, in 
general, has been very dismal. To add fuel to the 
fire, Indian PSUs did not confine themselves strictly 
to the areas specified for them in the IPR of 1956. 
They entered the field of consumer goods and services 
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and took over a large number of sick units which 
increased their losses. The government of India on 
July 24, 1991 made a clear-cut statement about the 
PSUs but the speed of liberalisation is very slow. 
Table No. 3.3 deals with profit earned/losses 
incurred by all manufacturing and service groups of 
PSUs from 1978-79 to 1995-96. The table gives the 
break up of PSUs into profit earning and loss 
incurring units as also the number of units neither 
making profit nor incurring losses. As will be seen 
from the table the ratio of losses of loss-incurring 
PSUs to the profits of profit making PSUs worked out 
at 73.0 in 1978-79 which declined to 70.4 in 1979-80. 
This situation was worst during the first year of the 
sixth Five Year Plan as the ratio of losses of loss-
making PSUs to profits of profit-making PSUs increase 
to 137.4. During the next two successive years of the 
plan the situation improved. However during 1983-84 
this situation again worsened and the afore-mentioned 
ratio became as high as 86.5. During Seventh Five Year 
Plan Period, the PSUs faired well as the ratio of 
losses of loss-incurring PSUs to the profits of 
profit-making PSUs came down from 58.0 to 34.1. 
The afore-mentioned trend was quite healthy 
and should have been sustained. But unfortunately, a 
( PERFORM AN( 
Year 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
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TABLE NO. 3.3 
:E OF MANUFACTURING S SERVICE GROUP 
Profit 
making 
PSUs(2) 
686 
(88) 
761 
(105) 
557 
(94) 
1293 
(104) 
1596 
(109) 
1778 
(108) 
2021 
(113) 
2856 
(119) 
3478 
(108) 
3776 
(114) 
4917 
(117) 
5751 
(131) 
5393 
(123) 
6079 
(133) 
7384 
(131) 
9722 
(120) 
12070 
(130) 
14704 
(134) 
Loss 
incurring 
PSUs (2) 
- 501 
(69) 
- 536 
(66) 
- 760 
(74) 
- 847 
(83) 
- 983 
(82) 
-1538 
(92) 
-1112 
(92) 
-1657 
(90) 
-1707 
(100) 
-1745 
(103) 
-1923 
(106) 
-1962 
(98) 
-3121 
(111) 
-3723 
(102) 
-4113 
(106) 
-5287 
(117) 
-4883 
(109) 
-4826 
(101) 
No.of PSU 
neither 
Profit 1 
incurring 
(2) 
(0) 
(0) 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
(2) 
(6) 
(3) 
(3) 
(0) 
(0) 
(2) 
OF PSUs) 
(Rs. 
Total 
making 
nor 
loss 
159 
171 
-203 
(168) 
446: 
(188) 
613 
(193) 
240 
(201) 
909 
(207) 
1199 
(211) 
1771 
(214) 
2031 
(220) 
2994 
(226) 
3789 
(229) 
2272 
(234) 
2356 
(237) 
3271 
(237) 
4435 
(237) 
7187 
(239) 
9878 
(240) 
. in crores) 
2 as % of 1 
73.4 
70.4 
136.4 
65.5 
61.6 
86.5 
55.0 
58.0 
49.0 
46.2 
39.1 
34.1 
57.9 
61.2 
55.7 
54.4 
40.0 
32.8 
NOTE: Figures in brackets represent the no.of Public Sector Underta-
kings. 
SOURCE: Table prepared, in the present form, by the author with the 
help of data taken from various of the Public Enterprises 
Survey Vol. 1, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Ministry of 
Industry, Govt.of India,New Delhi and Competition Success 
Review, Annual No. 1988. 
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serious reversal of trend occurred during 1991-92 and 
this ratio again jumped to 61 per cent. With marginal 
improvement in 1992-93, this ratio has again jumped to 
54.4 per cent in 1993-94. This is rather disappointing 
that nearly half of the total number of enterprises 
continue to incurred losses year after year. The need of 
the hour is to make a case-by-case study of these 
enterprises so as to determine the factors responsible 
for the persisting situation so that remedial action 
can be initiated. 
Although the Economic Survey of the Government 
of India has been presenting a rosy picture about the 
performance of public sector enterprises, still two 
observations need to be made. Firstly, a very narrow 
range of profit-making enterprises account for bulk of 
the total net profit. During 1993-94, about 67 per 
cent of the total net profit of profit-making 
enterprises (Rs. 9,722 crores) was contributed by 
Petrolevun Rs. 3,948 crores (40.6%), Power Rs. 1,013 
crores (10.4%), Financial Services. Rs. 546 crores 
(5.6%), Telecommunications, Rs. 520 crores (5.3%) and 
coal Rs. 511 crores (5.3%). Among the principal loss 
incurring enterprises were textiles, consumer goods', 
engineering goods, fertilizers, contract and 
consultancy services. 
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Secondly, the Government is achieving a higher 
profitability ratio by increasing the administered 
prices of goods produced in the public sector, rather 
than reducing costs, improving efficiency and capacity 
utilisation. The manipulation of administered prices 
to cover the inefficiencies of public enterprises is 
an unhealthy trend, more so on account of its other 
social impications, both in terms of imposing burdens 
on the people and providing the bureaucrats an easy 
escape route. The picture becomes very dismal if 
profits after tax are computed as percentage of total 
capital employed. 
During the four years (1977-78, 1980-81), the 
cumulative net loss works out to Rs. 388 crores. The 
situation has been particularly bad in 1980-81 when 
net loss was of the order of Rs. 203 crores. During 
1981-82, the public enterprises have turned the corner 
and even after paying income tax of Rs. 579 crores, 
earned post-tax profit of the order of Rs. 446 crores. 
But the situation again deteriorated in 1983-84 and 
net profit after tax was only Rs. 240 crores i.e. 0.8 
per cent of total capital employed. There was a slight 
improvement in 1985-86, since profit after tax rose to 
2.8 per cent. It further improved to 3.6 per cent of 
capital employed in 1987-88 and 4.5 per cent in 
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1989-90. The situation worsened again and profit after 
tax slumped to a low figure of 2.3 per cent in 1992-93 
and has marginally recovered to 2.8 per cent in 
1993-94.^ 
Table No. 3.4 gives sector-wise break-up of 
the Indian PSUs alongwith profits earned/losses 
sustained by each sector from 1985-86 to 1995-96. It 
will be seen from the table that the four sectors, 
comprising petroleum, power, agro-based and medium and 
light Engineering companies taken together made a 
profit of Rs. 594.4 crores in 1985-86 while the 
remaining 143 undertakings in nine sectors for which 
data are available, such as Service Enterprises, Coal, 
Steel, Chemicals and Fertilizers, Minerals and Metals, 
Textiles, Consximers Goods, Transportation Equipment 
and Heavy Engineering sustained losses of Rs. 608.95 
crores resulting in an overall net losses of Rs. 14.55 
crores during the same year. It terms of percentage 22 
per cent of the undertakings earned profit whereas 78 
per cent undertakings suffered losses. 
Likewise, in 1986-87, 68 out of 170 
undertakings in four sectors comprising petroleum, 
power, service enterprises and Agro based Industries 
earned profit of Rs. 963.3 crores while the remaining 
102 undertakings in nine sectors, viz., coal steel. 
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chemicals & fertilizers, minerals and Metals, 
Textiles, Consumer Goods, Transportation Equipments, 
Heavy Engineering and Medium & Light Engineering 
incurred losses of Rs. 730.34 crores resulting in an 
overall net profit of Rs. 232.96 crores. In terms of 
percentage of undertakings earning profits, as 
compared to the previous year, the situation improved 
a lot as 40 per cent of the undertakings earned profit 
while 60 per cent suffered losses. 
Another fact which emerges from the table is 
that, except for 1985-86, all the PSUs, taken 
together, have earned profits right from 1986-87 to 
1995-96 though the amounts of profits have varied from 
year to year. The highest profit was earned in the 
year 1995-96 which amounted to Rs. 2987.84 crores. 
Further, of around more than 150 reporting PSUs, the 
main profit-making PSUs have been in the sectors of 
petroleum, power, financial Services, Telecommunica-
tion Services and Trading and Marketing, while 
majority of the PSUs have continuously suffered 
losses. I.t may also be pointed out here that the PSUs 
which have constantly earned profits have mostly been 
monopolies of the Government. The Government has 
intermittently been raising the administered prices 
and most of their sales have been inter-government 
departmental transfers. It means that whatever profits 
121 
they have earned is more due to the government's 
raising the administered prices rather than due to 
their efficiency. 
Overall Performance : 
Analysis of financial performance, profitabi-
lity and return on investment of public enterprises 
can be made in several ways. What has been attempted 
in this section is an evaluation of profitability of 
these enterprises by application of the concepts of 
gross margin, gross profit, profit before tax as also 
post-tax position of profits/losses, dividend paid by 
enterprises on share capital, generation of internal 
resources, contribution to the exchequer, export 
4 
earnings and vlaue-added etc. 
During the year 1994-95 the top ten profit 
making PSUs whose pre-tax profits represented 62.28 
per cent of the total pre-tax profits of Rs. 14705.39 
crores earned by 132 enterprises are given in Table 
No. 3.5 below. 
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TABLE NO. 3.5 
TOP TEN PROFIT MAKING PSUs 1994-95 
S.No. Name of the enterprise Pre-Tax %age share 
Profit 
1. Oil and Gas Corporation 1931.07 13.13 
Ltd. 
2. Indian Oil Corporation 1369.84 9.32 
Ltd. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8^ 
9. 
10. 
Steel Authority of India 
Ltd. 
National Thermal Power 
Corporation Ltd. 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam 
Ltd. 
Indian Petro Chemical 
Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. 
Videsh Sanchar .Nigam Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. 
Gas Authority of India 
Ltd. 
Total 
1163.33 
1124.67 
1044.07 
604.44 
575.17 
520.89 
457.85 
367.68 
9159.01 
7.91 
7.65 
7.10 
4.11 
3.91 
3.54 
3.11 
2.50 
62.28 
Total Pre-Tax Profits of Profit-
Making Enterprises 14705.39 100.00 
Source : Public Enterprises Survey, Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, Government of India, Ministry 
of Industry, New Delhi, 1995-96, page 24. 
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Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and 
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. have occupied the first 
and second position respectively. Duriny the year 
1994-95 National Thermal Power Corporation and Mahanagar 
Telephone Nigam Ltd. have declined from 2 to 4 and 4 
to 5 respectively. Steel Authority of India Ltd. has 
improved its position from 5 to 3. Other PSUs which 
earned profit include National Aluminium Company Ltd., 
Oil India Ltd./ Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. and 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. 
The top ten-loss making Public Sector Under-
takings which accounted for roughly 50 per cent of the 
total loss of Rs. 4906.81 crores incurred by 109 PSUs 
during 1994-95 are given in Table No. 3.6 below. 
TABLE NO. 3.6 
TOP TEN LOSS MAKING ENTERPRISES 
S.NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Name of the Enterprises 
Hindustan Fertilizers 
Corporation Ltd. 
Fertilizer Corporation 
of India Ltd. 
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 
Delhi Transport Corpora-
tion 
Nett Loss 
395.79 
378.70 
364.23 
307.04 
%age 
share 
8.07 
7.72 
7.42 
6.26 
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5. Heavy Engineering 
Corporation Ltd. 270.49 5.51 
6. Indian Airlines Ltd. 188.73 3.85 
7. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. 154.63 3.15 
8. Cement Corporation of 
India Ltd. 149.96 3.06 
9. Nuclear Power Corporation 
of India Ltd. 120.82 2.46 
10. Central Coalfields Ltd. 118.96 2.42 
Total 2449.40 49.92 
Total loss by loss making 
enterprises 4906.81 100.00 
Source : Public Enterprises Survey, 1995-96, op.cit. 
pp. 24-25. 
It will be seen from the above table that 
Hindustan Fertilizers Corporation Ltd. has occupied 
the first position by incurring a net loss of Rs. 
395.79 crores. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. 
Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. and Central Coalfields Ltd. 
have worsened their performance as compared to the 
previous year. Other PSUs which suffered losses during 
the year under review include Nagaland Pulp and Paper 
Company Ltd., Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Indian 
Telephone Industries Ltd. and Mandya National Paper 
Mills Ltd. 
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The Public Enterprises are expected to give 
adequate return on investments made in them. Profits, 
as measure of performance evaluation of public sector 
enterprises, can be viewed from different angles. The 
concept of gross margin, which does not take into 
account the element of depreciation (usage cost of 
assets), is generally advocated by economists to 
measure the return of investments to national economy. 
The accountants, on the other hand, lay greater 
emphasis on the gross profit concept which takes note 
of depreciation but overlooks the charge on account of 
interest. The tax collector looks at the profit from 
his own view point as a source of revenue and, hence, 
is more concerned with pre-tax profit. The investors 
are, however, more concerned with the post-tax profits 
that are available to compensate them against the 
capital provided by them. 
Table No. 3.7 sets out a comparative analysis 
of the collective performance of the Manufacturing & 
Service group of enterprises separately for a period 
of twelve years from 1984-85 to 1995-96, measured in 
terms of financial parameters. In absolute 
terms, the gross profits of public enterprises have 
increased from Rs. 6427.81 crores in 1984-85 to 
Rs. 27988.51 crores in 1995-96 recording an increase 
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of 505 per cent over the period under review. This is 
after taking into account the increase in input costs 
and specially, salaries and wages which always tend to 
show an increase. The profit before tax has registered 
an increase of Rs. 11966.12 crores in 1995-96 over 
1984-85 which shows an increase of 570 per cent over 
the period. After taking into account the tax 
provision of Rs. 4186.66 crores, the net profit for 
the year 1995-96 works out to Rs. 9878.07 crores as 
against Rs. 908.90 crores for the year 1984-85 showing 
an increase of Rs. 8969.17 crores or 987 per cent over 
the same period. 
After providing for depreciation, amortisation 
and deferred revenue expenditure written off, the 
gross profit of the Central PSUs as a whole also 
recorded impressive upward movement from Rs. 4627.81 
crores in 1984-85 to Rs. 27988.51 crores in 1995-96 
showing an increase of 504.79 per cent. The gross 
profit, when viewed as percentage of capital employed, 
has also increased from 12.72 in 1984-85 to 16.10 in 
1995-96. In terms of overall net profit after tax, 
from a net profit of Rs. 908.90 crores in 1984-85 the 
public enterprises have recorded as overall net profit 
of Rs. 9878.07 crores in 1995-96. In terms of net 
return on investment, that is, the ratio of net profit 
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to capital employed, there is an increase from 2.49 
per cent in 1984-85 to 5.7 in 1995-96. Further, this 
marginal improvement in profitability has to be viewed 
against the background of multidimensional objectives 
of public enterprises and the divergent constraints 
faced by them. 
In order to be fair and objective it would be 
necessary to take into account the obligations of 
public enterprises which transcends the concepts of 
production and profits. Given that/ the performance of 
public enterprises either at micro or at macro level, 
has to be evaluated keeping in view the contributions 
made by them in discharging their socio-economic 
obligations, development of backward regions, 
provision of public utility services, selling basic 
inputs or products at administered prices etc. There 
is no denying the fact that all this has been possible 
despite several handicaps from which public 
enterprises suffer such as locational disadvantages in 
some cases, very high initial capital investments in 
others, haying to do with technology which was not 
necessarily among the best available, cost of learning 
and development and presence of a large number of 
units taken over from the private sector etc. 
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The table further bifurcates the enterprises 
into profit-earning and loss-making ones. As per 
details given in the table, during 1995-96, the nximber 
of profit-earning enterprise came to 134 while their 
number was only 114 in 1984-85. Likewise, profits 
earned by them increased from Rs. 3209.34 crores in 
1984-85 to Rs. 14704.28 crores in 1995-96, an increase 
of 358.17 per cent over the period under review. On 
the other hand, the losses of loss-making enterprises 
increased, from 92 in 1984-85 to 101 in 1995-96 while 
the losses suffered by them increased from Rs. 1110.73 
in 1984-85 to Rs. 4836.21 in 1995-96 showing on 
increase of 334.50 per cent. 
Table No. 3.8 presents data in respect of 
manufacturing PSUs from 1984-85 to 1995-96. In fact, 
manufacturing PSUs include those undertakings which 
engage themselves.in manufacturing steel. Minerals and 
Metals, Coal and Lignite, Power, Petroleum, Fertili-
zers, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, Heavy Engineering, 
Medium and Light Engineering, Transportation Equipment, 
Consumer Goods, Agro based industries and Textiles. In 
the manufacturing sector except for Petroleum, power, 
minerals and metals, coal and lignite and only a few 
other manufacturing units, others have been resulting 
in constant financial losses to the Government. For 
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example, PSUs engaged in the manufacture of steel. 
Heavy Engineering, Transportation Equipment, Textiles, 
Consumer Goods and Agro-Products, have largely brought 
losses to the Government. It may be seen from the 
table that except for 1990-91, 1992-92 nd 1992-93, 
these PSUs made gains from their operations over the 
previous years. Profits of profit-making enterprises 
increased from Rs. 2785.71 crores in 1984-85 to 
Rs. 11662.62 crores in 1995-96 with growth rate of 
318.66 per cent over the year 1984-85. Besides, losses 
of the loss-making manufacturing units also increased 
from Rs. 888.92 crores in 1984-85 to Rs. 3988.98 
crores in 1995-96. In percentage terms, the losses 
increased by 348.74 over the period under review. 
Table No. 3.9 presents data in respect of 
servicing PSUs from 1984-85 to 1995-96. In fact, 
servicing sector includes those PSUs which engage 
themselves in rendering services such as Trading and 
Marketing Services, transportation services, contract 
and construction services, industrial development and 
Technical consultancy services. Tourist Services, 
Financial Services, Telecommunication Services and 
Section 25 Companies. It may be seen from the table 
that, except for 1984-85 and 1990-91, service group of 
enterprises earned gains from their operations. It is 
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also clear from the figures presented in the table 
that profits of the profit-making concerns increased 
from Rs. 423.66 crores in 1984-85 to Rs. 3041.65 
crores in 1995-96 with rate of growth of 618 per cent 
over the period. Likewise, losses of the loss-making 
servicing enterprises increased from Rs. 221.81 crores 
in 1984-85 to Rs. 837.23 crores in 1995-96 recording a 
growth of 277.45 per cent over the years. The net 
pforit of the service group of enterprises, except for 
the year 1990-91, has been positive over the period 
with slight variations here and there. 
GROUP-WISE PROFITABILITY : 
Table No. 3.10 presents overall picture of net 
profit/loss in different cognate groups for a period 
of five years from 1990-91 to 1994-95. 
As is evident from the table the Manufacturing 
as well as Service Sectors both have improved their 
profits by Rs. 3595.27 and Rs. 1349.99 crores 
respectively over the period of five years from 
1990-91 to 1994-95. 
As is evident from the table the Manufacturing 
as well as Service Sectors both have improved their 
profits by Rs. 3595.27 and Rs. 1349.99 crores 
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respectively over the five year period under review. 
The combined profits of manufacturing and servicing 
PSUs also improved from Rs. 2272.15 crores in 1990-91 
to Rs. 7217.41 crores in 1994-95 bringing a net 
addition of Rs. 4956.26 crores to the net profit over 
the five year period. Individually/ petrole\im, Steel, 
Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals/ Mineral & Metals and 
Telecommunication Services have all improved their 
profits during 1994-95 substantially while the net 
profits of coal and lignite, medium and Light 
Engineering have declined. The largest increase in net 
profit was in Steel (Rs. 836.91 crores) whereas 
largest increase in net loss was in Fertilizers 
industries (Rs. 104.52 crores) over the period under 
review.. 
The Table No. 3.11 gives cognate group-wise 
ratio of gross profits to capital employed from 
1990-91 to 1994-95 to highlight relative profitability, 
i.e./ gross return on investment of each cognate 
group. In fact, gross profit ratio to capital employed 
serves as an invaluable clue to the pricing policy of 
an organisation in addition to serving as a useful 
means of verifying the accuracy of the trading results 
ascertained in respect of each accounting period. 
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The gross profit to capital employed ratios 
show a divergent trend over the period. It means that 
the PSUs have not followed any consistent policy of 
gross margins. Another fact which comes to light from 
the figures is that all those PSUs which had to face 
any competition from the private sector have not only 
not been capable of competing with the private sector 
units but, in fact/ have suffered heavy losses. The 
glaring examples are those of the textile, fertilizers 
and other consumer goods units working under 
government control. It may further pointed out here 
that Gross Profit to Capital Employed ratio is not the 
final indicator of the overall profitability of any 
concern as is evidenced by the figures given in the 
table. Many enterprises which earned substantial gross 
profits have ultimately suffered net losses. 
Again, it may be pointed out that in case of 
PSUs rendering services only those undertakings have 
shown profits which have been working either as 
absolute monopolies like telecom. Section 25 Companies 
and those engaging themselves in trading and marketing 
(by and large inter-government departmental 
transfers). For example, PSUs engaged in contract and 
construction activities and transportation have, for 
most part, sustained losses. Moreover, after the 
140 
implementation of a number of liberalisation measures, 
situation has radically changed even for those PSUs 
which had been earning profit mostly either because 
of their monopoly rights or undue government 
protection. Again, the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 were 
the boom years for the Indian economy as a whole. 
During these two years many of the loss-making 
undertakings have also shown profits. The situation 
for 1995-96 and 1996-97, for which the data are not 
available, will surely be quite different. 
Having examined the performance of the PSUs 
from different angles and having reached the 
conclusion that, except for a few PSUs, their 
performance has not been upto the mark in many 
respects, we now turn to comment on the privatisation 
of Indian PSUs. It must also be admitted here that 
apart from the poor performance of our PSUs another 
important reasons for privatisation and globalisation 
of our economy have been the unprecedented changes in the 
World during the late 'Eighties' and the early 
'Nineties'. The following chapter dwells upon the 
privatisation measures taken by the Government of 
India vis-a-vis changing world economic and political 
scenario. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
PRIVATIZATION OF PSUs - CHANGING INDIAN SCENARIO 
In the previous chapter we have examined the 
performance of the PSUs from different angles. Though 
the Indian PSUs did lay down infrastructure for the 
overall economic development of the country, the cost 
at which it has been laid down comes so high that a 
developing country like India cannot afford it. It is 
against this background that the present chapter 
examine the issue of privatisation of the PSUs. 
The people of Asian/ African and Latin 
American continents started their freedom movements in 
mid-twentieth century. The national movements in 
different countries had been educating the masses 
against the exploitation by the colonial powers as 
well as merits of socialistic pattern of society. The 
same philosophy was put forward by Indian leadership 
before the masses during its freedom struggle. All 
national leaders were ideologically convinced that it 
is only the Russian pattern of development which can 
bring about rapid industrial growth of the country and 
can successfully tackle with all problems of mass 
poverty, unemployment, etc. The leadership was also of 
the view, as in many other countries, that the State 
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alone had the entrepreneurial ability to create such a 
dynamic sector in the core and infrastructural field 
as would boost up development of the whole economy. 
Accumulation of capital was considered to be 
the route for accelerated growth and therefore major 
investments were directed towards capital intensive 
industries like/ heavy industry, oil, mines, 
petroleum, heavy chemicals, and a host of other areas 
through planned programmes. This was legitimized 
through the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 in 
which the Private Sector was kept away from taking part in 
such major industrial activities. 
Successive Five Year Plans saw the investment 
increase from Rs. 29 crores in 5 enterprises in 1951 
to Rs. 712,99 crores in 231 enterprises in 1988. The 
estimated investment as on April 1, 1992 is placed at 
well over Rs. 13,58,710 million in 246 State 
enterprises. This interventionist approach was also 
supported by the international aid agencies in one 
form or the other. Thus, the State intervention was 
not restricted to the creation of new assets in basic 
industrial activities only but it spread, in the form 
of nationalization, towards Financial Institutions, 
General Insurance, Coal Industries, a number of heavy 
& light engineering industries, jute industries and a 
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host of others like, steel, minerals, metals, power 
and petroleum etc. While in most of the basic areas 
the State enjoyed monopoly, in other fields the stake 
of the State was heavy. The IPR of 1956 accorded 
commanding heights to the PSUs and the growth of 
private sector was restricted, with strictest tariff 
measures. The growth of large industrial houses was 
restricted through the operations of MRTP Act 1969 and 
foreign equity participation was restricted to 40 per 
cent. The concept of mixed economy was allowed to 
function under stringent control and in conformity 
with plan objectives. 
To provide large scale employment opportuni-
ties and make large quantities of consumer goods 
available, development of small scale industry was 
encouraged by reserving items for the SSI Sector, by 
providing price advantage and a number of other fiscal 
incentives. The State in this regard confined itself 
to the development of infrastructure only. Thus, the 
overall industrial structure of the country was 
divided between the organized sector consisting of the 
private and public sectors, with dominants of the 
latter, and unorganized small scale industrial sector 
with a large number of terms reserved for it. 
The results of the foregoing planning pattern, 
were / however, not encouraging. In majority of the 
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cases the laid down targets could not be achieved. A 
number of projects could not be implemented on time 
causing significant cost overruns and the lack of 
satisfactory performance of the PSUs in generating 
adequate surpluses to plough back for sustained 
economic development created serious problems. 
The rate of return on investment ranged from 
1.1 per cent in 1981 to 4.4 per cent in 1989 which 
further declined to 2.2 per cent in 1990. Of the total 
of 246 PSUs, more than 100 PSUs suffered losses year 
after year. Of the remaining PSUs which earned profit, 
those in the petroleum sectors performed better. It 
must be mentioned here without fear or favour that 
whatever profits were earned by the PSUs were more due 
to their monopolies and the inter-government depart-
mental transfers rather than to their efficiency. In 
the absence of competition from the private sector the 
PSUs were well-protected from all sides. This 
situation created wide gap between investment needs 
and the resources required that should be arranged 
through revenue collection. 
Under the circumstances. Government had no 
option but to borrow money from internal as well as 
external markets. To reduce such gaps year after year. 
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the sources of soft loan, available earlier, dried up 
and most of the borrowing was available only on 
commercial terms. The intensity of debt burden can 
be imagined from the fact that it has gone up to the 
level of over rupees 202972 crores upto September 1992 
and the internal burden exceeds at about rupees 355800 
crores. It takes more than one-fourth of the GDP to 
service our external debt. The Government of India had 
no option but to tighten its belts on PSUs losses and 
non-essential expenditures simultaneously. Interna-
tional aid agencies have been pressing hard for 
structural adjustment in the economy so that the 
country may be able to serve its external debt without 
much difficulty. 
Whatever happened in India, the same situation 
prevailed, with the difference of degree only, in a 
host of other countries. The failure of the perception 
of planned development gave way to market-oriented 
development policy. The philosophy is gaining ground 
in developed as well as developing countries that the 
economies of the nations should be liberalised from 
Government control, restrictions and regulations, to 
allow market forces to play their role in reshaping 
the economy of a country. The U.K. during the last 
decade, with conservative rulers, successfully 
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privatized a number of its public enterprises. 
Convinced by its success, a number of 
countries from different continents have either 
started implementing privatization scheme as a measure 
of economic recovery or are committed to do so. It may 
also be mentioned here that dismemberment of 
earstwhile USSR has led all its allies to say good bye 
to the Government control of industrial licensing and 
to adopt market orientation of their economies so much 
so that the communist China has also opened the doors 
of its closed economy to the international 
competition. 
The Indian industrial policy, specifically 
with regard to PSUs, had been under heavy attacks from 
the very beginning. Upto the beginning of the 1980s a 
number of industrial policy statements were issued 
but, in fact, all of them contained special features 
of the IPR of 1956. It was only late Mr. Rajeev Gandhi 
who initiated some liberalization measures in 1985 
which marked the beginning of liberalization of Indian 
economy. The end of 'Eighties' and beginning of the 
'Nineties' witnessed the changes of so far reaching 
consequences, which, a few years back, no body could 
have even dream of. Disintegration of the Soviet 
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Union, re-unification of two Germanies and giving up 
of the centralized planning by all the countries which 
were under earstwhile Russian influence giving way to 
the market orientation of their economies are but a 
few examples. 
In India changes of far reaching consequences 
were taking place. On July 24, 1991, the Government 
of India declared New Industrial Policy which opted 
for radical changes from the policy pursued until 
then. The NIP, in fact, scraped control through 
licensing except in some strategic areas like defence, 
production of coal, petroleum, oil, drugs and few 
luxurious items. It diluted the MRTP Act, 1969 to 
enable large industrial houses to invest their 
surpluses and enhance foreign equity participation 
from 40 per cent to 51 per cent, proposed divestiture 
of 20 per cent of public shares in some of the PSUs, 
announced deregulation of a large number industries to 
free them from the shackles of bureaucratic control/ 
dereserved a large number of items so far reserved for 
small scale industrial sector and opened its doors to 
the foreign competitors to encourage competition. 
Considering the protective measures followed in the 
past four decades of development, these measures were 
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really a good step. This invited a lot of criticism 
from different quarters, some of the people calling it 
a complete 'sale out' to the private sector while 
others supported the initiatives whole heartedly. The 
Government of India needs to implement these policy 
measures without loss of time to make the economy 
dynamic and bright. 
Many socialist regimes as an alternative to 
the capitalism driven governments,not .only, survived 
for decades together but some of them met with 
tremendous success largely because of excessive 
regimentation, which suppressed the voice of the 
common masses and killed all sorts of private 
initiatives in political, social and economic spheres. 
A number of developing countries, in many parts of the 
world, firstly under the influence of the earstwhile 
Soviet Union and later on that of China followed 
socialistic policies and took over the existing 
efficient and growing undertakings and setting up the 
new ones, known by different names, such as Public 
Sector Undertakings, State-Owned Enterprises, Public 
Enterprises, Parastatals etc. either as government 
monopolies or under the effective government control. 
All such countries spent huge public funds on the PSUs 
and some of them claimed to be the 'model employer' 
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of huge working force. 
With the passage of time all the PSUs in all 
the countries became inefficient because of over-
staffing etc. Each and every worthy 'Chairman', 
•Managing Director', Officer-on Special Duty, 
Minister' or 'Minister of State' etc. put his 'own 
men' in the PSUs because these undertakings belonged 
to the whole nation or government and nobody was 
responsible except the government for such acts. In 
the process, these countries eacted legislations 
favouring the work force. In the ultimate analysis, 
the governments lost millions and billions of dollars 
in the forms of not getting adequate returns on the 
capital invested, under-utilisation of capacities, 
strikes, manhours lost, low productivity, shrinkage in 
excise duty and tax income to the exchequer etc. 
Besides, the SOEs created structural distortions in 
the economies of a number of countries, leading to 
many crises. 
It may not be out of place to mention here 
that the developed nations of the West like the U.K. 
and the U.S.A. had already experienced economic 
inefficiencies in the working of SOEs in their 
countries. It is because of this reason that U.K. and 
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the U.S.A. proved to be the leaders in privatisation 
though the process had already started in South Korea 
and Chile. Indeed, the process of privatisation has 
been crisis-driven all over the world though the 
reasons behind, objectives to be attained and concern 
of the political parties in different countries have 
not been very much different. 
The main reason for privatisation in the U.K. 
was financial deficits whereas in Japan negative 
economic growth, reduction in tax revenue and 
financial crises were the main reasons. USA wanted to 
solve the problems of economic inefficiencies and 
financial losses Russia, Argentina and Chile had the 
same reasons for privatisation. Malaysia resorted to 
privatisation because of the problems of increasing 
government expenditures, budgetory deficits and 
deteri orating terms of trade. South Korea wanted to 
reduce excessive government control whereas India 
suffered from severe balance of payments and other 
financial deficits before it announced its structural 
reforms programme. While Mexico suffered from severe 
economic lapses and inefficient state organisation, 
Zambia wanted to solve the problems of fiscal deficits 
and slow monetary expansion through privatisation. 
China's reason for resorting to privatisation was its 
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preference of economic modernisation to socialism. 
Thus, the reasons adduced for privatisation by all 
these countries were, summarily, the same, that is 
economic inefficiencies and the matters related 
thereto. 
The objectives of privatisation have been to 
attain optimum efficiency by removing various hurdles 
through competition. In the U.K. the objectives were 
to ensure wide-spread ownership of PSU shares and 
reduce the power of labour unions. In Japan too the 
objectives were to overcome fiscal crunch by improving 
managerial efficiency through competition and get rid 
of the redundant labour force. The USA wanted to break 
the bureaucratic strongholds in order to reduce costs 
and increase efficiency in resource utilisation while 
China wanted to revitalise the SOEs in order to 
improve motivation and productivity through privatisa-
tion. Russia's main aim in privatisation was to 
transform non-competitive and inefficient monopolies 
into market-oriented enterprises. Argentina's main 
objective was to end state corporate huge many and 
reduce foreign debt while Chile and Mexico wanted to 
increase efficiency and productivity for maximising 
the revenue resources. Similarly, Malaysia wanted to 
reduce financial and administrative burden of the 
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government by promoting competition through improved 
efficiency and productivity while South Korea desired 
more equitable income distribution to benefit low 
income groups. India wanted to solve its BOP 
difficulties by getting rid of the incompetent and 
inefficient PSUs through improving productivity and 
managerial autonomy. It this way, the aim of most of 
the countries in privatising the SOEs was achievement 
of maximum economic efficiency through competition. 
As mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, a 
number of countries which resorted to privatisation 
were, indeed, compelled to do so and their 
governments, under the circumstances obtaining in 
their countries, thought privatisation as the only 
appropriate way out. The main concern of the policy 
makers in the U.K. was to tackle the opposition of 
trade unions and the cost of restructuring the economy 
while in Japan redundant massive workforce and 
confrontational labour-management relations were the 
main concerns for the success of privatisation. Russia 
was concerned with strong opposition of the political 
parties as well as the problems of SOEs valuation 
while in the USA policy makers were concerned with 
greater competition with more private participation in 
delivering public services. Likewise, Mexico had to 
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face strong opposition from trade unions whereas Chile 
faced the problem of transparency in divestitures and 
in Argentina policy makers were busy in tackling the 
labour, economic, institutional and legal problems. 
Peoples' perception of their ownership rights in South 
Korea, inadequate incentives and structural 
deficiencies in Zambia, equity and employment issues 
in Malaysia and trade unions with political support, 
unwidely size of many PSUs and widespread industrial 
sickness in India have been the main concerns of the 
policy makers. 
Just as the main concerns of policy makers, 
their objectives and the reasons behind privatisation 
have differed from country to country, the modes of 
privatisation have also varied from country to 
country. Majority of the countries have preferred 
public offering of PSU shares. Argentina preferred 
private sale and joint ventures, Zambia opted for 
management contracts while India took up partial 
disinvestment of the PSUs. In a few cases like Air 
India and Indian Airlines, India has appointed 
executive officers from the private sector. The 
following chart No. 4.1 gives a synoptic view of 
privatisation in different countries of the world. 
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It will be clear from the chart that leaders 
of different countries, at different times have taken 
resort to different forms of privatisation of the SOEs 
in their countries in accordance with the 
circumstances prevailing in their countries, one 
factor which has been common with respect to the PSUs 
in all the countries, irrespective of the philosophy 
of development followed by them, is that they, except 
for some initial years, started breeding 
inefficiencies. Labour-friendly legislations, over-
staffing, under utilisation of installed capacities, 
strikes resulting in millions of manhours lost 
involvement of political parties etc. made things so 
complicated that almost all the SOEs, except for a few 
for reasons explained elsewhere, become white 
elephants for their respective governments. The 
governments, in the ultimate analysis, were left with 
no choice except to put them into private hands. 
The process of privatisation has already set 
in though its speed in some of the countries is vi?ery 
slow. In India, though the government initiated 
structural reforms five years ago, there is hardly any 
change in bureaucratic attitude. The need of the hour 
is bring about a sea-change not only in our policy 
measures but in the attitude of all those who are at 
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the helrn of affairs if the process of privatisation is 
to yield results for the benefit of the common men. 
After out-lining the world-wide trends in 
privatization that have taken place in the past decade 
and economic and political benefits emanating 
therefrom, let us analyse the concept of privatization 
itself. 
Although privatization seems to have been 
gaining world-wide recognition as many countries of 
the world have implemented rigorous reform programmes 
of liberalization, delicensing and privatization of 
PSUs, no uniform definition of the world 'privatiza-
tion' appears to exist.* The term has been so widely 
and variedly used that it conveys different meanings 
from case to case and country to country. It is to be 
understood not merely in the structural sense of who 
owns an enterprise but, in the substantive sense of 
how far the operations of an enterprise are brought 
2 
within the description of market forces. 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, 
approach privatization from three different angles. 
According to them privatization, firstly, refers to 
a change of ownership of an asset or part of it from 
public sector to private entrepreneur through the 
* List of Developing Countries Implementing Privatiza-
tion Programme is given in Annexure III. 
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process of denationalization or divestiture. Secondly, 
privatization can be brought in by allowing the 
private sector to enter into the areas until now 
protected for the public sector and thirdly, privati-
zation can be introduced by way of contracting out the 
services and utilities while retaining the ownership 
3 4 
with the Governments. Vuylesteke has identified the 
following means as links to the broad concept of 
privatization: 
(a) Introduction of competitive features into 
public sector. 
(b) By bringing in economic policy reforms like 
demonopolising certain activities or products 
or liberalizing or removing regulatory hurdles 
on business. These may also be brought about 
in combination with divestiture. 
(c) Increased use of private sector financing of 
new activities such as contractor equity 
financing or switch in source of financing for 
the supply of goods or services from taxation 
to user charge. 
(d) Privatization by "Attrition" where the public 
sector operates as a qua si-monopoly but not 
allowed to review investment and the private 
sector is gradually permitted investment 
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ultimately taking over the whole or part of 
the unit. 
(e) Contracting out in which the private sector is 
substituted for public sector in the area of 
services and utilities like water supply, 
sewage treatment, refuse disposal, building, 
maintenance etc. In this system the 
contractors follow the government procedures 
and maintain the plants and equipments at 
their costs. 
(f) Complete liquidation of public sector with 
assets sold to the private entrepreneurs. 
In fact, privatization consists of all those 
steps taken by a government which are directed towards 
(i) helping and encouraging private sector to 
undertake more economic activities and become 
efficient and competitive and (ii) effecting transfer, 
partially or full, of public enterprises to private 
sector with a view to achieving efficiency, 
productivity, profitability and simultaneously to 
ensure fair awareness towards social obligations. 
Mansour , while recognizing the fact that the privati-
zation is commonly viewed as a process by which public 
sector, assets are transferred to the private sector, 
has further added that there are fewer direct ways of 
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changing public sector to private sector by infusing 
competition through the process of liberalization of 
protected market and by encouraging private provision 
of public financed goods and services. 
7 
E.S. Savas says , 'privatization has already 
acquired a broader meaning, it has come to symbolize a 
new way of looking at society's needs, and a 
rethinking of the role of government in fulfilling 
them. 
According to S.R. Mohnot , 'Privatization is 
induction of management control, via transfer of 
ownership or otherwise, often both, in public owned or 
managed enterprises. It has also been remarked that 
Privatization is a process in which the intervention 
of the state gradually declines in the economic 
activities of a nation by shifting state ownership and 
Q 
r egu l a t i on of means of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Commander and Kil ick , in t h i s context , have 
r e l a t e d the current emphasis on p r iva t i za t ion as a 
p a r t of a more general r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the use of 
t h e p r i ces and markets as a mechanism for the a l l o c a -
t i o n of resources . According t o them i t i s the outcome 
of an i n t e l l e c t u a l d is i l lus ionment with more Keynesian 
and more i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t approach to economic 
management. 
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The connotation of privatization is broad in 
terms of both government ownership and government 
regulation. Privatization implies measures that 
eliminate certain or all elements of publicness in an 
^ . . 11 
enterprise or xn an economy. 
12 Venugopal Reddy, explains Privatization as: 
Starting from the usage (since practice seems to have 
preceded theory), in the broadest sense, the word is 
used to describe any roll-back of state (or 
government) in the lives and activities of citizens, 
any activity strengthening the role of markets. 
Privatization is, in fact, a recent 
phenomenon. The very word "Privatization" causes a lot 
of misunderstanding, premature polarization and 
arguments that are beside the point. Some believe that 
privatization is an attempt to restore completely free 
market. Others interpret the word as a check on the 
government or rolling back its activities. Generally 
speaking privatization refers to the transfer of 
activities from the public sector to the private 
sector. It can take a variety of forms. It can mean 
the sale of wholly-owned government enterprises either 
fully or in part. Privatization can also be a 
partnership between the government and business 
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through the transfer of responsibilities from the 
13 government to private sector. 
Public enterprises in India, as they exist 
today, owe their base and growth much to the 
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956. The 
Resolution of 1956 considered the public sector as a 
means to realize the socialistic pattern of society. 
It was stated in the Resolution that 'the adoption of 
socialistic pattern of society as the national 
objective as well as the need for planned and rapid 
development required that all industries of basic and 
strategic importance or in the nature of public 
utility services should be in the public sector.' 
The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) emphasized 
the need for rapid expansion of economic and social 
responsibilities of the State. The Second Five Year 
Plan (1956-61) did not want the public sector to be 
confined only to areas where the private sector was 
either unwilling or unable to go but to play a 
dominant role in shaping the entire pattern of 
investments. 
Over the years, there have been much adverse 
comments on the functioning of public sector enterpri-
ses and it has been asserted that their performance is 
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not satisfactory as they have not fulfilled the 
desired financial objectives. A certain dilution of 
public enterprises is also advocated in the context of 
securing overall efficiency and to meet the critical 
gaps. Hence, the idea of privatization has come to be 
very much convassed. 
As the loss-making pubic enterprises do not 
have any place in the economy, a panel of economists 
realized that the loss-making public enterprises 
should not be a burden on the Government's finance. 
Such enterprises should either be; sold out, closed 
dovm or transferred to private entrepreneurs. 
Privatization not only implies some kind and 
degree of demarketization but the measures that 
eliminate certain or all elements of publicness in an 
enterprise or in an economy. Hence, privatization may 
broadly be discussed in relation to : 
(a) Privatization at Macro Level : 
There are three stages of privatization at 
economy level : 
(i) No expansion of public sector, or 
(ii) Expansion of public sector at a lower rate, or 
(iii) Reduction of public sector so that private 
sector expands. 
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The stage of no expansion or expansion at a 
lower rate alongwith the stage of reduction in the 
public sector is high in U.K. while in India and other 
developing countries the second stage, i.e., expansion 
of public sector at a lower rate is adopted. The 
enterprises which have become mature and require no 
more government assistance may be privatized. At the 
same time, provisions of some essential goods and 
services may have to be taken up in the public sector. 
Privatization of the economy may be through reduction 
of investments in certain non-financial enterprises 
such as transport, trading, manufacturing etc., while 
increasing public investments in financial enterprises. 
The financial enterprises so created, may supply more 
capital to private investors. Besides, the increased 
investments in public financial enterprises may favour 
the attainment of social objectives such as evolution 
of small-scale industries, development of centrally 
notified backward areas, etc. 
(b) Privatization at Micro Level : 
There may be three specific measures for the 
privatization at micro-level, i.e., ownership, organi-
zational and operational measures as depicted in Chap-
ter No. 4.2. 
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(i) Ownership Measures : This mainly refers to 
denationalization of public enterprises which may be 
legal or partial. Legal denationalization means 
transfer of majority ownership rights and benefits 
alongwith management to private enterprises. Partial 
denationalization implies transfer of ownership upto 
49 per cent to the private entrepreneurs so that state 
holds majority ownership. 
(ii) Organizational Measures; One of the organiza-
tional services for the privatization is the creation 
of a holding company, which will be under direct 
government control with subsidiaries working under 
market discipline within the general supervision of 
the holding company. Another organizational device for 
privatization is leasing the assets of a public 
enterprise, without disturbing ownership structure, to 
the best bidder and the ownership of the public 
enterprise is retained by the State and only the 
operations are given to the private parties. The lease 
agreement may consist of necessary terms and 
conditions guaranteeing to preserve publicness in the 
operations. This device of privatization ensure the 
government to assess the comparative benefits that the 
enterprise has in the public and private sectors. 
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(iii) Operational Measures : The elements of priva-
tization can be introduced by encouraging the public 
enterprise management to acquire certain inputs 
across the market than produce them internally. This 
may yield two benefits. The input costs are likely to 
be low reflecting economies of scale of their supply. 
Secondly, it may promote ancillaries outside the 
enterprise. Another operational measures, suggested 
for privatization, in 'contracting out' certain 
ancillary services such as canteen, maintenance and 
cleaning of buildings, maintenance of parks, watch and 
ward, etc., to private parties. 
Another operational measure bringing in 
elements of privatization is to force a public 
enterprise as if it were a private enterprise in the 
sense of being bound by market discipline in 
investments, cost minimisation, pricing and production 
functions. The criteria for these aspects can be laid 
14 down under market discipline. 
TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION : 
It will not be proper to abruptly state that 
all public enterprises have absolutely failed to 
achieve their designated objectives and thus recommend 
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their elimination at a stretch by privatising them. It 
has been rightly observed that on account of Peculiar 
socio-political and economic environment and social 
systems, some of the public enterprises are indispen-
sible. Similarly, some of the public enterprises have 
produced better and impressive results, even in 
comparison to the one, if their task was assigned to 
and performed by private entrepreneurs or 
institutions. Therefore, it will not be an exaggera-
tion to state that for different environmental sets of 
the social system and for different types of public 
enterprises, different techniques will have to be used 
for privatising the public enterprises. 
E.S. Savas has undertaken extensive systematic 
study on the privatization issue. He has recommended 
the following four techniques for privatization of 
the public enterprises as follows : 
1. Load Shedding or Transfer By Default : 
When this technique is applied an attempt is 
made to identify existence of the following 
conditions: 
(a) that public enterprises (PEs) have failed to 
offer adequate and satisfactory services. 
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(b) that service rendered by PEs have failed to 
achieve reasonable expectation and have been 
very costly, and 
(c) that the private sector is capable of 
rendering better services on comparatively 
lower cost. 
The privatizationists propound that when above 
mentioned conditions exist in a social system, the 
private sector must step into, fill the void and 
satisfy needs of the people. These conditions are 
prone to the application of (Load Shedding Technique). 
An attempt is made to classify PEs according to their 
profitability and the process of privatization begins. 
It ends, where public enterprises in the identified 
industrial sectors are completely withdrawn. 
2. Limited Government Arrangement : 
This technique is applied when application of 
the Load-shedding Technique is not possible. It 
promotes an arrangement in which government plays a 
limited role in economic activities. That is, 
institutional arrangements should be chosen so that 
the government is involved in only a minimal way. 
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3. User Charges : 
It recommends for designing and implementing 
an arrangement in which user charges are levied on all 
providers of services including private as well as 
government controlled agencies. The user charge should 
be equal to full cost of service. Thus, it attempts to 
reflect true cost of service and offers an opportunity 
to the users to make comparison between the cost and 
quality of services provided by private and public 
enterprises. It may encourage users to patronize 
private institutions and facilitate the movement of 
privatizing of the public enterprises. 
4. Competition : 
It creates a situation of keen competition 
between private and PEs. It is believed that 
competition is the key to achieving better and cost-
effective service. A monopolistic arrangement/ whether 
governmental or private, is an invitation to poor 
performance. 
Vuylsteke has categorized privatization into 
17 the following techniques: 
(1) Public offering of shares 
(2) Private sale of shares 
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(3) New private investment in a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE). 
(4) Sale of Government or State Enterprises' 
assets. 
(5) Reorganization or fragmentation into small-
units. 
(6) Management/Employment buy out. 
(7) Lease and management contract. 
(1) Public Offering of Shares : 
In this method/ all or part of the shares of 
the public limited company are offered for sale to the 
public as a running concern. The government may decide 
to sell from the present holdings or may issue new 
public shares (primary) that will lead to increase in 
private shares into the capital of the enterprise. 
Primary issue that will lead to rise in private shares 
is with consequent dilution of the Government interest 
and control. If partial sales take place from present 
holding, the effect is conversion into a joint sector 
enterprise between the government and private share 
holders. This method has been pursued deliberately by 
most of the governments to ensure their presence into 
the company as a first step towards complete privati-
zation. A partially privatized company may go for 
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further privatization depending upon the performance 
of the company and Government's policy objectives. In 
the U.K., most of the privatizations are following 
this route. Companies, such as British Telecom, 
British Gas Electricity Generation have been 
approaching from partial privatization towards 
complete privatization. 
Offerings may be underwritten, as in U.K., 
18 France and Malaysia. Most of the developing 
countries do not have underwriting capacity due to 
weak market and the foreign offerings cannot be under-
written. In such a case, the Government itself takes 
the risk as is true for National Commercial bank in 
19 Jamaica. While implementing the decisions to go 
public, many sensitive issues may arise in the 
developing countries, and will necessarily need 
attention. The offerings for a PE with sound track 
records, which is the case in respect of a number of 
the public sector units in developing countries, the 
offerings are not only not easy but may even not be 
feasible also. In such cases the units will require a 
restructuring and turn around in operation before it 
can go to public. While no prescribed format exists 
20 for such restructuring, Vuylsteke has listed the 
following common steps necessary as 'readying' process 
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for private offering of shares : 
(i) Enterprise Diagnosis : This will consist of 
enterprise debt: equity position, capital structure 
and past financial performance. It may be necessary to 
review the financial statements and prepare new ones 
with sound financial accounting. The diagnosis will 
also require to examine the past operational results 
and present and indeed future market potential, conce-
ssions granted to the enterprise and their impact on 
the results. The physical conditions of the assets 
will also need to be professionally examined and needs 
for further investment estimated. 
(ii) Satisfaction of Legal Requirements : Before a 
public enterprise can go direct to public, it is 
necessary to find out the creditors claims. Claims 
will include shareholders (if any), employees and 
other sundry creditors' loans that routinely debar the 
sale or disposal of assets or control under a certain 
percentage without creditors' consent. Also the issues 
relating to the guarantees provided by the Government 
for borrowing by public enterprises, it has to be 
decided on the fate of such guarantee when the unit is 
privatized. 
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(iii) Conversion of Legal Form : Most of the public 
enterprises will require a legal conversion from its 
present form before it can be privatized. A joint 
Government/Private Sector is an exception where the 
residual share holding or a part of it may be sold to 
the Government. In other cases the legal transforma-
tion may involve either a simple amendment to the 
Articles of Association or dissolution of an 
enterprise and transfer of its assets and liabilities 
to a new corporate entity. Many specific legal steps 
may need to be taken to convert a company to a joint 
stock corporation or public limited company under 
company laws before it can be offered to public or 
private purchasers. 
(iv) Modification of Overall Legal Framework ; 
Occasion may arise when conversion of legal structure 
needs to be accompanied by ancillary legal changes. 
There may be a revision of special privileges such as 
termination of monopolies/ establishment of a 
licensing system, introduction of a revised regulatory 
system for utilities and so on. The purchasers may 
seek various commitments from the Governments so that 
they can operate the enterprise satisfactorily. 
Similarly, the Government may seek commitments from 
the purchaser to ensure future financial and economic 
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behaviour of a company it sells. Typical commitments 
sought by the purchasers include freedom of transfer 
of capital and distributed income/ the assurance that 
the investor can wind up the company and freedom from 
21 price control. When Togo , for instance/ signed an 
agreement with the Pan Africa Textile Corporation/ the 
convention d'Establishment signed a part of the 
privatization arrangement that provided, among others, 
for stability of legal regime, free transfer of 
capital and earnings, customs, tax and financial 
guarantees and assurance that the Government would not 
establish or encourage the establishment of another 
textile enterprise with the same line of products. 
However, this last clause itself can be a 
source of controversy about the real intention of the 
Government to infuse competition or unduly protect the 
purchaser. It is, therefore, necessary that in 
reviewing ancillary arrangements, extreme care should 
be taken to evaluate the long term cost-benefit 
analysis versus immediate return on completion of a 
transaction. Sometimes dissolution and liquidation may 
be a preferred choice than selling it with excessive 
concession although the former will cause immediate 
problem of unemployment. 
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(v) Financial Restructuring : To enable the SOE to 
be sold, it is necessary to have balance sheet 
restructuring and take other ancillary financial 
measures. The degree of necessary changes varies from 
unit to unit depending largely upon the manner in 
which it was operated. Important measures include 
writing down of assets, reduction in liabilities, 
recapitalization and spinning off of assets. It may, 
at times, be very difficult to justify the extent of 
restructuring, particularly for non-profitable 
enterprises. Also the restructuring, in itself, is not 
an assurance of it becoming a going concern or making 
it profitable but may only establish the necessary 
condition for the profitable operations. 
For excessive debt by the public enterprises, 
it becomes difficult to sell them without sorting out 
the issues relating to liabilities and working out its 
net worth. In many such cases the Government takes the 
responsibility of the debt either by writing it off in 
part or full or by transferring the same to the 
purchasers in which case the sale price will be 
22 
reduced to bare minimum. The U.K. Government has, as 
an original borrower, written off substantial debts of 
many SOEs converting them into equity to improve upon 
the balance sheet before going for sale. Other debts 
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were negotiated. Injection of new capital by new 
entity, offering of new primary shares with sales or 
by way of converting the assets of the enterprise as 
its equity and allowing private sector to participate 
with fresh equity, usually in the ratio of 49:51, may 
be resorted to. 
(vi) Physical Rehabilitation : An assessment of 
physical assets and need for rehabilitation is 
important for making the privatization offer 
attractive. Run down plants and equipments may need 
replacements and renewals, excess property could be 
disposed off and so on. Controversy arises whether 
rehabilitation should be done before privatization or 
not. It is concurable that prior rehabilitation would 
improve the conditions for privatization, but may not 
necessarily recover the cost of rehabilitation and 
would, therefore, be a subject of political criticism. 
In my opinion, any physical rehabilitation may be left 
to the purchasers since their technological perception 
may be different from that of the existing management. 
However, it would be necessary to make a detailed 
examination and clear picture of the situation must be 
known without any ambiguity at all. 
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(vii) Change with Respect to Staffing : This is one 
of the most important issues for privatization of SOEs 
in developing countries in particular. Privatization 
is invariably related to labour rationalisation and 
hence large scale redundancy. It will be more so in 
developing countries where almost all the public units 
are over manned. Also, most of the units will need 
upgradating of plants and equipments that has to be 
linked with labour rationalisation. At the same time, 
labour laws are quite rigid and it will be difficult 
to attract a potential buyer if agreement on this 
issue cannot be arrived at before sale. 
Over staffing is generally a problem in most 
of the State Sector units in India. Even when 
substantial investments are made for modernization and 
upgradation of technology, rationalization of work 
force becomes difficult. This hikes the cost of 
production making the unit uncompetitive. Unless an 
acceptable solution to this problem is worked out, any 
move towards privatization can be in serious jeopardy. 
It is, however, true that all the public sector units 
may not pose the problem of surplus workforce and the 
long term effect of privatization may be the prospect 
of creation of more job opportunities. One may need to 
feel the immediate problem adequately in order to 
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make privatization a success. Japanese Railways had to 
layoff 92,000 employees, constituting one third of its 
workforce, after privatization while Jaguar in Britain 
23 
created 2,000 jobs after it was privatised. 
(viii) Management Co-operation : To make the privati-
zation initiatives successful, it is absolutely 
necessary to secure management cooperation. After 
all, it is the management which has to carry out the 
decision. However, not all existing managements share 
the concept and any half-hearted effort is bound to 
result in a failure. It may, therefore, be useful to 
bring in a change in the management structure 
replacing existing board of directors by those 
favourable to the idea before the move is made. The 
top management of a dozen of about 25 enterprises were 
replaced before moving them into privatization in 
2. Private Sale of Shares : 
In this method all or part of the shares of 
SOEs are sold to a pre-qualified private individual or 
a group of purchasers. This may be acquisition by a 
private corporate sector. The private individual is 
included the institutional investors inclusive of 
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mutual funds or banks. The sale of government's shares 
in an SOE normally involves a wide search for 
potential bidders in two ways/ viz. competitive 
bidding and direct negotiation. In pre-qualifying the 
potential purchasers, the Government must look into 
the financial/ technical and managerial strength of 
the candidates and their track record of performance. 
In case of joint sector, the Government may simply 
decide to sell the shares to the private entrepreneurs. 
The SOE may be in need of readying activities such as 
restructuring balance sheet, alleviation of 
liabilities. Therefore, certain important steps the 
Government must take before going to market offer of 
shares.Since the process offers a lot of discretionary 
power, it is necessary to follow a well set out 
procedure regarding pre-qualification of bidders to 
avoid future criticism. In fact, this procedure may 
raise some problems such as restructuring employment 
before private sales, particularly in loss incurring 
enterprises, where job loss is inevitable on sale. 
Also, criticism may have to be faced on pricing 
aspects and in selection of private purchasers. Strict 
compulsory procedures should be able to resist such 
criticism to a large extent. 
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3, New Private Investment in a State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) : 
Under this category of privatization, primary 
share issues are subscribed by the private sector or 
public. Here the transaction consists basically of the 
sale of assets, rather than shares in a going 
concern. The Government may go to the public for 
selling new shares and gradually such offering can go 
on rising untill the private holding becomes large 
enough to hold control over the board. Thus, the 
assets may be sold individually or be sold together as 
new ones to withdraw from it. The sale of assets are 
based on competitive bidding or done by auction. It 
can also be concluded after direct negotiation with a 
pre-identified party. In the latter case, it will 
often be preceded by a complex investor search. Again 
a week public sector unit may need balance sheet 
restructuring to make it attractive enough to private 
investors and details regarding potential job losses 
will need to be carried out. 
4. Sale of Government Enterprises Assets : 
Here the assets of the public sectors are sold 
as private sdale instead of shares. It is of two 
types: One, in which an enterprise may like to sell 
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part of its excess such as extra land or a holiday 
home to raise necessary funds, and the other in which 
the company needs to sell its entire assets to recover 
the investment to the extent feasible. 
There are various ways to proceed that will 
depend on the legal form of the enterprise. In 
addition to the sale of assets, other option are as 
follows : 
(i) Break up into several legal entities. 
(ii) The SOE is transferred to a holding company 
which acquires the shares of subsidiary 
companies as well as their assets and 
liabilities, 
(iii) Separation of some activities, the Government 
retaining others (e.g., non-ccxtiraercial 
activities). Such operation often amounts to 
the simple sale of the assets, 
(iv) • Productive facilities are not sold as a whole 
but in single or groups of units. 
There are some problems that arise for 
settling the issues relating to jobs. In case the 
purchaser continues the operation, an agreement could 
be made to retain as many employees as possible. Here 
again pricing will be a sensitive issue that needs 
careful handling. 
184 
5. Reorganization into Component Parts : 
Under this method of privatization, the public 
sector unit is divided into several components or 
separate entities before the sale. A corporation may 
also be divided into many subsidiaries and a holding 
company and sold out individually. There may also be a 
case where such a holding company with a number of its 
subsidiaries already existing like the National 
Textile Corporation in India managing 124 textile 
units through nine subsidiaries and a holding company. 
Also British Rail gradually disposed of most of these 
subsidiaries and used the proceeds in improving the 
railway services. The other advantage of this system 
is to reduce monopoly of public enterprise by fragmen-
ting it into many entities and subjecting them all to 
competition. The Central Electricity Generation has, 
in 1990/ fragmented into 12 regional companies and 
privatized through public share offer in which the 
issue was over subscribed 10 times and since the call 
for the first instalment of £ 1 of the price of £ 2.70 
per share, prices are ruling significantly higher in 
the market. 
This type of privatization is done by a 
capital increase of the SoE. It may also be done by a 
merger procedure. In such cases the SoE is transformed 
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into mixed economy. This new share issues of the SoE 
may be made through private subscription or public 
offer of subscription. In either case the normal 
procedures for corporate capital increases and new 
share issue subscription payment apply. In many cases 
different classes of share are issued according to the 
objectives of the parties involved. For example, the 
offering of preference shares wil attract more private 
investment. 
6. Managonent/Employee Buyout : 
It is a notable method of privatization tried 
in a few countries for a handful of enterprises. It 
essentially involves either the management or 
employees or both acquiring controlling shares of the 
Public Sector Unit set for privatization. It may also 
take the shape of workers' cooperative in which there 
is higher degree of membership participation than 
management/employee buyout where the employees are 
simply shareholders. The advantages of this system/ as 
25 
explained by Blackstone and Franks, are that the 
financiers provide bulk of the funds while they take 
disproportionately smaller share of equity. On the 
other hand, the buyers take large shares of the equity 
but have small role in funding. The equity to debt 
ratio may go as high as five times (1:5) the amount of 
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share capital in the company, which is normally not 
permissible under any other system of borrowing. In 
such cases it is naturally important that the 
projected cash flow is sufficient to allow for payment 
of large sums of interest and capital repayment 
without placing the viability of the business in 
jeopardy. 
A case of privatization under this system is 
2G the National Freight Company Limited, in U.K. This 
was a large company with about 30,000 employees, that 
was performing too weakly for public offering. It was 
acquired by Management/Employee consortium created for 
the purpose for £ 53.5 million of which £ 51.0 million 
was obtained as medium term loan against the assets of 
the subsidiaries of the group and the rest was raised 
from the equity capital. Some Government debt was 
written off. The average investment made by the 
workers was about £ 700 and the company has since 
reportedly been performing well with increasing profit 
and therefore smart share values. Similarly, several 
shipyards, formerly under the control of the British 
shipyards Corporation, were privatized either through 
management/employee buy-out or management buyout in 
1985. British Steel Corporation sold its subsidiary 
victualic Company through management/employee buy-out 
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in 1983 and Leyland Bus and Uniport were bought out by 
the management from British Leyland. 
There is more experience with employee buyouts 
outside the privatization sphere, the experience of 
which iS/ however, directly applicable to acquisition 
27 
of SoEs. Vuylsteke has explained the procedure to 
follow in which a holding company is created through 
an equity issue subscribed largely by management and 
employees, then acquires the State Sector unit to be 
privatized, using the equity funds and borrowing with 
the security of the assets of the company. Where 
substantial borrowing is involved it is called 
leveraged management/employee buyout (LMBO). 
28 Chile has recently ventured into 100 per 
cent workers buy-out of a large computer firm ECOM at 
a price of about $ 1.5 million equivalent, of which 10 
per cent was borrowed from CORFO, the state holding 
Corporation acting as vendor with 10 years maturity 
and 5 per cent real rate of interest. Reportedly, the 
losses of the order of $ 1.5 million was turned into a 
profit within six months time and the company has 
since been progressively improving its results. 
Management and Employees bought out 50 per 
cent of the holdings of the Institute Development 
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29 I n d u s t r i a l ( I D I ) , a l a rge ven tu re of c a p i t a l firm in 
France p r i m a r i l y owned by the S t a t e . The remaining 50 
per cent was bought by a group of 6 o t h e r i n v e s t o r s 
who provided t h e f i n a n c i a l guaran tees i n exchange . 
30 Employees Stock Ownership P lans (ESoP); 
Employees s tock ownership p l a n s i s used as a 
f inanc ing t echn iques for a c q u i s i t i o n of sha r e s by 
employees. This method he lps i n f o s t e r i n g the 
employees p a r t i c i p a t i o n and may a l s o be used as a 
leveraged employee buy-out . Bank bor rowings a r e made 
by ESoP fund and se rv i c ing i s done by t h e s u r p l u s e s 
gene ra t ed . The employees get t h e b e n e f i t s . 
Employees' a c q u i s i t i o n of u n i t s appea r s t o be 
a p o t e n t i a l l y v i a b l e way of p r i v a t i z a t i o n i n which 
persons w i l l have t h e i r s take and hence w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
do t h e i r b e s t . However, the Government a l s o needs t o 
extend i n c e n t i v e s t o both t h e employees and 
f i n a n c i e r s . ESoPs have upto now been a p e c u l i a r l y 
American i n i t i a t i v e because of t h e t a x advantages 
afforded by U .S . l e g i s l a t i o n . Among o t h e r s , t h e s e 
i n c l u d e : 
( i ) An annual c o n t r i b u t i o n pa id by t h e employer t o 
each employee 's ESoP amount u p t o 25 p e r cent 
189 
of pay. This may be deducted against corporate 
income tax. 
(ii) The tax relief is provided to the financiers 
from the income received from the loan 
extended to enterprises undergoing privatiza-
tion. 
(iii) 50 per cent of the proceeds realized from the 
sale of the firms' stocks to an ESoP are 
excluded from estate. 
This method will perhaps answer to the problem 
of unemployment where liquidation is the only alterna-
tive. It should/ however, be backed by a strong and 
competent management and committed work force. 
Various examples of this are to be found in 
recent British Privatization/ the best known of which 
is the National Freight Company. A management and 
labour group bought the company with a combination of 
a loan and employee equity subscription purchased by 
80 per cent of the employees. They were rewarded with 
a substantial increase in share value in a very short 
period. Other examples include a water supply company 
in the Cote d' IVoire that was taken over in a buy-out 
to avoid liquidation and a number of buy-outs with 
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full or partial workers participation in Chile. A 
problem of such labour/management buy-outs is that if 
the firm fails to generate profits because of heavy 
initial debt services costs / workers/shareholders may 
sell their stock at low rates to investors to avoid 
losses. Control of the firm could then pass to a few 
individuals who might profit handsomely when and if 
31 the firm can be turned around. 
Implementation of programme will have the 
problem of preparing and presenting a strong cash flow 
as most of the units under liquidation will face cash 
flow problems. Investment will be high and salary and 
wages may need a freeze. 
7. Lease and Management Contract : 
Both lease and management contract are the 
forms of privatization in vrtiich the private sector 
management, technology and/or skills are provided to 
an SoE. The State either leases owned assets for a 
period at a compensation agreed by both the parties or 
the Government gives the management contract to a 
private enterprise to run the operations of certain 
facilities for a specific period for which an agreed 
fee is paid by the Government. There does not exist 
the divestiture of State assets because there is no 
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transfer of ownership. These increase the efficiency 
of the firm and the effectiveness of State's assets. 
Lease : Under this system the ownership remains with 
the Government while the leasee assumes full responsi-
bility for operations and maintenance of its 
facilities for a specific period under agreed terms 
and conditions. Under this system, fees are payable to 
government through a process of negotiation. The 
leasee is also responsible for up keep of the plants 
and machinery and hands them back to the State sector 
in a reasonably good condition after the expiry of the 
lease terms. Under this system, also the leasee is 
responsible for hiring personnel. The leasee may hire 
existing personnel and integrate them into its own 
work force, but in doing so he would exercise complete 
freedom of choice. When the operations are resulting 
in a loss, and the leasee fails to use the facilities 
fully, the State Sector Unit is not responsible for 
such losses. 
Management Contract : 
Under this system, the owner pays for the 
management skills provided while the manager retains 
the management and operational control. Different 
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types of contractual arrangements will be discussed at 
a subsequent stage. 
32 The management contractor (normally a 
company in the same line of business as the 
enterprise) assumes responsibility under a contract to 
manage the enterprise for compensation. Whereas a 
leasee pays the State for the use of assets or 
facilities/ a management contractor is paid by the 
State for its management or other skills. While the 
contractor might be given extensive management powers 
and operational control/ it has no financial exposure 
and receives its fee regardless of the profitability 
of the enterprise. In this/ ownership is retained, a 
defined degree of control is maintained, and a high 
level of management and other skills is injected into 
the enterprise, enhancing its overall efficiency and 
profitability. 
33 In the words of Vickridge and Jobling, many 
infrastructure projects in developing countries fall 
into premature disrepair mainly on account of 
inadequate maintenance or improper operation reducing 
thereby the operating life of the capital assets 
created. This may be due to selection of inappropriate 
technology, lack of efficient management structure or 
non-availability of technical manpower as also because 
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of inadequate funding of the operation and maintenance 
programme that is a common feature in developing 
countries. 
Duration of the Contract : 
The duration of the contract only depends upon 
the interest of involvement of the2 contractor. 
Normally/ a contractor duration is 2 to 5 years for 
operation and maintenance of newly constructed 
facilities such as sewage, water treatment, plants 
treatment, etc. But this duration may go upto 20 years 
when the contractor is interested to continue his 
contract. Again this duration may be further extended 
upto 30 years and beyond in cases where the contractor 
is required to make investment as well. 
(i) Sale of Shares or Partial Privatization : In 
this system, the government retains a portion of the 
ownership of the enterprise. Joint ownership covers 
cases where the ownership of the share capital is on a 
50:50 per cent basis. 
(ii) Selective Privatization : An agency responsi-
ble for certain services or interest may sell or lease 
a part of its services while retaining the remaining 
services under public ownership, control and 
management. 
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(iii) Management Privatization : The management 
expertise and know-how of the private sector is 
invited through a management agreement. 
(iv) Contract Privatization : There is private 
sector involvement in the provision of certain 
services or activities, but there is no change in the 
organizational set up of the government agency 
responsible for the service. 
(v) Leasing Privatization : For financial or other 
reasons, leasing should be considered by the parties 
involved but the responsible agency will have to 
evaluate the cost and benefits of leasing and to 
indicate whether it will be permanent feature or only 
a phase in its privatization plan. Monhof has 
summarised Hybrid Enterprise Models and their route to 
privatization in the following chart No. 4.3. 
NEED FOR PRIVATIZATION : 
The New Industrial Policy Statement of July 
35 24, 1991 has stated , that PEs have shown a very low 
rate of return on capital invested. This has inhibited 
their ability to regenerate themselves in terms of new 
investment as well as in technology. The result is 
that many of the PEs have become a burden rather than 
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being an asset to the Government. 
36 In Programme for Structural Reforms 
submitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 
November 11, 1991 to secure its financial assistance 
for the ongoing reforms process stated that India's 
severely constrained budgetary circumstances create 
both the need and opportunity for rationalising the 
scope of public sector activity and for placing 
greater reliance on the private sector for resource 
mobilization and investment. Public enterprises have 
absorbed large amounts of budgetary support for their 
expansion or operations, but in many cases they have 
failed to generate adequate returns on the investment 
of public money and contributed significantly to the 
public sector saving gap and fiscal deficit. 
The most apparent reason for the failure of 
PES are low rate of return on investment, declining 
contribution to national saving, poor capacity 
utilization leading to excessive delays and wastage of 
scarce resources. The biggest reason for the failure 
of PES is that the managers work under a work culture 
37 
which applies to the bureaucracy of the government. 
It is because of these reasons that all loss-making 
Central and State PSUs will have to be privatized as 
the accumulated losses, in the ultimate analysis, are 
paid out of the general revenues of the State 
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Exchequer. 
•^Objectives of Privatization : 
The privatization is an important device in 
the hands of policy makers to reform the public sector 
undertakings (PSUs). Some of the important objectives 
38 
of privatization may be: 
(a) Fiscal objectives (reducing revenue deficits) 
(b) Economic objectives (efficiency through 
competition). 
(c) Socio-political objectives (emphasizing 
consumer in preference to workers). 
(d) Administrative objectives (reducing cost of 
bureaucracy). 
(e) Ideological objectives (strengthening and 
deepening individualism, property rights, 
etc.). 
However, there may be occasions when the 
objectives contradict each other. In such cases, 
relative priorities have to be identified. Whatever be 
the objective, an implicit assumption in the drive 
towards privatization is that market forces or private 
ownership will contribute to great efficiency. In the 
39 
words of Cook and Minoque, privatization would be 
198 
relevant in developing countries in many wayS/ namely/ 
it will: 
(a) Improve e f f i c i e n c y 
(b) Reduce budget d e f i c i t s 
(c) Reduce l o s s e s 
(d) Help r e d u c i n g / e l i m i n a t i o n of uneconomic 
c a p a c i t i e s . 
(e) Help t h e Government reduce s u b s i d i s a t i o n of 
l o s s e s . 
( f) Reduce t h e c la im upon Government f o r 
cont inuous i nves tmen t . 
(g) Improve t h e P u b l i c s e r v i c e s . 
(h) Help in Government 's resources e a r n i n g s e t c . 
However, p r i v a t i z a t i o n in developing c o u n t r i e s 
l i k e Ind ia , may no t simply be a blue p r i n t of t h e 
developed c o u n t r i e s . I t can not be b l i n d l y 
d u p l i c a t e d . Before approaching t h e move one may need 
40 t o f ind answer t o t h e q u e r r i e s as Heald pu t them: 
Why do t h e p u b l i c s ec to r e n t e r p r i s e s e x i s t ? 
What a r e they d e l i v e r i n g ? 
How can they be improved? 
Should they be abo l i shed? 
Finding answers t o such q u e r r i e s may l e a d t o 
an app rop r i a t e s o l u t i o n r a t h e r than fo l lowing any b l u e 
p r i n t . In f a c t , t h e r a t i o n a l e of p r i v a t i z a t i o n may be 
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explained from the above. Moreover, no generalized 
method exists for the privatization of any enterprise. 
A case to case study will be essential to understand 
the realities of situations and to work out an 
appropriate method. 
Views on Privatization : 
The Policy-makers ^^ in India have pronounced 
time and again that the loss-making PEs do not have 
any place in the economy. Even the World Bank has 
42 
suggested for privatization of PEs in India. The 
43 Arjun Sengupta Committee, set up to review the 
Government policy for PEs, divided the entire spectrum 
of PEs into core and non-core sectors. The non-core 
sector enterprises were further sub-divided into 
financially viable and non-viable enterprises. The 
core sector included coal and lignite, crude oil, 
petroleum and natural gas, power, primary steel 
production, primary production of aluminium, copper, 
lead, fine-nickle, fertilizers and primary production 
of petro-chemical intermediaries. The Committee 
suggested closure of non-viable PEs in non-core 
sector. It recommended special studies of such 
enterprises in the core sector to put them back on 
rails. If we superimpose the Arjun Sengupta Committee 
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criteria of five year consecutive cash loss and bring 
in non-priority sector, according to an estimate, 23 
PEs get selected for priority privatization. A meeting 
of the panel of economists convened by the Planning 
Commission has suggested selling shares of PEs to the 
public to raise resources. PEs should not be allowed 
to become burden on Government finance. The PEs which 
cannot be viable may be closed down or sold off or 
44 
restarted as private enterprise. 
Privatization Model : 
The privatization modalities will not only 
depend upon the objectives of privatization but also 
on the nature of PEs to be privatized, comparative 
gain after conversion and the prevailing political and 
economic environment of the country at that time. For 
example, if the objective is wide distribution of 
ownership, the method employed could be a public 
offering through the facilities of a stock exchange or 
possibly off the exchange at a concessional price. If 
the objective of privatization is to support and 
encourage an incipient business class, the Government 
may not place any limitation on the number of shares 
bought by any individual or group, and may sell shares 
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through adhoc negotiations with a small group of 
prospective buyers. 
Different modalities of privatization given by 
experts has a preference for green field privatization 
and cold privatization which came out through policy 
changes and procedured modification. These terms 
45 
coined by Y. Venugopal Reddy are as follows : 
Green Privatization : is a term coined to denote 
encouragement to private sector in areas hitherto 
reserved for PEs. It is also known 'Incremental 
46 
Privatization'. It lies under two given considera-
tions. 
(i) the need to tap private sources for funding 
large projects especially if the private 
sector could also mobilize foreign resources 
and 
(ii) technology upgradation through foreign colla-
boration . 
The new economic policies of liberalization 
have provided considerable scope for green field 
privatization in as much as they have promoted private 
industrialists to venture into areas/ earlier reserved 
for the public sector, such as power, aviation. 
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hydrocarbon development, telecommunication equipment 
and more recently, even specialized telecommunication 
services (cellular phones). Substantial new green 
field investment can be observed in the Tata h IBM 
computer Project, Kellogg breakfast cereal/ GE 
47 
engineering and General Motors. 
Private investment was first used in case of 
construction and maintenance of highways in the State 
of Andhra Pradesh. General Information for Roads and 
Highway was first published by the Indian Government 
in July, 1985. It described the consideration of 
private participation in constructing roads/ tunnels 
and bridges. There has been some activity in private 
sector development in the state of Andhra Pradesh and 
Maharashtra. Other cases of greenfield privatization 
are setting up of petroleum refineries in the joint 
sector with equity participation, one at Mangalore (a 
Birla-Hindustan Petroleum Project) and the other at 
Karnal. Recently, Hindustan Max GB (HMGB) is a 50:50 
joint venture of the state owned Hindustan Antibiotics 
Ltd. (HAL) and Max GB. Tata Oil Corporation (TOC) has 
signed a Memorandom of understanding (Mou) with Tata 
Chemicals, each of them having 26 per cent equity 
participation and the remaining will be issued for 
public participation. 
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Cold Privatization : 
In this type of privatization, steps are taken 
to distance the PE from the Government. The distancing 
of PE management from government is being attempted in 
the form of a MoU to be signed by each PE and the 
government. 
Memorandxim of Understanding (MoO) : 
It is to improve the performance of the public 
enterprises (PEs) and is an alternative option to the 
policy of privatization. The Government of India has 
introduced the concept of performance contracts which 
48 
we call the Memorandum of Understanding . This 
concept waS/ for the first time, introduced in South 
Korea, France and other countries. In India this 
concept was introduced in 1988-89 on the recommenda-
tions of the committee to Review the policy for PEs 
(chaired by Arjun Sengupta) and was notified in 
1989-90 under this device. The relationship between 
the Government and PEs provides greater autonomy to 
the management to improve operational results. 
The emphasis has been at achieving the 
negotiated and agreed targets and objectives rather 
than interfering in their day to day operation. The 
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MoUs spell out the mission, objectives and annual 
targets of an enterprise. Each target is then 
assigned a weight corresponding to its priority and 
target achievement based upon a 5-point scale 
ranging from excellent to poor. The MoU also imposes 
certain obligations on both the management and the 
Government for progressive improvement of performance. 
A high level committee has been constituted for 
evaluating such MoUs as also to review the performance 
of the PES. Therefore, the MoU is being used as an 
instrument for bringing in greater autonomy to the 
49 Management alongwith accountability in the PEs 
During 1990-91, 23 PEs signed MoUs with their 
administrative ministries. Their performance 
evaluation categorized 14 of them as excellent, eight 
as very good and one as poor. In 1991-92, 71 
enterprises (with 35 subsidiaries) signed MoUs, in 
1992-93, 120 enterprises (with 44 subsidiaries) have 
been identified for this purpose. During 1993-94 
101 PSEs signed MoUs as against 98 in the preceding 
year. Based on their audited accounts, performance of 
100 PSEs was evaluated out of which 46 were rated 
excellent (46 per cent), 29 as very good (29 per cent) 
12 as good and 10 fair. During 1994-95, 99 PEs 
signed MoUs; for 1994-95, self evaluations have been 
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rated as excellent; 26 very good and only 2 have been 
rated as poor. Evaluation for 16 is pending. It is 
awaited for 4. In 1995-96, 104 PSEs signed MoUs, 51 of 
them have been- rated as excellent* 31 as very good and 
a meagre 2 as poor. Evaluation for 1 unit is still 
52 pending. Names of enterprises signing MoUs for the 
year 1996-97 and MoU scores of these enterprises for 
1995-96 appear in Annexures I and II respectively 
appended at the end of this dissertation. 
Although the MoU system has an important role 
to play in impvoring performance in public sector 
enterprises, one should realize that the focus of MoU 
is only on the operational autonomy and accountability. 
This should not eventually turn out to be only a ritual 
for setting soft targets in achieving these easily at 
the end of the year. One is not sure as to whether this 
will eventually serve the purpose of making the public 
sector efficient consistent with the objectives set out 
53 before them. 
Having discussed the Arjun Sengupta Committee's 
recommendations with respect to improving the 
operational efficiency of the PSUs by giving their 
management more freedom through MoUs which evaluated 
these undertakings on a five-point scale ranging from 
'excellent' to the 'poor', we now turn to evaluate 
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India's privatization performance with reference to a 
number of other countries. 
Before doing so it would be quite relevant here 
to quote from the Industrial Policy T^endment Act of 
July 24, 1991 which clearly stated that 'in order to 
raise resources and encourage wider public 
participation, a part of the government's shareholdings 
in the public sector would be offered to the mutual 
funds/ financial institutions, the general public and 
the workers-
In strict sense of the term, 
privatization is specifically defined as the government 
initiated transfer of assets, operations, rights and 
activities from the public to the private sector 
through a variety of means. On the other hand, the 
divestiture of small equity stakes to private sector 
investors or the sale of shares to mutual funds or 
other institutions controlled by the government without 
any significant change in the level of government 
control or managerial freedom does not constitute 
privatization. But the process does include contracting 
out to the private sector those services which had, 
historically, been performed by the public sector and 
the provision and financing of new infrastructure 
projects. 
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To dispassionately assess India's performance 
on global privatization scale Business Today teamed up 
in January 1996 with Coopers & Lybrands, one of the 
biggest consultancy companies of the world/ to tap the 
latter's fund of experience in working with various 
governments on privatization programmes. The simple 
objective was to compare India's progress with similar 
or outstanding international examples in order to 
scientifically evaluate the Congress Government's role 
to privatise±he public sector. The five sectors - Power, 
Telecom/Banking, Airlines and Oil and Gas-selected for 
the evaluation are, in fact, the same areas wherein 
Narasimha Rao had actually initiated the change 
process. 
To facilitate sector-wise comparisons an 
achievement rating was derived from the four criteria, 
evaluated on a five-point scale where 1 stood for 
completely regulated and 5 for completely competitive. 
The four critical factors considered were : (i) Market 
Structure : Are there barriers to entry? Are prices 
State-controlled? (ii) Ownership: what is the level of 
private ownership in the public sector? (iii) 
Management : What is the level of freedom the managers 
of the PSU enjoy? (iv) Finance : What is the level of 
freedom the PSU has in terms of raising funds? 
208 
Each sector's performance was compared against 
publicity declared objective of the government and it 
was possible to assign a rating to the present status 
of privatization in each of the five sectors. Then, 
India's overall performance in relation to privatiza-
tion was compared against a mix of six countries-
Britain, Mexico and Thailand having a long track record 
to privatization and Portugal, Argentina and Indonesia 
which, like India, had turned to privatization only 
recently. The comparison was made on a five-point scale 
(on a number of key privatization parameters), such as, 
the government's defined objectives, the methods 
employed, the political will, the timescales involved, 
the objectives attained and so forth. 
Considering all the foregoing factors, India's 
privatization performance is quite dismal. Alongwith 
political unwillingness, execution of privatisation 
programme has also been quite weak. India's rating in 
political will is the lowest (1) among all the 
countries compared while that of the U.K. is the 
highest (5) followed by Argentina, Portugal, Indonesia, 
Mexico and Thailand. It was the iron will of Mrs. 
Margret Thatcher that she undertook one of the most 
radical public sector reform programmes in the world, 
privatising a majority of that country's nationalised 
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industries and utilities with total proceeds now 
exceeding $ 95 billion. 
As for the degree of preparedness/ Argentina 
(Rating 4-5) based its process of privatisation on the 
State Reforms Law of 1989 and collected $ 22 billion 
through the process. Similarly, Portugal (Rating 3-4) 
enacted a general legal framework which spelt out 
exactly how its nationalised undertakings could be 
returned to the private sector. Mexico (Rating 3) 
started its privatisation of parastatals through 
liquidation/ mergers and transfers as well as the sale 
of companies and trusts in 1982 and out of 1/100 SOEs 
in 1983/ the government controlled only 258 enterprises 
in 1993. India (Rating 1)/ has not, despite its 
initiation of reforms programme five years ago/ passed 
any specific law in relation to privatisation and is 
still knee-jerking. Here/ the path to privatisation 
remains paved with indifferent intentions. In fact/ 
Indian privatisation was an economic necessity but a 
political impossibility. 
In terms of timescales involved, India's 
(rating 1) position was slightly better than Thailand. 
It was proceeded by the U.K. (Rating 4), Portugal, 
Argentina, Indonesia (Rating 3-4), followed by Mexico 
(Rating 2-3). Regarding the methods employed for 
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achieving privatisation objective, U.K. (Rating 5), was 
on the top followed by Portugal, Mexico, Argentina 
(Rating 3-4) and Thailand and Indonesia (Rating 2-3). 
Indonesia's score in terms of its competence in 
implementing privatisation is praiseworthy, 3-4, which 
is higher than Britain's 3 or India's. Chart No. 
4.4 gives all these details. 
The foregoing privatization paradigms indicate 
towards the fact that what hase been happening in India 
over the last five years can only be described as 
creeping privatization, with pieces of state monopoly 
being liberalised from time to time. During the four 
rounds of disinvestment that has taken place since 
1992, it has auctioned off only 0.65 per cent of 
Government's investments in the public sector and has 
realised a meagre amount of $ 3 billion only, though C. 
Rangarajan Committee appointed by the Government had 
recommended, as early as in 1992, that the Government's 
share in the PSUs be brought down to les than 51 per 
cent. It means that the government never seems to have 
made up its mind on the subject. 
As a consequence of the aforementioned 
indifference, Indian PSUs are in no better position 
today than they were five years ago. They have not so 
far realised the importance of public ownership, nor 
have they bothered about cost reduction through 
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increasing productivity. Their monopoly culture 
continues and they have hardly learned anything from 
global experience with particular reference to 
competition and wide dispersal of ownership of public 
assets around the world. 
As a matter of fact such reform programmes 
require strong political will and preparedness and 
specific timescales on the part of the government of a 
country. Unfortunately, in India, these things are 
lacking. But, half hearted measure will not do. 
Thailand, for example, which undertook privatization 
task long ago has failed only because of lukewarm 
measures adopted by it. In India, whatever has been 
done so far is not, in fact, privatization as it has 
not brought about any significant change either in 
ownership pattern or management freedoms which are 
necessary if privatisation programme is to succeed in 
the country. 
Disinvestment of PSE Shares : 
It is sale of a part of equity holdings by the 
government in PSUs to private investors. It was a 
major strategy by the government to finance the fiscal 
deficit. The economic motivation was to improve 
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efficiency of PSUs. Government expected that a small 
investment by the private sector will make the 
managers disciplined and motivated. Its results came 
out in 1992-93, the percentage of net profit on the 
capital employed in PSUs was one third of the private 
sector. Following five are the distinct methods for 
the disinvestment of PSU's shares. 
(i) Market value method 
(ii) Earning capacity value method 
(iii) Fair value method 
(iv) Net Tangible Assets method 
(v) Face value plus investment method 
Features of Disinvestment in the year 1991-97 : 
There have been ten rounds of disinvestment 
during the period 1991-97. 
Disinvestment in 1991-92 : Disinvestment was initially 
started in the year 1991-92 in two rounds. Equity 
varying between 5 and 20 per cent in selected public 
enterprises was disinvested in two phases in December 
1991 and February 1992. The 31 companies whose shares 
were selected for disinvestment were a mix of 8 very 
good, 12 good and 11 not so good companies with net 
asset Rs. 20-50 and less than Rs. 20 respectively. The 
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shares were offered in bundles consisting of 9 PSE as 
randomly structured portfolios each with a notional 
reserve price. The reserve price was an average of NAV 
and profit earning capacity value (PECV). The shares 
were offered to selected financial institutions and 
mutual funds. During the first phase of disinvestment 
in December 1991, bids were received from nine parties 
totalling R$. 427 crores; 51.62 crore shares constitu-
ting 4.7 per cent of the equity were sold. The average 
realisation per share (with a face value of Rs. 10) was 
R$. 27.65. In the second phase in February 1992 bids 
were received from 19 parties for Rs. 1611 crore; 35.59 
crore shares constituting 3.3 per cent of the equity 
were sold. The average realisation per share was 
R$.45.25. The total shares disinvested during 1991-92 
thus comprised 8 per cent of the total Government 
share holding in the 31 PSEs and the total amount 
54 
realized was Rs. 3038 crores. Unit Trust of India 
(UTI) alone was alloted shares worth Rs. 2.017 crores 
(around 70 per cent), followed by General Insurance 
Corporation (GIC) (7 per cent), life Insurance 
Corporation (LIC) (6 per cent), can bank MF (4.3 per 
cent) and State Bank of India (SBI) MF (3.5 per cent) . 
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In a research paper submitted at a seminar, 
Mr. Shankar Mishra and Nandgopal have stated that the 
Government could have raised more than Rs. 356 crore 
from PSU disinvestment during 1991-92, instead, it 
could raise less than 50 per cent of this amount from 
the sale of shares of 31 PSUs. In fact, PSUs shares 
were undervalued to alarge extent. 
The Public Account Committee (PAC) submitted 
its 75th report on 29th April 1994 and identified 
persons the responsible for undervaluation of PSE 
shares in the 1991/92 round of disinvestment. The PAC 
has found the disinvestment process deficient on the 
following counts : 
(i) Haste in accepting uncompetitive bids and 
incorrect method of bundling shares, 
(ii) Method of fixing reserve prices and 
(iii) Sale of shares before their listing 
Clearly all the above mentioned factors have 
contributed to the undervaluation of shares and short-
fall in revenue generated. 
Disinvestment in the Year 1991-92 : During this 
financial year disinvestment was done in three rounds 
'(i.e. October 1992, December 1992 and March 1993). 
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It had the unbundled shares and the bidding 
was open to the public and even to other institutions; 
Enterprises-wise sale of shares was effected so as to 
get optimum benefits. Reference floor price, which was 
fixed from the average recommended price of Merchants 
Bankers (i.e., ICICI, IDBI and SBI Capital Market 
Ltd.) was not made public. 
In October 1992, the bids eligible for 
acceptance amounted to a total sale value of Rs.681.95 
crores for 12.87 crores share in the 8 companies. In 
October 1992, the bids for 12 PSUs were sold for 
Rs.1183.3 crores and in March 1993, bids for 15 PSUs 
were sold for Rs. 46.73 crores. 
The Government also decided, in principle, to 
disinvest shares in favour of employees during 
1992-93. 
For tranche of October 1992 disinvestment was 
opened to all and offer of minimum bid was Rs. 25 crore 
where small investors were automatically kept out of 
scene. In second round minimum bid was reduced to Rs.lO 
lakhs and in tird round (March 1993) it was only Rs.l 
lakh. 
The total loss of revenue in three phases of 
disinvestments in 1992-93 was estimated to be Rs.804.8 
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crore. The extent of loss in second phase of 
disinvestment was only Rs. 485 crore. 
1993-94 : 
Rangarajan Committee was formed on the 
disinvestment of shares in PSEs, the committee 
submitted its report in April 1993. It recommended 
that : 
(1) Industries which were reserved for public 
sector should observe a 49 per cent disinvest-
ment of equity whereas 74 per cent should be 
considered for other cases. 
(2) An action plan should be brought in rather 
than the year-wise target. 
(3) A scheme should be developed so that workers 
and employees of PSUs must get the benefit of 
offerings. 
(4) The choice of method of valuation of shares of 
a PSE needs to take into account the special 
circumstances affecting PSE's operation, such 
as, the past focus on social responsibilities 
rather than pure commercial considerations. 
(5) Valuation of the shares of PSEs should be 
considered according to the special conditions 
of past which affected their operations. 
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(6) Ten per cent of the proceeds of disinvestment 
may be set apart by the Government for lending 
to the PSEs on Concessional terms to meet 
their expansion and rationalisation needs. 
(7) A committee on PEs disinvestments may be 
formed to overlook the action plan for 
restructuring, reformation and disinvestment 
and also the monitoring and evaluation of the 
progress alone. 
The Government had estimated to raise of 
Rs.2,500 crores in this disinvestment. As the plan was 
very much delayed in 1993/94 round bidding was held 
only in March 1994. The offer was opened from 17 March 
CO 31 March. The bids were opened in April 1994 and 
the Government raised an amount of Rs. 2,292 crores. It 
has been accounted in the capital receipts of the year 
1994/95. Foreign investors took the bid for shares in 
March 1994 round. Equity raised by the Indian 
companies abroad in 1993-94 amounted to US $ 2.5 
billion. Government's plan of strategic alliance was 
observed in case of Maruti Udyog Limited, an 
automobile joint venture with Suzuki Motors 
Corporation of Japan. The company was set up in 1980s 
with Suzuki having an stake of 40 per cent and 
remaining 60 per cent with the Government of India. As 
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the policy was to encourage the foreign investors by 
increasing their share holdings, Suzuki purchased the 
fresh equity thus increasing their stakes to 50% and 
getting a control over Management. This round was 
noted as more successful round and the revenue lost 
was estimated very small, i.ei, about lis. 91 crores by 
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development and Research 
(IGlDR) (Mid-Year review of the economy 1994-95). 
1994-95 : 
Two rounds of disinvestments in PSUs were 
observed during the year 1994-95. (1st in October, 
1994 and second in January 1995). Both of these were 
having very poor performance. The PSUs whose shares 
were offered, were oil majors like ONGC and IOC, in 
Telecomjwere the MTNL and VSNL and other profit making 
enterprises as Steel Authority of India Limited. 
Except for oil majors other PSUs did not show any 
positive response. 
During the first round, equity of six 
companies was sold and government raised R$. 2,231 
crores. In second round, disinvestment of equity in 
five PSUs was sold and government received Rs. 338 
crores. Thus, a total of Rs. 2,629 crores showed a wide 
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margin as estimated amount for this year disinvestment 
was Rs. 4,000 crores. 
In both these rounds government had fixed a 
reserved price for bids, below which no bids were 
accepted. According to above reserved price government 
did not accept any bids for MTNL in the first round 
and VSNL in second round. Due to the failure of MTNL 
first time, the government offered a sale of shares of 
MTNL at a fixed price of Rs. 190 per share. This issue 
was to take place in February 1995, but actually took 
place in the year 1995-96. Minimum bid in 1994-95 was 
brought down by the Government as Rs. 25,000. 
1995-96 : 
Further disinvestment in public sector was 
announced by Union Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh in 
the year 1995-96 to raise an estimated amount of 
Rs.7,000 crores. It was the biggest disinvestment of 
PSUs till now. During the offer of January 1995 
Government collected Rs. 288.66 crores by selling 
458.30 lakh shares of the five PSUs. The Government 
does not have any proposal for more disinvestment 
which results in Government's holding of less than 51 
per cent. On May 9, 1995, the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee's report stated that according to IGIDR 
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estimates SAIL'S disinvestment loss is nearly Ds. 1030 
crore. 
1996-97 : 
In this year Rs. 5,000 crore of disinvestment 
was set in target upto the 31st March. Finance 
Minister, Mr. P. Qiidambaram said that the problem lies 
in the 107 PSUs making a loss of Rs. 5,000 crore as 
against 130 profit making units. He said we need 
greater investment in social infrastructure and basic 
industries in order to get another Rs. 5,000 crore. 
The industries Minister, Murasoli Maran has 
indicated that the budgeted Rs. 5,000 crore public 
sector disinvestment programme could be a non-starter 
during the current financial year due to adverse 
market conditions. The number of PSUs since 1991 until 
the end of September 1996 wherein the Government has 
approved disinvestment of its shares come to forty. 
Year-wise and PSU-wise details of disinvestment since 
1991-92 is given in Table 4.1 
It is expected that upto 1999, a flow of 
another 10 billion $ by way of disinvestment of 
Central Government share holdings of the PSU will be 
achieved. 
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TABLE WO. 4.1 
YEAR-HISE/PSD-wise DETAILS OF SHARES DISINVESTED SINCE 1991-92 
% of Central Govt. Holding 
Name of the PSE 
1.7.91 31.3.92 31.3.93 31.3.94 31.3.95 31.3.96 
Andrew Yule 71.30 62 .80 62.80 62.80 62.80 62.80 
Bharat Earthmovers Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 80 .00 80.08 60.08 60.08 
Bharat E l e c t r o n i c s Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 80.00 80.00 75.86 75.86 
Bharat Heavy Elec tron ics Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 79.54 79.46 67.72 67 .72 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 70.00 69.62 66.20 66.20 
Bongaigacn Refineries « Petro Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 74.60 74.59 74.47 74.47 
CMC Ltd . 100.00 8 3 . 3 1 83 .31 83.31 83.31 83 .31 
Cochin r e f i n e r i e s Ltd. 61 .16 55 .04 55 .04 55.04 55.04 55 .04 
Dredging Corpn. Ltd. 100.00 9 8 . 5 6 98.56 98.56 98.56 98.56 
F e r t . » Chem.(Travancore) Ltd. 98.69 97 .46 97 .35 97.35 97,35 97.35 
HMT Ltd. 100.00 95 .14 90.32 90.32 90.32 90 .32 
Hindustan Cables Ltd. 100.00 9 6 . 3 6 97.97 97.97 97.97 95.97 
Hindustan Copper Ltd. 100.00 1 0 0 . 0 0 98.88 98.88 98.88 98 .88 
Hindustan Organic Chonicals Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 80 .00 80.00 56.90 56 .90* 
Hindustan Petxoletn Occpn. Ltd. 100.00 8 0 . 0 0 70.00 69.72 60.25 51 .00* 
Hindustan Photofilns Mfg. Co. Ltd. 100.00 8 7 . 4 7 87.47 87.47 87.47 87 .47 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 100.00 80 .04 75 .93 75.93 75.92 75 .07 
Indian Fetzochenlcals Qxpn. Ltd. 100 .00 8 0 . 0 0 80.97 62.40 62.40 61 .43 
Indian Railway Const. Oo. Ltd. 100 .00 9 9 . 7 4 99 .74 99.74 99.74 99 .74 
Indian Telephone Industries Ltd, 99 .65 7 9 . 7 2 77 .79 77.67 77.02 77 .02 
Madras R e f i n e r i e s Ltd. 84 .62 6 7 . 7 0 67 .70 51.80 51,80 51.80 
MBhanagar Telephone Nigan Ltd. 100 .00 8 0 . 0 0 80 .00 80.00 67.18 65.73« 
Minexals • Metals Trading Cocpn. 100 ,00 9 9 . 3 3 99 .33 99.33 99.33 99 .33 
Nat iona l Aluniniun Co. Ltd. 100.00 9 7 . 2 8 87 .20 87.19 87.15 87 .15 
Nat iona l F e r t i l i z e r s Ltd. 100.00 9 7 . 7 2 97 .66 97.66 97.65 97 .65 
Mtional Mineral Dev. OOEpn. Ltd. 100 .00 1 0 0 . 0 0 98.38 98.38 98.38 98 .38 
Heyve l i L i g n i t e Corporation 100 .00 9 5 . 4 2 93.86 94.19 94.19 93.29 
RaShtriya ChendcBls • FectUlxers 100 .00 9 4 . 3 6 92.50 92.50 92.50 92 .50 
Shipping Corpn.of India 100.00 8 1 . 4 9 81 .49 81.49 80.12 80 .12 
S t a t e Trading Corpn. 100 .00 9 2 . 0 2 91 .02 91.02 91.02 91 .02 
S t e e l Author i ty of India Ltd. 100 .00 9 5 . 0 1 89 .49 89.45 89.04 88 .93 t 
Videsh Sanchar Nigan Ltd. 100 .00 8 5 . 0 0 85 .00 85.00 85.00 82 .02 
Container Corporation of India 100 .00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100 .00 100.00 80.00 76.92« 
Indian O i l Corporation 99 .88 9 9 . 8 8 99.88 99.88 96.08 91 .04 
Oi l k Natural Gas Corporation 100.00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100.00 100.00 98.00 96 .12 
Engineers India Ltd. 100.00 1 0 0 , 0 0 100.00 100.00 94.01 94 .01 
Gas Author i ty of India Ltd. 100 .00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100 .00 100.00 96.63 96 .63 
Indian Tourism • Dev. Corpn. 100.00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100 .00 100.00 90.00 89.97 
RaSenniIch Iron • Ore Gonpeny Ltd. 100 .00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100 .00 100.00 99.03 99 .03 
I n d u s t r i a l Dev.Bank of India 100 .00 1 0 0 . 0 0 100.00 100.00 100.00 72 .14 
# F igures are prov i s iona l , as the s h a r e s s o l d i n Oct. 1995 are y e t t o be 
t r a n s f e r r e d i n favour of s u c c e s s f u l B i d d e r s . 
* These companies had f loated p u b l i c i s s u e s . Percentage of Govt, holding a f t e r 
proposed publ i c i s s u e i s not known. 
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EXIT POLICY AND NATIONAL RENEWAL FUND (NRF) : 
The Government has been trying to rehabilitate 
workers affected by the industrial sickness. The 
Golden Handshake policy or voluntary Retirement Scheme 
(VRS) has been implemented in a large number of PSUs 
like Coal India, MAMC, FCI/ MMTC, CCI, Heavy 
Engineering Corporation, Indian Oil Corporation, 
Calcutta Port Trust etc. Planning Commission in this 
connection, has observed, "Even here, to minimize the 
adverse effects of closure of a unit on labour, 
several options like introduction of compulsory 
insurance or the creation of a fund to pay 
retrenchment benefits to employees should be tried." 
(Vlllth Plan, Vol. 1, p. 88). 
Dr. Manmohan Singh, Finance Minister of 
Narasimha Rao's Government has announced outside the 
country to close down the unviable PSUs and in 
India he has ever promised not to retrench the 
workers. The trade unions were vigorously opposed to 
the Government's proposals of retrenchment. The midway 
scheme has been voluntary retirement schemes or golden 
handshake for which NRF was set up in February 1992 
for providing financial benefits. Hence, the exit 
policy now cannotes VRS and nothing ese. Other schemes 
of retraining for re-employment hinge in balance. 
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56 The main objectives of the NRF area: 
(i) to provide assistance to firms to cover the 
costs of retraining and redeployment of 
employees arising as a result of modernization 
and technological upgradation of existing 
capacities and from industrial restructuring. 
(ii) to provide funds for compensation to employees 
affected by restructuring or closure of 
industrial units/ both in the public and 
private sector. 
(iii) to provide funds for employment generation 
schemes in the organized and unorganized 
sectors in order to provide a social safety 
net for labour. The Department of Industrial 
Development, which administers NRF/ has now 
taken up the first set of cases relating to 
the National Textile Corporation Units. 
The National Textile Corporation (NTC)/ a 
Central Government undertaking which has a portfolio 
of 120 textile mills taken over by the government 
at various points of time,* has negotiated a package 
with labour whereby 70,000 workers will be retrenched 
over a period of six months, of these 30,000 workers 
*Out of the 120 mills under NTC, the Government would 
take up the revival and modernisation of 49 mills only. 
The other 71 are considered to be too sick to be 
revived. (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Aug.20, 1997). 
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have already been retrenched. The NRF has first been 
used to implement a VRS for the surplus labour of NTC 
of whom 27/943 have accepted voluntary retirement as 
on May 29, 1993.^^ 
The result of VRS has been had that young and 
skilled managers left the organization to join in 
private sector export-import houses as senior 
managers. The redundant staff at lower level however, 
remained in their positions in PSUs. The introduction 
of the VRS was baseless. It was open to all and 
resulted in rapid depletion of technical and 
managerial cadres in PSUs. In other words, mostly 
cream workers of the organization were taken by 
private sector, leaving the public sector with 
employees whose opportunity cost in the market was 
lower than their present wage level. It is true that 
the entire NRF was used to finance the VRS only and 
even then it produced adverse effect on output and 
efficiency. 
Whereas the budgetary allocation for the year 
1994-95 has been Rs. 700 crores for NRF, the budgetary 
allocation for the year 1995-96 was recommended to 
Rs. 300 crores only. The break up of the budgetary 
allocation for the year 1995-96 is as under Table 
No. 4.2 
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Table No. 4.2 
Budgetary Allocation, 1995-96 
SI.No. Particulars Amount (Rs. in crores) 
1. VRS in Central PSU 239.68 
2. Workers Counselling 
retaining etc. 35.32 
3. Un-allocated 25.00 
Source : Public Enterprises Survey, 1995-96, vol. 1, 
Ministry of Industry, Government of India, 
New Delhi. 
Provisional expenditure for the year 1995-96 
out of the budgetary allocation have been as under 
Table No. 4.3 
Table No. 4.3 
Provisional Expenditure, 1995-96 
SI.No. Particulars Amount (Rs. in crores) 
1. Expenditure on VRS 209.58 
2. Expenditure on Workers 
Counselling, retaining 7.42 
Total 217.00 
Source : Pub l i c E n t e r p r i s e s Survey, 1995-96, Vol. 1 , 
Minis t ry of I n d u s t r y , Government of Ind ia , 
New De lh i . 
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The Exit Policy should not mean that NRF be 
exhausted through VRS only; rather its scope should be 
enlarged to retaining and redeployment of workers. The 
NRF should be mandatory/compulsory by statutory 
provisions. The NRF should be utilised properly on 
selective basis after making a study of each 
enterprise and identifying surplus workers in 
different departments. 
The Labour Minister, Mr. P.A. Sangma of 
Narasimha Rao's Government said that till March 1995, 
over 75,000 workers in 61 PSUs had taken VRS. As the 
process of restructuring public sector firms gains 
momentum the NRF will play a larger role in years to 
come. 
• 
Indian Scenario : 
In India , i t was the l a t e Mrs. Ind i r a Gandhi 's 
Government which had i n i t i a t e d act ions regarding the 
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p r iva t i za t ion . However, the f i r s t c l e a r pronounce-
ment on the publ ic sec tor out l ining the change in 
policy was made by the Late Prime Minis ter , Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi in his f i r s t broadcast to the na t ion in 1984 
wen he said "the publ ic sector has spread i n t o too 
many areas where i t should not be . We w i l l be 
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developing our public sector to undertake jobs that 
the private sector cannot do. But we will be opening 
up more to the private sector so that it can expand 
and the economy can grow more freely. 
RBI made large drawings from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) which amounted to US $ 2.4 billion 
in July 1990 and January 1991. Even then there was a 
sharp reduction in the foreign exchange reserve 
during 1990-91. As of July 1991, their level was at a 
little over US $ one billion which was barely 
sufficient to finance imports for a fortnight. As 
inflation accelerated to almost 14 per cent and 
foreign exchange reserves dwindled international 
default by India seemed to be a real possibility. It 
was in this atmosphere of crisis that a newly elected 
government launched a programme of economic reforms in 
June 1991.^^ 
Since the introduction of the New Industrial 
Policy on July 24, 1991, the Government of India have 
come a long way in initiating a number of measures to 
implement the liberal industrial and Trade Policy in 
pursuit of globalizing of the economy. The main 
features of the actions already initiated can be 
62 
summarized as follows: 
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(i) Industrial Licensing : It is a major aspect 
for reform. It has centered on loosening the barriers 
to entry for firms to push competitions in the 
industrial sector. Licensing requirements for 
industrial investment have been abolished for all 
industries, except those specified, irrespective of 
levels of investment. These specified industries will 
continue to be subjected to compulsory licensing for 
reasons related to security and strategic concerns, 
social reasons, problems related to safety and over-
riding environmental issues manufacture of products of 
hazardous nature and articles of elitist consumption. 
Licensing was further liberalized on 23rd 
April 1993 according to Press Note No. 9 (Series, 
1991, which was amended from time to time). In the 
light of the Import Policy which has removed almost 
all restrictions on the import of capital goods, raw 
materials and components, and modification of the 
Liberalized Exchanged Rate Management System introdu-
cing unified exchange rate for the 'Rupee* effective 
from 1st March 1993, it has now been decided to 
delicense the motor car and the white goods industry. 
White goods industries cover domestic refrigerators, 
domestic dish washing machines. Programmable domestic 
washing machines, microwave ovens and air 
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conditioners. Modernization of leather industries with 
a view to promote exports, improve productivity, 
encourage ancillary industries and generate 
employment, particularly in rural areas requires 
injection of substantial investments in the leather 
industry and therefore, it has been decided to 
delicense raw-hids and skins, leather and patent 
63 leather, excluding chamois leather. 
(ii) Locational Policy : The locational policy has 
also been liberalized. For locations other than cities 
of more than one million population, there will be no 
requirement of obtaining industrial approvals from the 
Central Government except for industries subject to 
compulsory licensing. In respect of cities with 
populations greater than 1 million, industries other 
than those of a non-polluting nature such as 
electronics, computer software and printing will be 
located outside 25 kms. of the periphery, except in 
prior designated industrial areas. 
(iii) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP Act) : The thrust of the Monopolies and Restric-
tive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act for large companies 
has shifted to controlling and regulating monopolistic. 
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restrictive and unfair trade practices rather than 
making it necessary for undertakings, to obtain prior 
approvals for expansions, establishment of new under-
taking, merger, amalgamation, takeover and appointment 
of Directors. The limits of assets in respect of MRTP 
Companies and dominant undertakings in India have been 
removed. Therefore, there is no barriers to growth. In 
order to give effect to the above, MRTP (amendment) 
Act 1991 has been enacted and also the distinction 
between the PSUs, and private sector companies under 
this Act has been done away with. 
(iv) Policy for Small-Scale Industry Sector : The 
Government continues to provide protection to the 
small scale industries (SSIs) through the policy of 
reservation of items for exclusive manufacture by the 
SSIs. Total number of 836 such items continues to be 
reserved for manufacture in the small scale sector. 
The investment limit of the small scale sector and the 
ancillary industries has been enhanced from Rs. 35 lakh 
to Rs. 60 lakh and from Rs. 45 lakh respectively. 
Industrial licences can also be given to manufacturers 
of items reserved for exclusive manufacture by the 
small scale industries with an export obligation of 75 
per cent. 
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(v) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) : 
(a) Automatic Clearance : Under the New Industrial 
Policy the RBI accords automatic approval for Foreign 
Equity Investment upto 51 per cent in high priority 
areas and provides the foreign equity covers for 
foreign exchange requirements for import of capital 
goods. 
(b) Foreign Equity : In order to have access to 
international markets, majority of foreign equity 
holdings upto 51 per cent is also automatically 
permitted by the RBI for trading companies primarily 
engaged in export activities. 
(c) Expansion of Foreign Equity : The RBI can 
accord automatic approval to an existing company 
wishing to raise its foreign equity holding upto 51 
per cent as a part of expansion programme provided the 
expansion is in the high priority areas and additional 
equity forms part of the finance for expansion 
programme and the finance is remitted in foreign 
exchange. 
(d) Full Foreign Investment : 100 per cent direct 
foreign investment is permissible for 100 per cent 
export oriented units. An automatic approval is given 
for setting up of 100 per cent export oriented units 
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subject to prescribed value addition norms and within 
the limit of imported capital goods. 
(e) Non-Resident Indian Investment (NRI) : NRIs 
are permitted to invest upto 100 per cent foreign 
equity in high priority industries such as Metallur-
gical Industries, Electrical Equipment, Telecommunica-
tion, Transportation etc. with full benefits of 
repatriation of capital investment and interest 
accruing thereon. Automatic approvals are accorded 
within the prescribed parameters and the system. The 
conditions for automatic approval of the NRI 
investments are the same as those for foreign 
investors seeking automatic approval from the RBI. 
(vi) Foreign Technology Agreements : The RBI can 
also accord automatic permission for foreign 
technology agreements involving a lump-sum payment 
upto is. 10 million, 5 per cent for domestic sales and 
8 per cent for exports, subject to a total payment of 
8 per cent of the sales over a period of 10 years from 
the date of agreement or 7 years from commencement of 
production. 
(viii) Sectors for Public Investment : The number of 
sectors reserved for the public investment has been 
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drastically private investment both from the domestic 
and from foreign entrepreneurs. These areas are 
defence, atomic energy, coal and lignite, mineral 
oils, minerals specified in schedule to the atomic 
energy (Control of Production and use) order, 1953 and 
railway transport. Except for these six segments the 
whole Indian economy is open for private investments. 
(viii) Disinvestment of PSE Shares : The disinvest-
ment of shares of PSEs for increasing resources and to 
encourages wider participation of general public and 
workers in the ownership of the PSEs has already been 
resorted to. Rangarajan Committee has recommended 
substantial disinvestment of PSU shares. 
(ix) Taxation Policy : Taxation of capital gains 
has been restructured to allow for inflation 
accounting. Double taxation of partnership firms has 
been abolished and financial assets such as equities 
and debentures have been exempted from wealth tax. 
These fiscal measures have improved the incentives for 
industrial investment and encouraged flow of resources 
64 towards industry. 
(x) Fiscal Policy : Fiscal policy initiatives have 
sought to improve the incentives for investment in the 
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industrial sector and encourage a shift towards exports 
and away from domestic markets. 
(xi) Export and Import (EXIM) Policy : the Export 
Promotion of Capital Goods (EPCG) Scheme made capital 
goods importable at 25 per cent and 15 per cent duty as 
long as the importers agreed to fulfil a stipulated 
export commitment. Besides, the peak import tariff was 
brought down from a maximum of 150 per cent to 110 per 
cent, thereby reducing costs of imported industrial 
inputs. Rates of import duties on project imports, 
capital goods and general machinery have been 
substantially reduced. 
(xii) The Capital Market Policy : The capital market 
has been liberalized and Government control on capital 
issues withdrawn, the office of the controller of capital 
issues has been abolished. The Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) has been converted into a 
statutorily empowered Board to regulate the functioning 
of capital market and stock exchanges. Companies are now 
free to price their equity issues at their own risk and 
at self-determined premia, within the guidelines laid 
down by SEBI for investor protection. 
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(xiii) Reorientation in Policy : Government in the past 
have undertaken organizational improvements in PSEs based 
on the recommendations of expert committees such as, 
establishment of holding companies and the system of MoU, 
and reference of sick units to the Board for Industrial 
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Though these have 
resulted in some improvements a comprehensive reform of 
PES was considered necessary to bring PSE operations in 
consonance with the overall structural changes and the 
Macro-economic stabilization programme initiated by the 
present Government. The desirability of public sector 
reforms has been emphasized by the need to raise the 
productivity of capital resources employed and to reduce 
PSE losses so as to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit 
in successive budgets. The budgetary support as 
percentage of the total plan outlay of the PEs has 
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significantly come down. 
(xv) Promotion Cell ; with the introduction of New 
Industrial Policy, New Exim Policy, Liberalized Exchange 
Rate Management System (LERMS) etc. an Investment 
Promotion and Project Monitoring Cell was set up to 
assist the entrepreneurs on a wider range of steps 
including the licensing policy, tariff and excise duties, 
corporate tax and company laws. This cell attends to the 
enquiries from both Indian and foreign investors 
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regarding extant laws and procedure and practices 
governing investments in industries in India. In 
addition, foreign entrepreneurs interested in information 
on infrastructural facilities available in various parts 
of India, clearance required at local levels etc. may 
also contract the cell who in turn can put them to the 
right officials for contact. Nodel officers have been 
designated in the economic ministries of Industry, 
Commerce, Finance, Reserve Bank of India and the India 
Investment Centre. 
In the foregoing pages we have examined the 
problem of economic inefficiencies of the PSUs faced by a 
number of countries as well as the privatisation 
initiatives taken by them. Different modes of privatisa-
tion have also been discussed. In view of the world-wide 
developments, India also announced its structural reforms 
in its NIP of July 24, 1991. The speed of ongoing reforms 
programme is not very fast. Though the economic reforms 
started five years ago, bureaucracy of the country has 
not brought desired change in its attitude. 
Automobile industry in India has been in the 
private sector. It was only Maruti Udyog Limited which 
was started in the Public Sector on February 24, 1981 
with 74 per cent share of the Government of India and 26 
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per cent share of SMC of Japan. Its process of privati-
sation started alongwith the Governments NIP. On June 20, 
1992/ Government of India reduced its share to 49.74 per 
cent. The following chapter deals with automobile 
industry of India with special reference to Maruti Udyog 
Limited. 
REFERENCES 
1. Mondal, R., 'Privatisation in the Third World'/ Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi/ 1994. 
2. Ramanadham, V.V. (ed.)/ 'Privatisation in Developing 
Countries'/ Routledge, London, 1994, p. 4. 
3. Cook, Paul & Kirkpatrick, Colin: Privatisation in 
Less Developed Countries, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd./ 
Sussex/ U.K./ 1988, p. 3. 
4. Vuylesteke, Charles: Techniques of Privatisation of 
State-Owned Enterprises, The World Bank Report/ Vol. 
1/ Washington D.C., 1988. 
5. Agrawal/ H.N./ 'Privatisation of Public Enterprises. 
A Move Towards Realism' in Privatisation of Public 
Enterprises, by Jagdish Prakash/ Himalaya Publishing 
House/ New Delhi, 1992, p. 153. 
6. Mansour, A., in 'Privatisation in Less - Developed 
Countries', Cook Paul and Kirkpatrick/ Colin, 1988/ 
Ed. p. 180. 
7. Savas/ E.S./ 'Privatisation - The Key to Better 
Government', Tata MacGraw Hill, New Delhi, 1989/ p.3. 
8. Mohnot/ S.R., (Ed.)/ 'Privatisation : Options and 
Challenges', CIER, New Delhi, 1991, p. 2. 
9. Prakash, Jagdish, 'Privatisation of Public 
Enterprises in India', Himalaya Publishing House, 
Bombay, 1992, p. 52. 
239 
10. Commandar, Simon & Killick/ Tony: in 'Privatisation 
in Less Developed Countries'/ Cook & Kirkpatrick/ 
Ithaca, Pr. U.K. 1988, p. 91. 
11. Ramanadhan, V.V., 'Privatisation in the U.K. Groom 
Helm, London, 1988, p. 1. 
12. Reddy, Y. Venugopal, 'State, Market and Privatisation: 
Overview, Instt. of Public Enterprises, LBS, Seminar 
Papers on 'Diversification of ovmership of Public 
Enterprises', Hyderabad, January 22-23, 1988, p. 81. 
13. Barbara, McDougall, 'Privatisation in Canada 
Information provided by the Directorate of Communica-
tions', Ottawa, Canada, p. 1. 
14. Prakash, Jagdish, Op.cit., pp. 109-111 
15. Ibid., p. 207. 
16. Savas, E.S., Privatisation : The Key to Better 
Government, Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey, 
1987. 
17. Vulysteke, Charles : Technique of Privatisation of 
State-Owned Enterprises, Op.cit., pp. 1-10. 
18. Mayer, Colin and Meadowcroft, Shirley : 'Selling 
Public Assets : Techniques and Financial Implications 
in Privatisation and Regulation : The U.K. Experience 
Kay, Mayer and Thompson, 1990, Ed. Calrendon Press, 
Oxford, pp. 322-40. 
19. Red Wood, John and Letwin, Oliver, 'New Directions in 
Privatisation' Rothschild, R.M. & Sons Ltd., 
Manuscript, 1986. 
20. Vuylsteke, Charles: Techniques of Privatisation of 
State-Owned Enterprises, Op.cit., pp. 94-105. 
21. The World Bank Report Vol. 11, Washington, 1990, 
p. 140. 
22. Vuylsteke, Charles: Techniques of Privatisation of 
SoEs, Op.cit., p. 102. 
23. Ibid., p. 129. 
24. Heald, D. (Ed.), The Relevance of Privatization to 
Developing Countries in Public Administration and 
Development, 1990, Vol. 10, p. 18. 
240 
25. Blackstone, Lance & FranckS/ David, 'Guide to 
Management Buy-outs# 1986-87' The Economist, London, 
1986. See also Wright, M. and Cyone, B., Management 
Buy-outs, Croom Helm, London, 1986. 
26. Thompson, Sir Peter: 'The Buy-out at National 
Freight' in Manual on Privatisation, Butler, and 
Perie, 1989 (Ed.), p. 115. 
27. Bradley, Keith & Gelb, Alam, 'Employee Buyouts of 
Troubled Companies', Harvard Business Review, Sept.-
Oct., 1985, pp. 121-130, and same authors, workers 
Capitalism: The New Industrial Relations, Cambridge 
Mass. The MIT Press, 1983. 
28. The World Bank Report, 1990, Vol. II, Wahington, 
Op.cit., pp. 36-38. 
29. Minister de I'economic, Des Finance et de la 
Privatisation, Les Notes Bleues, 1990,k p. 342. 
30. For details, see Accelerating Private Ownership: The 
Role of ESoPs' in Ghadar, E., Hesley, M.L., and 
White, T.H. Privatisation for Development, 
International Law Institute, Washington, 1987, pp. 
643-705. 
31. Gray, Cowan, L., Privatisation in the Developing 
World, Op.cit., pp. 50-51. 
32. Hegstad, Sven and Newport, Ivan, Management 
Contractors: Main Features and Design Issues, World 
Bank Technical Paper No. 65, Industry and Finance 
Series, Washington, D.C* 1987. 
33. Vickridge, Ivan and Jobling Paul: 'Contractual 
Arrangement for Opera-tion, Maintenance and Training 
in Developing Countries', a paper presented at the 
IWRA Seminar on Contracting and Construction of Large 
and Small Scale Hydraulic Works, 1987, Sept. 7-12, 
Rome, Italy. 
34. Ramanadham, V.V. (ed.), 'Privatisation in Developing 
Countries', Op.cit., p. 222. 
35. Nagaraj, R., 'Macroeconomic Impact of Public Sector 
Enterprises - Some further evidence', in Economic and 
Political Weekly, New Delhi, Jan. 16-23, 1993, p. 
105. 
36. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Bombay, April, 1992, 
p. 789. 
241 
37. Datt, Ruddar, 'Public Sector and Privatisation' in 
Economic Growth and Social Change, Half Yearly, 
Alaknanda, New Delhi, March 1992, p. 14. 
38. Financial Express, New Delhi, July 17, 1989, p. 7. 
39. Cook, Paul and Minogue, Martin: 'Public 
Administration and Development' Oct.-Dec, 1990, Vol. 
10, p. 4. 
40. Heald, David: 'Public Administration and Development' 
Oct.-Dec, 1990, Vol. 10, No. 4. 
41. Indian Express, Bombay, December 23, 1987, p. 1. 
42. Asthana, B.N., Indian Journal of Public Enterprises, 
Allahabad, June, 1987, p. 55. 
43. Report of the Committee to Review Policy for PEs 
(Arjun Sengupta Committee), Submitted to Government 
of India in December, 1984. 
44. Norhern India Patrika, Allahabad, July 28, 1989, p. 
1. 
45. Reddy, Y. Venugopal, 'Modalities of Privatisation' in 
Gauri, Geeta (ed.). Privatisation and Public 
Enterprises. The Asia-Pacific Experience, Oxford & 
IBH Publishing House, Delhi, 1991, p. 222. 
46. Mohnot, S.R., 'An Exploratory Action Plan for 
Privatisation in India' in Privatisation : Options 
and Challenges, Op.cit., p. 330. 
47. Ahluwalia, Isher Judge, 'New Economic Policies 
Enterprises and Privatisation in India' in Casen 
Rober & Joshi, Vijay (ed.) India - The Future of 
Economic Reforms, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
1995, p. 219. 
48. Kumar, Suresh, 'Non-Privatisation Reforms of Public 
Enterprises. The Indian Case' in Mohnot, S.R. (ed.) 
Op.cit., p. 100. 
49. Mandal, R., 'Privatisation in the Third World', 
Op.cit., pp. 83-84. 
50. Economic Survey, 1992-93, Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, p. 149. 
242 
51. Economic Survey, 1994-95/ Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, p. 109. 
52. Economic Survey, 1996-97, Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, p. 120. 
53. Mandal, R., 'Privatisation in the Third World', 
Op.cit., p. 84. 
54. Economic Survey, 1992-93, Op.cit., pp. 149-150. 
55. Seminar on Valuation of Public Sector Equity Shares 
organisation by the Institute of Public Enterprises 
and the Standing Committee on the Public Enterprises 
at New Delhi on November 12, 1992. 
56. Economic Survey, 1992-93, Op.cit., pp. 124-25. 
57. The VRS is open to persons with 10 years of service 
or 40 years of age. In addition to leave encashment 
it offers 1/2 months wages per completed period of 
service or the duration of service remaining 
whichever is less (wages in this case comprise basic 
pay, dearness allowance and interim relief) The 
scheme is applicable in respect of labour declared 
surplus and the management has the right to refuse 
voluntary retirement. 
58. The Pioneer, New Delhi, May 23, 1995. 
59. Prakash, Jagdish, 'Privatisation of Public 
Enterprises in India', Op.cit., p. 168. 
60. Datt, Ruddar, 'Public Sector and Privatisation', 
Op.cit., p. 14. 
61. Ahluwalia, Isher Judge, 'New Economic Policies, 
Enterprises and Privatisation in India', Op.cit., 
1995. 
62. 'Annual Report, 1991-92', Ministry of Industry, 
Government of India, New Delhi. 
63. 'Hand Book of Industrial Policy and Statistics' 
Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Industry, 
Government of India, New Delhi, p. 94. 
64. Economic Survey, 1992-93, Op.cit., p. 123 
65. Ibid., p. 123. 
66. Ibid., p. 123. 
67. Ibid., p. 123. 
68. Ibid., p. 148. 
243 
ANWEXURE - I 
LIST OF ENTERPRISES SIGNING HOU FOR THE YEAR 1996-97 
SI. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
No. 
SI. POBLIC ENTERPRISE 
No. 
1 . 
2. 
3. . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
IB. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
AIR INDIA LTD. 
AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA 
ANDREW 
BALMER 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
BHARAT 
YULE • COMPANY LTD. 
LAHRIE • CO. LTD. 
ALLUMINIUM CO. LTD. 
HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. 
YANTRA NIGAK LTD. 
ELECTRONICS LTD. 
DYNAMICS LTD. 
EARTH HOVERS LTD. 
PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. 
BHARI UDYOG NIGAM LTD. 
BONGAIGOAM REF. • PET. VTD. 
C M C LTD. 
CENTRAL COTTAGE INDUSTRIES 
CORPN. 
CENTRAL WAREHOUSING CORPN. 
CENTRAL ELECTRONICS LTD. 
COAL INDIA LTD. 
COCHIN 
COCHIN 
REFINERIES LTD. 
SHIPYARD LIMITED 
CONTAINER CORPN. OF INDIA LTD. 
COTTON CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
DREDGING CORPN. OF INDIA LTD. 
EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANTS INDIA LTD. 
ELECTRONIC TRADE • TECH. DEV.CORPN. 
ELECTRONICS CORP. OF INDIA LTD. 
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD. 
EXPORT CREDIT » GUARANTEE CORPN. 
FERRO SCRAP NIGAM LTD. 
FERTILIZERS AND CHE. TRAN. LTD. 
FOOD CORP. OF INDIA LTD. 
GARDEN REACH SHIP BOJhD. » ENGG. 
GAS AUTH(XtITY OF INDIA LTD. 
GOA SHIPYARD LTD. 
BANDICRAFTS AND RANDLOOHS EXP. 
HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD. 
HINDUSTAN PAPER CORP. LTD. 
HINDUSTAN ORGANIC CHE. LTD. 
HINDUSTAN PEntOLEUM CORPN. 
HINDUSTAN INSECTICIDES LTD. 
HINDUSTAN TELE PRINTCRS LTD. 
HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD. 
HINDUSTAN CABLES LTD. 
HINDUSTAN LATEX LTD. 
HINDUSTAN SHIPYARD LIMITED 
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SI. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
No. 
SI. 
No. 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
HMT LIMITED 
HINDUSTAN ANTIBIOTICS LTD. 
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. 
HINDUSTAN VEGETABLE OIL CORPN. 
HOSPITAL SERVICES CONSULTANCY 
CORPORATION. 
HOUSING « URBAN DEV. CORPN. 
I B P LTD, 
INDIAN AIRLINES LTD. 
INDIAN OIL CORPN. 
INDIAN RARE EARTHS LTD. 
ITI LTD. 
INDIAN PETRO CHEMICALS LTD. 
INDIAN RAILWAY CONSTN. CORPN. 
INDIAN RAILHAY FINANCE CORPN. 
INDIAN TOADE PROMOTION ORGN. 
INDIAN RENENABLE ENERGY DEV. 
AGENCY 
INDIAN TOURISM DEV. CORPN. 
KARNATAKA ANTIBIOTICS » 
PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. 
KUDREMUKR IRON ORE INDIA LTD. 
LUBRIZOL INDIA LTD. 
MADRAS REFINERIES LTD. 
MADRAS FERTILIZERS LTD. 
68 
69, 
70, 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
MANGANESE ORE INDIA LTD. 
MAZAGON DOCKS LTD. 
MET. t ENGG. CONSULT. CORP. 
METAL SCRAP TRTOJING CORP. 
MINERAL t METAL TRAD. CORP. 
MINERAL EXPLORATION CORP. 
MISHRA DRATU NIGAM LTD. 
MODERN FOOD INDUSTRIES INDIA LTD. 
NATIONAL HANDLOOM DEV.CORPN. 
NATIONAL BUILDING CONST. CORPN. 
LTD. 
NATIONAL THERMAL POHER CORPN. 
NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO. LTD. 
NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. 
NATIONAL MINERAL DEV. CORPN. 
NATIONAL HYDRO ELECTRIC POHER 
CORPN. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH DEVE.CORPN. 
OF INDIA. 
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. 
LTD. 
NATIONAL FILM DEVELOPMENT CORPN. 
NATIONAL SMALL SCALE INDOSTRIES 
CORPORATION 
NEYVELE LIGNITE CORPN. LTD. 
NORTH EAST ELEC. POHER CORPN. 
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S I . PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
No. 
SI. 
No. 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
89. NUCLEAR POWER CORP. 
90. OIL INDIA LTD. 
91. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPN. 
92. PARADEBP PHOSPHATES LTD. 
93. POWER FINANCE CORPORATION 
94. POWER GRID CORP. OF INDIA 
95. PROJECTS AND EQUIPMENT CORP.LTD. 
96. PYRITES PHOSPHATE t CHEMICALS 
LTD. 
97. RAIL INDIA TECHNICAL AND 
ECONOMIC SERVICES 
98. RASHTRIYA CHEMICALS t PERT. LTD. 
99. RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LTD. 
100.RURAL ELECTRIFICATION CORPN. 
101.SHIPPING CORPORATION LTD. 
102. SPONGE IRON INDIA LTD. 
103. STATE TRADING CORPN. 
104. STATE FARMS CORPORATION 
105. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. 
106. TELE COMMU. CONS. INDIA LTD. 
107. URANIUM CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. 
108. VIDESH SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. 
109. WATER AND POWER CONSULTANCY 
SERVICES 
110. ENGINEERING PROJECTS INDIA 
LTD. 
111. HINDUSTAN STEEL WORKS COHSTN. 
CORPN. LTD. 
112. NORTH EASTERN REGIONAL MARKET-
ING CORPN. LTD. 
113. NATIONAL SEEDS CORPN. LTD. 
114. RASHITRIYA PARIYOJNA NIRHAN 
NIGAM LTD. 
246 
ANNEXURE - II 
MOU SCORES FOR 1995-96 
SI.No. ENTERPRISE SCORE RATING 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Teleconununications Consul-
tant India Ltd. 1 
Projects & Equipment Corpn. 1 
National thermal Power 
Corpn. 1 
National Mineral Develop-
ment Corpn. 1 
Rail India Technical Eco. 
Services 1 
Cotton Corpn. of India 1 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Hindustan Petroleum 
corpn. Ltd. 
Educational Consultants 
India Ltd. 
Power Grid Corpn.of India 
Cochin Refineries Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn.Ltd. 
National Industrial 
Development Corpn. 
Kudremukh Iron Ore Ltd. 
Metallurgical Engineering 
Consultants Ltd. 
IRCON Internationals 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. 
Hindustan Organic 
Chemicals Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
1 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.05 
1.06 
1.06 
1.06 
1.07 
1.1 
1.11 
1.12 
1.13 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
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SI.No. ENTERPRISE SCORE RATING 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
Shipping Corporation of 
India Limited 
Balmer Lawrie & Co. 
Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
Container Corpn.of India 
Indian Oil Corpn. 
Central Cottage Industries 
Limited 
IBP Ltd. 
Manganese Ore India Ltd. 
Hindustan Insecticides Ltd. 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
Rural Electrification Corpn. 
Perro scrap Nigam Ltd. 
Fertiliser & Chemicals 
Travancore Ltd. 
Water & Power Consultancy 
Services 
Indian Tourism Development 
Corporation 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
Central Warehousing Corpn. 
Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. 
Modern Food Industries Ltd. 
National Building Construc-
tion Corpn. Ltd. 
National Fertiliser Ltd. 
1.13 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
1.16 
1.17 
1.2 
1.2 
1.22 
1.23 
1.24 
1.25 
1.27 
1.29 
1.32 
1.34 
1.35 
1.35 
1.36 
1.38 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
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SI.No. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
ENTERPRISE 
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 
Bongaigaon refineries & 
Petroleum Ltd. 
National Aluminium Co.Ltd. 
Dredging Corpn.of India Ltd. 
National Hydro Electric 
Power Corpn. 
Indian Petrochemicals Ltd. 
Neyveli Lignite Corpn. Ltd. 
Madras Fertilisers Ltd. 
CMC Ltd. 
Indian Trade Promotion 
Organisation 
Indian Airlines 
Bharat Dynamics Ltd. 
Airport Authority of India 
Hindustan Vegetables Oil 
Corporation 
National Small Scale 
Industries Corporation 
Pyrites Phosphates & 
Chemicals Ltd. 
Hindustan Paper Corpn.Ltd. 
State Trading Corpn. 
Mazgaon Dock Ltd. 
Lubrizol India Ltd. 
Nuclear Power Corpn. 
Housing & Urban Development 
Corporation 
SCORE 
1.40 
1.38 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
1.42 
1.45 
1.45 
1.46 
1.46 
1.49 
1.51 
1.52 
1.58 
1.58 
1.6 
1.62 
1.62 
1.63 
1.64 
1.64 
1.77 
RATING 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
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SI.No. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
61. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
ENTERPRISE 
Engineers India Ltd. 
Rashtriya Chemicals & 
Fertiliser Ltd. 
National Handloom Develop-
ment Corporation 
Goa Shipyard Ltd. 
Coal India Ltd. 
National Film Development 
Corpn. 
Hindustan copper Ltd. 
Bharat Bhari Udyog Nigam Ltd. 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 
Mineral & Metal Trading 
Corporation 
Mineral exploration Corpn. 
Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
Food Corporation of India 
Limited 
Oil India Ltd. 
Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. 
Garden Reach Shipbuilders & 
Engineers Ltd. 
Export Credit & Guarantee 
Corporation 
Sponge Iron India Ltd. 
Bharat Electronics Ltd. 
Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. 
SCORE 
1.7 
1.71 
1.74 
1.76 
1.88 
1.9 
1.97 
2.04 
2.05 
2.09 
2.2 
2.27 
2.28 
2.3 
2.34 
2.42 
2.43 
2.44 
2.47 
2.48 
RATING 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Very 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
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SI.No. ENTERPRISE SCORE RATING 
83. Indian Renewable Energy 
Development agency 
84. Bharat Yantra Nigam Ltd. 
85. Uranium Corpn.of India Ltd. 
86. North East Power Corpn. 
87. National Research Develop-
ment Corpn. of India 
88. Indian Rare Earths Ltd. 
89. Metal Scrap Trading corpn. 
90. Electronic Corpn.of India 
Limited 
91. Hindustan Latex Ltd. 
92. Hindustan Cables Ltd. 
93. Central Electronics Ltd. 
94. HMT Ltd. 
95. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. 
96. Karnataka Antibiotic and 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
97. Indian telephone Industries 
Limited 
98. Air India 
99. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. 
100. Madras Refineries Ltd. 
101. State Farms Corpn. 
102. Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. 
103. Electronics Trade & Tech. 
Development Corpn. 
104. Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. 
2.53 
2.71 
3.04 
3.07 
3.13 
3.16 
3.47 
3.57 
3.62 
3.64 
4.06 
3.82 
3.92 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Good 
Pair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
3.92 Fair 
4.23 
4.25 
4.32 
4.36 
4.47 
4.6 
4.96 
1.23 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Fair 
Poor 
Poor 
Excellent 
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ANNEXDRE - III 
LIST OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chile 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cote D* Ivoire 
The Dominicant Republic 
El Salvador 
Egypt 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Moroco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Peru 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
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ANNEXURE - III CONTINUED 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
Sao Tome E 
Senegal 
Principe 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
Tabago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Venezuela 
Western Samoa 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Source: Manual on Privatisation-Adam Smith Institute-1989 
BB^pysTiRY ©I? wmm 
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CHAPTER - V 
A CASE STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY OF INDIA 
Historical Background ; 
The origin of the automobile industry in India 
can be traced back to 1942, when Hindustan Motor 
Limited was established in Baroda. In 1949 the first 
partially manufactured car rolled out of the assembly 
2 
line of the Hindustan Motors Limited. The 
establishment of Hindustan Motors Limited (HML) was 
followed by Premier Automobiles Limited (PAL) and 
Standard Motor Products Limited (SMPL). Both of these 
car manufacturing units were set up in Bombay and 
3 
Madras respectively. 
As is the case with each and every line of new 
production/ the initial years were the years of strains 
and stresses and the manufacture of motor vehicles 
could not be taken up till 1953 when the Government of 
India approved the recommendations of the Tariff 
Commission with respect to this industry. Most of the 
manufacturing units started production in 1953-54. They 
were compelled to work at a loss as the small Indian 
market was, at that time, overflooded with the imported 
cars of various designs. Ashok Leyland, took up the 
production of commercial vehicles in 1957, Tata 
2'^ 4 
Kngineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) in 1962, 
while Mahindra and Mahindra was promoted in 1965 in the 
Jeep Line. In two wheelers group Royal Enfield Motors 
Limited was established in 1955 as pioneer, in 
collaboration with the Enfield Cycle Company Limited, 
England at Thiruvottiyar, in Madras. This was followed 
by the establishment of Bajaj Auto and Escorts and 
Jawa. All of these were the prominent units. The late 
'Eighties' witnessed breath-taking developments. During 
this period a number of automobile manufacturing units 
were set up which included, Hindustan Motors Limited, 
Maruti Udyog Limited, Swaraj Mazda Limited, D.C.M. 
Daewoo Motors Limited, etc., for manufacturing of light 
commercial vehicles, heavy commercial vehicles and two 
wheelers. It opened up a new chapter in the history of 
Indian automobile Industry. 
Trends in Production - Commercial Vehicles 
(i) Medixim & Heavy Commercial Vehicles (M & HCVs) : 
Table No. 5.1 sets out statistics of production 
of Medium and Heavy Commercial Vehicles as well as 
light commercial vehicles from 1948-50 to 1994-95 with 
gaps of five years upto 1980 and then on yearly basis. 
It will be observed from the figures presented in the 
table that upto the year 1980 there was a continuous 
rise in the production of both Medium and Heavy 
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TABLE NO. 5 .1 . 
TREND IN PRODUCTION OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLES 
( U n i t ; No. of V e h i c l e s ) 
Year 
1948-50 
1951-55 
1956-60 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Medium & 
Heavy 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
764 
5731 
73064 
126283 
149805 
169883 
207716 
65234 
61393 
60120 
60500 
62844 
63926 
60196 
64933 
70225 
76594 
86807 
89544 
76051 
75495 
92805 
129400 
% 
Increase/ 
decrease 
(-) 
-
6.50 
11.75 
73 
19 
13 
22 
- 69 
- 6 
- 2 
0.6 
4 
2 
- 6 
8 
8 
9 
13 
3 
- 15 
23 
39 
6 
Light 
Commercial 
Vehicles 
11683 
17707 
24452 
27881 
29161 
40195 
62189 
24518 
28853 
7245 
32893 
33160 
36528 
37624 
45167 
46274 
48457 
57746 
53710 
52529 
101994 
129730 
N.A. 
% 
Increase/ 
decrease 
(-) 
-
52 
38 
14 
5 
38 
55 
- 61 
18 
- 6 
21 
0.8 
10 
3 
20 
2.5 
5 
19 
- 7 
- 2 
56 
27 
Total 
12447 
23438 
97516 
154164 
178966 
210028 
269905 
89752 
90246 
87365 
93393 
96004 
100454 
97820 
110100 
116499 
125051 
144553 
143254 
128580 
194799 
259130 
N.A. 
SODRCE : 
1. Kothari 's Year Book on Business and I n d u s t r i e s 1988,1991, PA-29,PA-7fi 
2. Kothari 's I n d u s t r i a l Directory of Ind ia , pp . 8-5. 
3. India, o p . c i t . , 1995, p . 525. 
4. Indian Express, 'Investment Week', New Delhi, Jan. 6-12, 1997, p. 10. 
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Commercial Vehicles as well as Light Commercial 
Vehicles with sudden ups and downs. 
The year 1981 marked as abrupt decline in the 
production of both types of vehicles. While the produc-
tion of Medium and Heavy Commercial Vehicles fell down 
by 69 per cent, that of the Heavy Commercial Vehicles 
registered a fall of 61 per cent. The next two consecu-
tive years registered fall in the production of both 
types of vehicles with varying degrees. During the next 
three years production picked up for both types of 
vehicles with varying percentages over the previous 
years. With a slight percentage fall in the production 
of M & HCVs during 1986-87, production of both types of 
vehicles continued to rise til 1990-91. During 1991-92 
while the production of Light Commercial Vehicle 
declined by seven per cent that of the M & HCVs 
increased by three per cent. However, during the year 
1992-93, production of both types of vehicles declined 
(15 per cent in case of M & HCVs and 2 per cent in case 
of light commercial vehicles). Since 1993-94, produc-
tion of both types of vehicles has been showing a 
rising trend. 
The demand for commercial vehicles may also get 
accelerated with new provision of the amended Motor 
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Vehicle Act. The average vehicles have to be replaced 
at a faster rate for ensuring efficiency and economy in 
fuel consumption. The pattern of growth in the sales of 
HCVs and LCVs in the Eight Plan may be different as the 
offtake of HCVs will be more pronounced because of the 
economies in operation and the increase in volume of 
long distance traffic. The target of production was 
around 2 lakhs in 1994-95 and capacity was around 2.2 
lakhs vehicles. 
Telco-the market leader in HCV - also commands 
60 per cent of the light commercial vehicle (LCVs) 
market, followed by Bajaj Tempo, which holds 22 per 
cent of the market with its Matador brand. The 
remaining segment is shared between six other manufac-
turers, all of whom will be trying desperately to break 
TelCO's monopoly. 
In the 1996-97 budget, the excise duty on LCVs 
was hiked from 10 per cent to 15 per cent. Earlier a 
dual excise duty used to prevail in case of commercial 
vehicles. All fuel efficient vehicles (decided on the 
basis of norms released by the Ministry) were required 
to pay 10 per cent duty and other LCVs and Medium and 
Heavy Vehicles were charged 15per cent. Due to the 
rationalised excise duty in the budget, the fuel 
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efficient clause has been abolished and, as a result, 
LCV manufacturers now pay 5 per cent more than what 
they were charged earlier. This has led to an increase 
in the prices of these vehicles which is ultimately 
passed on to the customers and thus can rightly be 
adduced as the prime reason for the sliding of sales 
this year. In fact/ prices have gone up substantially 
by Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 25,000 because of the new duty 
structure. This has directly affected the leading LCV 
manufactures like Telco, Eicher Motors, Bajaj Tempo, 
Ashok Leyland and Swaraj Mazda. 
Protogonists maintain that in the international 
markets, the ratio of LCV to HCV is around 60:40 while 
in Indian market it is around 45:55 and thus this 
segment is likely to grow the fastest. But a point to 
be noted is that growth (sales) here in the last two 
years has been abnormally high (around 35%). Such a 
high growth rate cannot be sustained on a year to year 
basis. During the current year, growth of sales (for 
the April-November period) fell from a height of 40 per 
cent (1995-96 over 1994-95) to a low of 17 per cent in 
1996-97. Although Telco's production has grown by 33 
per cent (61,663 LCVs produced in April-November 
1995-96 as against 46,610 vehicles produced in the 
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previous corresponding period), it is reliably learnt 
that the company has piled up huge inventories. Telco 
has reportedly decided to give priority to liquidating 
stocks in the second half and hence the high growth 
rate in production seen last year is likely to be cut 
down this year. If this is the state of the market 
leader then a slow down can definitely be expected 
o 
among other players too. 
(ii) Passenger Cars : 
Some major developments have also been taking 
place in the passenger car sector. The first passenger 
car plant of India was established on the outskirts of 
Calcutta in the early 1940s and in the next few years 
9 
two more plants came up at Bombay and Madras. But in 
subsequent years there was no induction of new 
technology in the passenger car sector and production 
stagnated. The idea of manufacturing 'Peoples' car 
(small and low priced) was first developed in early 
1960s but this project was not given serious considera-
tion till the 1970s. •'•^  
Table No. 5.2 shows that the total production 
of passenger cars increased from a mere 9267 units in 
1948-50 to 347,800 units in 1995-96 which shows an 
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increase of 3653 per cent over the 1948-50 with the 
average rate of growth of 31.638 per cent. During the 
periods, 1951-55, 1956-60, 1961-65, 1966-70 and 1985 
the production of passenger cars was very impressive. 
Except for the aforementioned periods, the production 
of passenger cars was very low as compared to other 
sectors of the automobile industry. 
The growth in passenger car market, in fact, 
slowed down to under ten per cent on an annual basis. 
Exports continued to drive growth with export volumes 
up at 32 per cent annually as compared to only three 
per cent growh in domestic sales in February, 1997. 
TABLE NO. 5.2 
TREND IN PRODUCTION OF PASSENGER CARS 
(Unit : Number) 
Year Production Growth % over 
Previous Years 
1948-50 
1951-55 
1956-60 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
9267 
23057 
64746 * 
108716 
168627 
176152 
163768 
148.80 
180.80 
67.92 
55.10 
4.47 
- 7.03 
Contd. 
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1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1989-
1990-
1991-
1992-
1993-
1994-
1995-
•90 
•91 
•92 
•93 
•94 
•95 
•96 
SOURCE : 1 
42106 
42674 
44674 
63728 
102456 
115285 
121000 
151000 
166000 
179278 
180333 
166383 
163100 
207658 
264468 
347800 
. Kothari' i 
- 0.74 
1.35 
4.69 
42.66 
60.77 
12.52 
4.96 
24.80 
9.94 
7.99 
0.58 
- 7.73 
- 1.97 
27 .31 
27.35 
31.50 
Kothari's Year Book on Business and Industry, 
Published by Kothari Enterprises/ Madras, 
1988, p. A29. 
2. Kothari's Industrial Directory of India, 
Op.cit., 1994, p. 8-5. 
3. Financial Express, New Delhi, May 20, 1989, 
page 6. 
Export growth (mainly of Maruti) at 36 per cent is more 
than double of the 17 per cent annual growth in the 
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domestic car sales, though significantly below the 30 
per cent improvement in 1995-96, 26 per cent in 1994-95 
and 28 per cent in the previous year. Sales of Maruti's 
800 CC continued to be brisk while the Premium segment 
suffered a bit. 
With the sustained growth in the automobile 
sector the estimated demand for passenger cars by the 
year 2000 would be around 60,000. A recent study by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) shows that the 
demand for the passenger cars is generated in the top 
10 per cent income bracket comprising about 90 million 
people. However, the size of car-owning households is 
currently 3 to 4 million and according to the study, 
the future prospect of the passenger car industry 
would, among other things, depend on the possibility of 
growth in size of households and the growth in incomes 
12 
of this category. 
Passenger car production grew by 19 per cent 
during the April-November of 1996-97. This growth has 
been much lower than the massive 38 per cent growth 
evinced in the same period of 1995-96. Again in the 
1996-97 budget, the duty on cars designed to carry not 
more than six persons remained unchanged at 40 per cent 
and thus did not provide any direct impetus for growth. 
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What comes out clearly in the passenger car market are 
new contestants (in the mid car segment) catering to a 
13 fairly narrow market. 
(iii) Three-wheeler Vehicles : 
It is clear from table No. 5.3 that the total 
production of three-wheeler vehicles increased from 469 
in 1960 to 65,166 in 1992-93 showing an overall 
increase of 13,794.66 per cent over 1960 with the 
average rate of growth of 211.30 per cent. It is also 
evident from the table that the production of three 
wheeler vehicles was continuously rising, from 1960 to 
1990 wherefrom it shows a declining trend. In fact, it 
was for the first time that the production of three-
wheeler vehicles showed a negative trend till 1992-93. 
Thus, this was not a good period for this sector of the 
automobile industry. Bajaj Auto Limited, Automobile 
Products of India Limited and Scooters India Limited, 
are the leading producers. Of them, Bajaj Auto accounts 
for 79 per cent of entire production. Total production 
of three-wheelers was 89,488 during 1990-91, which was 
more than 467 per cent as compared to production of 
14 1976.-^* 
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TABE NO. 5.3 
TREND IN PRODUCTION OF THREE WHEELER VEHICLES 
Year Production Growth % Over 
Previous Year 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1990-
1991-
1992-
1993-
1994-
•91 
•92 
•93 
•94 
•95 
— 
469 
4229 
26519 
49267 
95528 
89162 
76652 
65166 
91608 
127532 
801.7 
527.0 
85,7 
93.8 
- 0.06 
-14.03 
-14.98 
40.57 
39.21 
SOURCE: 1. ACMA, Automotive Industry of India Facts 
and Figures 1989-90, New Delhi. 
2. Kothari's Year Book 1991, Op.cit., p.A76. 
3. Kothari's Industrial Directory of India,1994, 
Op.cit., p. 8-5. 
4. India - 1995, Op.cit., p. 539. 
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Three-wheeler volume growth slowed down in 
February 1997 again despite absolute sales volume 
remaining strong. It is expected that the volume of 
growth will improve in the coming months with the 
phased commissioning of Bajaj Auto's expansion 
15 programme. In fact, three-wheeler population is 
likely to be 1,741,122 by the year 2001."'•^  
(iv) Two Wheelers : 
The first two-wheeler in the country was 
produced in 1955 by the Royal Enfield Motors Limited. 
It was set-up as pioneer in motor-cycle industry in 
collaboration with the Enfield Cycle Corporation 
Limited, England in Madras to manufacture 350 CC 
'Bullet' Motor cycles having a 4-troke single cylinder 
18 
engine. During the late 'Eighties' the Government 
attitude - changed radically. Not only did it recognize 
the advantages of economies of scale but also the fact 
that the models being made in the country were hopeless 
and outdated. There was a long waiting period for 
delivery of vehicles in some cases. The Government 
recognized the need to satisfy the growing demand and 
the consumer was not getting the benefit of modern 
automotive technology in internal combustion engine 
technology available elsewhere outside India. 
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The Government liberalized its technology 
import policy and eased the restrictions on foreign 
collaboration and import of critical components and 
reduced duties and taxes on fuel efficient vehicles. So 
with the new open door policy on technology imports, 
especially the easing of restriction on manufacturing 
equipment and kit imports, there is enthusiasm among 
almost every well known manufacturer abroad to offer 
technical and financial collaboration to the Indian 
companies, the prominent ones are Ind-Suzuki (Motor-
cycles) with Suzuki of Japan, Escorts (Motor-cycles) 
with Yamaha of Japan, Bajaj (Motor-Cycles) with 
Kawasaki of Japan, Hero with Honda of Japan. In 
Scooter, Kinetics with Honda of Japan, Lohia Machines 
and A.P. Scooters with Piaggio of Italy, Kelvinator 
(Moped) with Garelli of Italy, Chamundi Mopeds with 
Cycles Peugeot of France, Mopeds India with Motobecan 
of France and Enfield India (Moped & Motor Cycles) 
with Zundapp Werke of West Germany etc. as is 
evidenced by details given in Table No. 5.4 
It will be clear from Table No. 5.5 that the 
production of two-wheelers rose to 1262396 vehicles in 
1995 against 18626 vehicles in 1960 which showed an 
increase of 6677.6 per cent over 1960 with an average 
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TABLE NO. 5.4 
PASSENGER CAR PROJECTS WITH FOREIGN COLLABORATION 
Foreign Location/ Cost Capacity Comple-
Col la- Country State (P.$ in tion 
boration crores) date 
DCM Daewoo 
Motors 
Hyundai Motor 
India 
Mahindra Ford 
Honda SIEs 
Cars Indi 
Mercedes Eenz 
India 
Overseas 
Concept Auto 
Eicher Motors 
General Motor 
India 
General Motor 
India 
BMW India 
Kinetic Engg. 
Frezer Nash 
Peerless auto 
Daewoo 
Motors 
Hyundai 
Motor 
Ford 
Motor 
Honda 
Motor 
Daimler 
Benz 
Concept 
Auto 
Scoda 
Mitsubi-
shi 
General 
Motors 
BMW 
Aixam 
Briggs & 
Strator 
Frezer 
Nash 
Korea 
Korea 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
Germany 
U.K. 
Germany 
Japan 
U.S.A. 
Germany 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
Surajpur/ 
U.P. 
Irrugattu-
kkottai/ 
T.N. 
Maraimala-
nagar/T.N. 
Noida/U.P. 
Chikhalli/ 
Mah 
Rajpura/ 
Punjab 
KarnatakA 
Chennai/T.N 
Halol/Guj. 
Noida/U.P. 
Pune/Mah 
Okhla/DHL 
3,474 
2,450 
1,700 
855 
750 
600 
500 
. 320 
320 
270 
100 
20 
252 
100 
50 
30 
20 
10 
60 
30 
25 
10 
50 
4 
Dec. 
Jul. 
Dec. 
Oct. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Mar. 
Dec. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Oct. 
N.A. 
.98 
.98 
.98 
.97 
.96 
.98 
.00 
,97 
1 
,96 
SOURCE: Indian Express, Investment Week, New Delhi, January 6-12, 1997. 
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TABLE NO. 5 . 5 
TRENDS IN PRODUCTION OF TWO-WHEELERS 
, A = O u t p u t ( N o . o f V e h i c l e s ) 
B = P e r c e n t S h a r e t o T o t a l 
Year Category Scooters Motor- Mopeds 
cycles 
Total 
1960 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
11994 
64.39 
58392 
51.65 
(386.85) 
101763 
49 
(74.85) 
209943 
50.28 
(106.30) 
202884 
40.65 
(-3.37) 
250727 
42.26 
(23.59) 
273850 
36.07 
(9.23) 
297303 
34.93 
(8.56) 
422307 
37.52 
(42.05) 
3998 
21.46 
42968 
38 
(974.74) 
69739 
33.58 
(62.30) 
101586 
24.32 
(45.67) 
110795 
22.20 
(9.06) 
129999 
21.92 
(17.34) 
156254 
20.58 
(20.19) 
175283 
20.63 
(12.18) 
248001 
22.03 
(41.49) 
2634 
14.15 
11687 
10.35 
(343.70) 
36195 
17.42 
(209.70) 
106073 
25.40 
(193.05) 
185424 
37.15 
(74.80) 
212562 
35.82 
(14.64) 
329079 
43.35 
(54.82) 
376994 
44.37 
(14.56) 
455298 
40.45 
(20.77) 
18626 
113047 
(506.9) 
207697 
(83.7) 
417602 
499103 
(19.5) 
593288 
(18.8) 
759183 
(27.96) 
849580 
(11.9) 
1125606 
(32.48) 
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1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1 9 9 0 - 9 1 
1 9 9 1 - 9 2 
1 9 9 2 - 9 3 
1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
6 
N.A. 
1994 A 
( A p r . S e p t . ) B 
1995 A 
( A p r . S e p t . ) B 
578063 
42.89 
(36 .89 ) 
626000 
44 .61 
(9 .29 ) 
663000 
43.05 
(5 .91 ) 
850000 
50.08 
(28 .20 ) 
875259 
50.45 
(2 .97 ) 
910417 
49,97 
(4 .01 ) 
766620 
47.8 
( - 1 5 . 7 ) 
703105 
46.85 
( - 8 . 2 8 ) 
N.A. 
489457 
48.17 
581160 
46 
(18 .7 ) 
325000 
2 4 . 1 0 
( 3 1 . 0 5 ) 
301000 
2 1 . 4 5 
( - 7 . 3 8 ) 
412000 
2 6 . 7 5 
( 3 6 . 8 7 ) 
421000 
2 4 . 8 
( 2 . 1 8 ) 
417401 
2 4 . 0 6 
( - 0 . 0 0 8 ) 
470859 
2 4 . 8 4 
( 1 2 . 8 ) 
430366 
2 6 . 8 4 
( - 8 . 5 9 ) 
384080 
2 5 . 5 9 
( - 1 0 . 7 5 ) 
N.A. 
292053 
2 8 . 7 4 
388247 
30.75 
( 3 2 . 9 3 ) 
445000 
33 .01 
( - 2 . 2 7 ) 
476000 
33 .92 
( 6 . 9 6 ) 
465000 
30 .19 
( - 2 . 3 1 ) 
426000 
25 .10 
( - 8 . 3 8 ) 
441950 
25 .47 
( 3 . 7 4 ) 
440359 
24 .17 
( - 0 . 3 ) 
406081 
2 5 . 3 3 
( - 7 . 7 8 ) 
413356 
27 .54 
( 1 . 7 9 ) 
N.A. 
234494 
23 .08 
292989 
23.20 ( 2 4 . 9 4 ) 
1348063 
( 1 9 . 7 6 ) 
1403000 
( 4 . 0 7 ) 
1540000 
( 9 . 7 6 ) 
1697000 
( 1 0 . 1 9 ) 
1734610 
( 2 . 2 1 ) 
1821635 
( 5 . 0 1 ) 
1603067 
( - 1 1 . 9 9 ) 
1500541 
( - 6 . 3 9 ) 
1756095 
( 1 7 . 0 3 ) 
1016004 
(-42.14) 
1262396 
( 2 4 . 2 5 ) 
NOTE: The f i g u r e s i n b r a c k e t s i n d i c a t e t h e p e r c e n t a g e r i s e / 
d e c l i n e o v e r p r e v i o u s y e a r . 
SOURCE: 1 . K o t h a r i ' s Year Book on B u s i n e s s and I n d u s t r y , 1 9 8 8 , 
PA20, 1 9 9 1 , PA78. 
2 . F i n a n c i a l E x p r e s s I n v e s t m e n t Week Guide , F e b r u a r y , 
26-March 4 , 1990, Bombay, p . 1 3 . 
3 . K o t h a r i ' s I n d u s t r i a l D i r e c t o r y of I n d i a , 1994 , 
p . 8 - 6 . 
4 . D a t a I n d i a , November 1 9 - 2 5 , 1 9 9 5 . 
5 . I n d i a - 1995, p . 5 3 9 . 
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rate of growth of 43.89 per cent. It is also a fact 
that the production of two-wheelers in some years was 
so low that production figures resulted in negative 
trends in comparison to the previous years. In fact, 
the overall production figure rose in 1985 by 32.48 per 
cent as compared to previous year, while in 1975, as a 
result of the Government's liberalized technology 
import policy, overall increase was 83.7 per cent in 
comparison to 1970. 
The production of scooters was 581160 in 1995 
(April-September) as against 11994 scooters in 1960 
which showed an increase of 4745.42 per cent over 1960. 
The production of Motorcycles was 388247 in 1995 
(April-September) as against 3998 motorcycles in 1960 
which showed an increase of 9611.03 per cent over 1960. 
In 1970, the Motorcycles captured 38 per cent of the 
total production of two-wheelers. The market share of 
the motorcycles was lowest in 1983 (20.58 per cent). 
The production of Mopeds was 292989 in 1995 (April-
September) as against 2634 Mopeds in 1960 which showed 
an increase 11023.34 per cent over 1960. The production 
figures of Mopeds was highest in 1970 which showed 
343.70 per cent increase over 1960 while their 
production figure was lowest in 1989. In the two 
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wheelers market Mopeds captured highest share in 1984 
(44.44%) and the lowest in 1970 with 10.35 per cent of 
the total two-wheelers production. On the whole two-
wheelers production has shown ups and downs over the 
years. 
A close look at the sales pattern of last three 
years is quite revealing. Scooters continue to dominate 
the market with as high as 46.8 per cent share. This is 
perhaps because it is considered to be a family 
vehicle. The remaining market is shared by motorcycles 
and moped. 
Motorcycles sales were the highest for the 
second successive month of 1997. Over the last four 
months sales have accounted for 115 per cent of the 
total two-wheeler volume growth, implying that volumes 
for scooters and mopeds have declined in absolute 
terms. Hero Honda, historically plagued by capacity 
constraints, has been the major market share gainer in 
the last three months, its capacity in Dharuhera having 
21 increased to three lakh vehicles in December 1996. 
The two-wheeler market has shed its complacency 
and has become hot. Manufacturers are trying to woo the 
customers by offering better deals and better products. 
The heavies of the past years like bullet and Jawa have 
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become out dated. They have new bikes in 100 CC class 
made in collaboration with Japanese giants like Honda, 
Kawasaki and others. They have become the rage of the 
youth because of their performance, looks and above 
22 
all, reliability< 
Figure-5.1 indicates that the demand for two-
wheeler vehicles has been constantly increasing from 
1990-91 and this trend is likely to continue till 2000 
A.D.23 
Projected Vehicle Population in India in 2001 : 
The Indian Automobile Manufacturers Association 
(AIAM), the apex body of automobile manufacturers, have 
made some projections on the vehicle population, 
production, sales and exports. According to AIAM, 
India's total vehicle population is estimated to cross 
over 53 million by the year 2000-2001 from the present 
27 million (1994-95) . 
The major contribution to this 53 million plus 
vehicle population is expected to come from two-
wheelers with a total number of 40,260,383. Passenger 
cars is next with an expected population of 6,166,026 
followed by Light, Medium and Heavy Commercial Vehicles 
while the three-wheelers population is likely to be 
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TABLE NO. 5,6 
PROJECTED VEHICLE POPULATION IN INDIA IN 2001 
Year Total 
1992-93 23,198,090 
1993-94 25,343,426 
1994-95 27,761,857 
1995-96 31,015,507 
1996-97 34,606,762 
1997-98 38,627,143 
1998-99 43,159,562 
1999-2000 48,240,222 
2000-2001 53,100,314 
SOURCE: Data India, Press Trust of India, New delhi, 
November, 19-25, 1995, p. 903. 
1,741,122 by the year 2001, the number of utility 
vehicles like the Jeep is estimated to be 1,083,947. The 
AIT^ also claims that total vehicles sales wil also go 
up considerably from 2,985,000 in 1994-95 to 3,253,650 
in 1995-96 and would reach 5,668,726 by the year 
2000-2001.^^ 
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During the Eighties India became the seventh 
largest producer of automobiles and the industry is not 
only able to meet the country's requirement but also 
25 has some exportable surplus. With about 12 lakh 
vehicles of all types being manufactured every year in 
India, the country currently ranks ninth among the 
26 
automobile manufacturing countries in the World. In 
the production of two-wheelers / India stand second in 
the world after Japan. 
EXPORTS OF AUTO COMPONENTS : 
It is clear from table No. 5.7 that Auto 
component exports, which were hovering around a low 
base of Rs. 150-200 crore near the end 'Eighties' and 
improved to Rs. 234 crore in 1990-91, almost doubled to 
Rs. 400 crore in the following year. By 1994-95, the 
value of exports peaked to Rs. 750 crores, recording an 
annual average growth rate of nearly 30 per cent during 
the first five year of the current decade. The auto 
parts exported include brake linings, engine values, 
piston rings etc. Major Indian auto component exporting 
companies are Motor Industries Company (MICO), Bharat 
Forge, Brakes India, Sundaram Fasteners, Bharat gears. 
Wheels India, gabrie India etc. The leading importing 
countries are Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Nepal, 
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Sri Lanka, Kenya, France, Germany, USA, Holland, Italy 
27 
and Canada. 
TABLE NO. 5.7 
EXPORTS : RISING TRENDS 
Year Export value As % of value of 
(Rs. in crore) Production 
6.0 
6.3 
7.7 
8.6 
8.4 
11.8 
12.3 
12.1 
11.5 
SOURCE: Kothari's Industrial Directory of India, Kothari 
Enterprises, Chennai, 1996-97, p. 8-6. 
PRIVATIZATION IN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
(i) Meditjm size Cars and Light Commercial Vehicles: 
Late ' Eighties' opened up a new chapter in 
history of Indian automobile industry. A number of new 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
73.1 
96.6 
153.9 
200.00 
234.1 
400.0 
512.0 
630.0 
750.0 
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automobile manufacturing units were incorporated for 
medium sized cars and Light Commercial Vehicles. It 
took nearly three decades for the passenger car 
industry to take its next step forward. In the early 
1980s/ as a result of the oil crises, the automobile 
industry world over had to look inwards and reorient 
itself to the changes in product designs. So new 
manufacturing process technoiogies were evolved. These 
consequently led to an increased emphasis on weight 
reduction/ optimum product design, appropriate quality 
and fuel efficiency. So, the Government decided to look 
up the manufacture of a 'peoples car' in public sector. 
With Japanese know-how and financial participation 
Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) was incorporated on 24th 
28 February 1981 after taking over the assets of the 
erstwhile .Maruti Limited which was nationalised by an 
Act of Parliament in the Year 1980. The objective of 
the company was envisaged to employ modern 
manufacturing technology. It entered into collaboration 
agreement with M/s Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan in 
October, 1982 for transfer of technology relating to 
passenger cars and light vehicles then in production in 
29 Japan. The production commenced in November 1983. 
MUL's origins can be traced to the bail-out it 
received (by way of nationalisation) in the wake of 
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Sanjay Gandhi's untimely death. It was concieved to 
takeover the assets of the abortive, yet loss-making, 
automobile venture started by this son of a former 
30 Prime Minister of India. 
The main objectives of the government in setting 
up MUL were modernization of the automobie industry, 
production of fuel efficient vehicles and to produce a 
modern car at a price affordable by more and more 
people. Skilled persons who were associated with Maruti 
Udyog alongwith the government took a decision to 
manufacture LCV and medium sized family cars, 50 per 
cent of whose production was to be exported. So, the 
government approached the leading manufacturers of 
Europe and Japan but, except for Renault of France, no 
one was ready to buy back 50 per cent of what was to be 
produced by MUL. 
In September 1981 the MUL commissioned a market 
survey conducted by Indian Market Research Bureau 
(IMRB) to ascertain the kind of cars that the peoples 
31 
are willing to buy. The survey showed that majority 
of Indians wanted to buy car at a low price with 
minimum of maintenance cost, inexpansive and fuel 
efficient. There are basically three segments the small 
car segment represented by small engine capacity cars 
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32 
such as Maruti-800, Omni, for the medium class 
families in India. The other variant could be a model 
that will have a little more engine power raising its 
engine capacity by about 1000 CC. A Maruti spokes 
person admitted that different designs of the 800 
model are being worked out. But he ruled out that the 
present engine capacity of Maruti 800 may be increased 
33 by another 100 CC, 4-wheel drive Gypsy and 1000 
CCB-Box car with different versions. The company also 
produces cars for handicapped and left hand drive (LHD) 
models of 800 CC car and Gypsy. 
The Maruti 800 model holds more than 80 per 
cent of the car segment in India and still privilege of 
having a waiting list of about two-to-three weeks 
despite a number of automobile MNCs trooping into the 
34 Indian market. The medium car segment consisting of 
semi-luxury cars priced at Rs. 2.5 lakhs to Rs. 3.5 
lakhs, introduced some years ago such as. Premier 
118NE, Contessa classic and standard 2000. The third is 
the large luxury car segment, comprising luxury cars 
with bigger engine capacity and modern technological 
features. These include models like Maruti Esteem, 
Maruti-1000, Maruti Zen, Tata Sierra and Tata Estate. 
Many reputed foreign car makers are also tieing up with 
Indian parties for introducing well-known models in the 
35 Indian Market. 
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Sequentially, a joint Venture Agreement and 
Licence Agreement were signed with M/S Suzuki Motor 
Company Limited (SMC) of Japan on 2nd October 1982. 
This agreement signed between the Government of India 
and Suzuki Motor Company (SMC), for licence and 
transfer of technology to Maruti Udyog Limited was upto 
1992 but it was further extended. 
MUL set up its Research and Development 
Division in 1986 for smooth and quick results. The 
major objectives of the R & D Division were as followsr 
(1) Absorption of imported technology. 
(2) Production modifications to suit needs of 
Indian and overseas customers bringing about 
speedy indigenisation of components by transfer 
and absorption of technological know how. 
(3) To undertake mandatory safety related and 
performance related testing know how. 
The achievements claimed by the Research & 
Development (R&D) Division of the MUL during the past 
38 two years are as follows : 
(1) New Product Developed : The Gypsy was modified for 
increasing its treat for better stability during 
cornering at high speeds. 
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(ii) Launching of Zen in domestic market and also in 
export market after absorbing technology from 
Suzuki/ Japan, 
(iii) Introduction of 1300 CC engine on Maruti 3 Box 
Car for domestic market with upgradation of 
interiors etc. 
(iv) National type approval was obtained for YE2 
model in Holland, U.K., Germany and Belgium, 
(v) Suspension system was modified for Zen to suit 
Indian road conditions and driving habits. 
(vi) Modification of Maruti 800 Left Hand Drive car 
to meet emission requirement as per EEC/91/441 
(transitionary clause EEC/89/458) for extending 
life of Maruti 800 for export, 
(vii) Adoption of compressed Natural Gas Kit on 
Maruti 800, Omni and Gypsy. 
Equity Participation between Government of India and SMCi 
In the very beginning, equity participation 
between government of India and SMC was decided 74 per 
cent and 26 per cent with Suzuki Motor Corporation 
(SMC). But during the 1990, the equity shares of the 
SMC was raised from 26 per cent to 40 per cent. 'Legal 
Status of Maruti Udyog Limited has changed w.e.f. 
20.06.1992 from a Government Company to a company 
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without direct responsibility for management when 
Maruti alloted and issued 22,04,860 additional equity 
shares of Rs. 100 each to Suzuki Motor Corporation, 
Japan. With due aforesaid allotment and issue of shares 
to Suzuki, Government's equity has come down to less 
than 51 per cent in the total paid up capital of the 
company. The present share holding pattern of the 
corporation given in the following table : 
TABLE NO. 5.8 
PATTERN OF SHARE HOLDING IN MUL 
Shareholder Equity (Rs.) % Share 
Government of India 65,80,18,100 49.74% 
Suzuki Motor Corporation 66,14,58,100 50.00% 
MUL Employees Mutual 
Benefit Fund 34,40,000 vO.26% 
Total 1,32,29,16,200 100% 
SOURCE: Public Enterprises survey. Government of India, 
Department of Public Enterprises, Ministry of 
Industry, New Delhi, 1990-91, Vol. 1, p. 90. 
The Minister of Industries has asserted that 
under no circumstances Government's share of 49.74 per 
39 
cent will be diluted. Thus, MUL was privatised on 
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June 20, 1992, after the Expert Committee recommended 
to the Government to reduce its equity. At present, the 
equity held by the SMC is 50 per cent while the 
government holds 49.74 and MUL 0.26 per cent. The 
capital structure was decided with a debt equity ratio 
of 2.1:1 under the third plan, the expansion is likely 
to be financed through Rs. 700 crores of equity and 
Rs. 900 crores of debt. Out of this amount, Rs. 400 
crores will be used to finance the modernization of the 
40 
existing plants. According to the original Joint 
Venture agreement,the clause can be invoked after one 
lakh vehicles have been produced by MUL or 10 years 
have lapsed - in addition Suzuki should have held the 
41 
shares for a period of at least 4 years. 
Public Issue : MUL came out with a public issue of 
1759500 Equity Shares of Rs. 10/- each at a premium of 
Rs. 60/- per share for the Indian Public on competitive 
basis and 6,50,000 Equity Shares of Rs. 10/- each at a 
premium of Rs. 70/- per share for the Mutual Funds/NRIs 
etc. on firm allotment basis. The issue, opened on June 
14th 1995, was oversubscribed and the allotment was 
duly made on August 3rd, 1995 : As a result the paid up 
capital of the company increased to Rs. 607.01 lacs, as 
against Rs. 400.00 lacs last year. The shares are 
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listed on three Stock Exchanges, namely Mumbai/ Delhi & 
Jaipur. The issue proceeds are being utilised for the 
purpose of constructing an integrated workshop in 
Patparganj (a locality situated at East of Delhi)/ The 
workshop would be the only workshop of its kind in the 
T, • 42 Region. 
Production of Cars : 
Table No. 5.9 sets out figures of car 
production by Hindustan Motors, Premier Automobiles and 
Maruti Udyog Limited. It is clear from the table that 
the total production of Hindustan Motor Limited cars 
increased from 22017 in 1980-81 to 27710 in 1995-96 
showing an overall increase of 25.857 per cent over 
year 1980-81 with the rate of growth of 2.76 per cent 
per annum. Similarly, Premier Automobile Limited cars 
increased from 9301 in 1980-81 to 20322 in 1995-96 
showing an overall increase of 118.49 per cent over 
year 1980-81 with the rate of growth of 11.13 per cent 
per annum. It is also clear from the figures that 
Premier Automobile Limited is more dominant in the 
market than Hindustan Motors Limited. As far the 
Maruti Udyog Limited, its cars increased from 844 in 
1983-84 to 268,756 in 1995-96 showing an overall 
increase of 31743.127 per cent over the year 1983-84 
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TABLE NO. 5 .9 
PRODUCTION OF CARS 
Hindus tan Motor L t d . P r e m i e r Auto L t d . M a r u t i Udyog L t d . 
Year Nos. % o v e r Nos . % ove r Nos . % o v e r 
p r e v i o u s p r e v i o u s p r e v i o u s 
y e a r y e a r y e a r 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
22017 
22771 
22646 
24176 
24641 
23271 
23156 
26552 
28693 
28730 
25164 
16043 
21848 
25893 
26177 
27710 
-
3.43 
- 0.55 
6.77 
1.93 
- 5.56 
- 0.49 
14.67 
8.06 
0.12 
-12.41 
-36.25 
36.18 
18.51 
1.09 
5.86 
9301 
19764 
20778 
21456 
28014 
29265 
27457 
33556 
38743 
42314 
42925 
32563 
15342 
24718 
27213 
20322 
-
112.50 
5.13 
3.26 
30.56 
4.47 
- 6.17 
22.21 
15.46 
9.22 
1.45 
-24.13 
-52.89 
61.11 
10.09 
-25.32 
-
-
-
844 
22481 
49718 
73762 
90848 
98505 
108023 
112827 
116697 
121973 
149743 
198601 
268756 
-
-
-
-
2563.63 
121.16 
48.36 
23.16 
8.42 
9.66 
4.44 
3.43 
4.52 
22.77 
32.63 
35.32 
SOURCE: V a r i o u s I s s u e s of Assocham P a r l i a m e n t a r y D i g e s t , A u t o m o b i l e 
Component M a n u f a c t u r e r s A s s o c i a t i o n of I n d i a (ACMA), New D e l h i , 
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with an annual rate of growth of 239.79 per cent. 
Lastly, the figures presented in the table 
also bring to light the fact that MUL, because of its 
light and fuel efficient models, has been capturing the 
market while the other two competitors are being 
religated to the background. 
Market Share : 
Table No. 5.10 presents figures with respect 
to the respective market shares of HML, PAL and MUL 
from 1980-81 to 1995-96. As will be seen from the 
table, upto the year 1983-84 Indian car market was 
dominated by HML and PAL makes. However, over the years 
the share of HML once a market leader, has come down 
from 70 per cent in 1980-81 to 8 per cent in 1995-96. 
Similarly, the share of Premier Automobiles, which once 
enjoyed as much as 49 per cent of the Indian car market 
has come down to merely 6 per cent. MUL entered the 
Indian car market in 1983-84 with a meagre share of 2 
per cent. Over the years its share has gone up as much 
as 77 per cent in 1995-96. In fact, more and more 
people are preferring small, light and fuel efficient 
cars. It seems the new entrants fear to tread the 
path taken by India's 'number one' car manufacturers. 
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TABLE NO. 5.10 
MARKET SHARE 
Hindustan Premier Auto-
Motor Ltd. mobile Ltd. 
(%) (%) 
Maruti Udyog 
Limited 
(%) 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1992-93 
1995-96 
70 
53 
51 
52 
33 
23 
19 
17 
17 
16 
14 
N.A. 
8 
— 
45 
49 
N.A 
46 
37 
29 
22 
23 
24 
24 
N.A 
6 
2 
30 
49 
59 
60 
59 
60 
62 
66 
77 
SOURCE: Table prepared, in the present form, by the 
author by compiling figures from various 
issues of Assochem Parliementary Digest, ACMAi 
New Delhi. 
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Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL), which has flooded the 
market with its fuel efficient economically priced 
small family car. The possible reason for this seems to 
be a certain amount of risk involved in developing a 
43 
new market which is presently a monopoly of market. 
Sale of Passenger Cars : 
Table No. 5.11 sets out data regarding the 
sale of passenger cars. It will be seen from the table 
that the sale of passenger cars manufactured by 
Hindustan Motors Limited increased from 23021 in 
1990-91 to 27730 in 1995-96 showing an overall increase 
of 20.46 per cent over the year 1990-91 with the annual 
rate of growth of 5.46 per cent. It is also evident 
from table that the total sale of Passenger Cars 
manufactured by Premier Automobiles Limited decreased 
from 42561 in 1990-91 to 20340 in 1995-96 showing an 
overall decrease of 52.209 per cent over the year 
1990-91 with the negative rate of growth of sales of -
- 8.75 per cent. 
It is also clear from table that the total sale 
of passenger cars/ manufactured by MUL increased from 
111860 in 1990-91 to 267020 in 1995-96 showing an 
overall increase of 138.70 per cent over the year 
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TABLE NO. 5.11 
PASSENGER CARS I SALES 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Hindustan 
Nos. 
23021 
17263 
21897 
26149 
26131 
27730 
Motor Ltd. 
% over 
previous 
year 
-25.01 
-25.01 
26.84 
19.42 
- 0.07 
6.12 
Premier 
Nos. 
42561 
30887 
17388 
25002 
27206 
20340 
Auto.Ltd. 
% over 
previous 
year 
-
-27.43 
-43.70 
43.79 
8.82 
-25.23 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. 
Nos. 
1118860 
118083 
121620 
150929 
198930 
267020 
% over 
previous 
year 
-
5.56 
2.99 
24.09 
31.80 
34.23 
SOURCE: Assochem Parliamentary Digest, ACMA, New Delhi. 
1990-91 with the annual rate of sale of 19.734 per 
cent. 
Production of Utility Vehicles (JEEPs); 
Presently, there are two major units producing 
jeeps in the country, viz. Mahindra & Mahindra Limited 
44 (M&M) and Marutx Udyog Limited. Mahindra & Mahindra 
is a pioneer in Jeep industry of the country. The total 
production of utility vehicles numbering 11,010 during 
1976 increased to 67643 in 1995-96 recording a rise of 
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514.37 per cent over 1976. It is clear from the table 
5.12 that the total production of Jeep, manufactured by 
M&M Limited increased from 27368 in 1990-91 to 58623 in 
1995-96 showing an overall increase of 114.20 per cent 
over the year 1990-91 with the rate of growth of 17.87 
per cent per annum. It is also evident from the table 
that the production of Jeeps / manufactured by MUL, 
decreased from 10001 in 1990-91 to 9020 in 1995-96 
showing an overall decrease of 9.81 per cent over the 
year 1990-91 with the rate of growth of 2.52 per cent 
per annum. Therefore, the Mahindra & Mahindra dominated 
the market as compared to Maruti Udyog. 
Sales of Utility Vehicles : 
Table No. 5.13 deals with figures of total 
sales of Jeeps, manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra 
Limited and Maruti Udyog Limited. The sale of M&M Jeeps 
increased from 27248 in 1990-91 to 57387 in 1995-96 
showing an overall increase of 110.60 per cent over the 
year 1990-91 with an annual rate of sales of 16.88 per 
cent. The sales of M&M Jeeps has, thus, shown an 
increasing trend. It is also evident from the table 
that the total of Maruti's products decreased from 8675 
in 1990-91 to 8582 in 1995-96 showing an overall 
decrease of 1.07 per cent over the year 1990-91 with 
annual rates of sales of 1.45 per cent. Thus, the 
demand of M&M Jeep is higher than Maruti Jeep. 
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TABLE NO. 5 .12 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
PRODUCTION OF 
Mahindra 
Nos. 
27368 
26307 
33247 
43799 
42328 
58623 
UTILITY VEHICLES 
• 
& Mahindra 
% over prev. 
year 
-
- 3.88 
26.38 
31.74 
-38.49 
38.49 
Maruti 
Nos. 
10001 
5194 
6029 
6037 
7347 
9020 
Udyoq Limited 
% over prev. 
year 
-
-48.06 
16.07 
0.13 
21.69 
22.77 
SOURCE: Assocham P a r l i a m e n t a r y Digest,ACMA,New D e l h i 
TABLE NO. 5 .13 
SALES OF UTILITY VBHICISS(JEEPS) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Mahindra 
Nos. 
97248 
28303 
92620 
43207 
43225 
57387 
& Mahindra 
% over prev. 
year 
-
3.87 
15.25 
32.46 
0.04 
32.76 
Maruti 
Nos. 
8675 
6568 
5610 
6243 
7725 
8582 
Udyog Limited 
% over prev. 
year 
-
-24.29 
-14.59 
11.28 
23.74 
11.09 
SOURCE: Assocham Parliamentary Digest, ACMA, New Delhi, 
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Industry Structure : 
Three distinct segments are visible in the 
industry. The largest is the small car segment 
(approximately 60 per cent of industry sales) 
comprising a single manufacturer, Maruti, with its 
800 CC car and Van priced around Rs. 0.2 million. The 
Premier Padmini (from Premier Automobiles) and the 
Ambassador (from Hindustan Motors) make tip the medium 
segment (below 20 per cent of industry sales) with a 
price range of between Rs. 0.2 to 0.3 million, followed 
by the luxury car segment priced at a over Rs. 0.3 
million. Maruti, with its two models in the small car 
segment, dominates the industry with a 72 per cent 
45 
market share and currently its percentage has 
increased to 80 per cent. 
Two cc»npanies manufacture Jeeps in the country. 
Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) dominates with a market share 
of 87.4 per cent followed by Maruti with share of 12.6 
per cent/. M&M's dominance in the Jeep market is 
attributed to its diesel - powered vehicles. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MARUTI DDYOG LTD. (MUL) i 
For efficient running of any organisation its 
'organisation structure' has its own importance because 
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it pinpoints duties, responsbilities and authority of 
various persons and creates a sense of consciousness 
among them. According to George Terry, 'Organization 
structure is a diagrammatical form which shows 
important aspects of an organization including the 
major functions and their respective relationship, the 
channel of supervision and relative authority of each 
employee who is incharge of each respective 
47 . function. According to Allen A. Louis, organization 
is the process of identifying and grouping the work to 
be performed, defining and delegating the responsibi-
lity and authority and establishing a pattern of 
relationship for the purpose of enabling people to work 
most effectively to accomplish the objectives of an 
industrial organization. 
Usually, it is the Board of Directors which is 
responsible for the day-to-day functioning of an 
organization for attaining its ultimate goals. As in 
any other industrial concerns. Board of Directors of 
MUL is the top administrative organ as well as the 
Supreme policy making body of the company. The 
directors hold responsibility for management. First 
directors are appointed by the Promoters and their 
names are mentioned in the Articles of Association* 
Subsequently, they are elected by shareholders at the 
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Annual General Meeting of the company. The present size 
of MUL board is nine of which six are full time 
directors while three of them are part-time. The 
Chairman of the Board is appointed by the Government of 
India who also acts as part-time director of the 
company. Two other part time directors are secretaries 
of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Heavy 
Industry (Department of Public Enterprises) respec-
tively. 
It is clear from Chart 5.1 that one of the six 
full time directors is representative director of the 
SMC and other directors are director of production, 
director of material, director of technical, director 
of finance etc. The Managing Director is Chief 
Executive of the company who is also supreme authority. 
He is assisted by the aforementioned four directors 
who, in turn, are assisted by twelve Divisional /heads 
directly or indirectly in routine matters. The Managing 
Director is having all powers authorized by board and 
is responsible for all important policy matters such as 
production, marketing, sales, quality control, vendor 
upgradation, employees welfare schemes etc. There are 
thirteen main divisions, five of which are reporting 
directly to the Managing Director while the rest eight 
Divisional Heads report to their respective Directors. 
•As per the 1992 agreement signed between Government 
and SMC the joint venture partners had agreed on SMC 
first exercising the right to have its nominee as 
Managing Director and the Government opting to name its 
candidate as chairman. After the completion of five 
years the Government was empowered to nominate its 
candidate as Managing Director followed by SMC having 
its candidate as non-executive chairman. (Hindustan Times 
Mew Delhi, 30 August, 1997). 
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Chart No-3.1 
MARUTI UDY06 LIMITED 
ORCANISATION STRUCTURE CHART 
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Thus, the Managing Director is to be helped by four 
Directors, thirteen Divisional Managers and fifty five 
Departmental Managers and one company Secretary. 
The Director of technical matters is assisted 
by one Divisional Manager and four Departmental 
Managers. Similarly, the Director of Projects & 
Production is to be helped by three Divisional Managers 
viz. Production Manager, Production Service Manager and 
Production Engineering Manager, The Production 
Divisional Manager is to be helped by Departmental 
Managers of Production, Planning, Control, Press Shop, 
Weldshop, Paint Shop, Assembly Shop, Machine Shop etc. 
The Divisional Manager of production service is to be 
helped by Departmental Managers of facilities 
maintenance and operations, civil engineering, civil 
maintenance, and factory administration. The production 
Engineering is to be helped by Press Engineering, Body 
Engineering, Assembly Engineering, Machine Engineering, 
tool room and projects. Similarly the director of 
material is tobe helped by three Divisional Managers, 
viz., vendor development, material administration and 
vendor upgradation. The vendor development manager is 
to be helped by three Departmental Managers. The 
material administration manager is to be helped by four 
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Departmental Managers. Similarly, the Director of 
Finance is to be helped by one Divisional Manager who 
is assisted by five Departmental Managers. Thus, each 
and every Director of the Board of Directors is 
assisted by a number of Divisional Managers and 
Divisional Managers are assisted by each Departmental 
Manager and onwards. 
In general, a division is divided into a number 
of departments and department consists of one or more 
than one deputy manager. Under him there are two or 
more than two senior executives, and also two or more 
than two junior executives, one private secretary and 
a number of supervisors. The number of the supervisors 
depends upon the size and function of the department. 
The production areas have more supervisors than non-
production areas. Below the supervisor there are 
technicians and clerical staff. It will be observed from 
foregoing discussion that there is no set quota for a 
department and that a particular department needs so 
much staff below the manager. Below the departmental 
manager/it is very difficult to categories and classify 
the employees in the company. All employees are 
categorised between LOl L020. L020 stands for Managing 
director (M.D.) while LOl & L02 stand for unskilled 
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personnel and remaining employees fall between L03 to 
L019. -^ The company has its Registered office in the 
Union Territory of Delhi and plant at Gurgaon 
(Haryana). The company is also having its Regional 
Offices in Mumbai/ Calcutta, New Delhi, Chennai and 
Chandigarh and other offices in Kandla and Nhava Sheva. 
Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 309 of 
the Companies Act and Article 121(2) (ii) of the 
Company's Articles of Association, the Directors of 
the Company (other than a Managing Director, and a 
Director appointed as a whole-time Director) are 
entitled to receive a commission up to one per cent of 
the net profits of the company computed in the manner 
referred to in Section 98(1) of the Companies Act 1956 
in any financial year for a period of 5 years 
49 
commencing 1st April 1996. 
It is a primary aspect for a company to 
achieve more for the development of a country' s 
economy. The achievements of MUL are categorised into 
several categories, as follows ; 
PRODUCTION : 
It is clear from Table No. 5.14 that higher 
growth rate in production in the year 1984-85 was the 
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result of the fact that masses had become fed up with 
existing models having outdated technology. As such, 
production increased to 277776 vehicles in 1995-96 
against 852 vehicles in 1983-84 showing an overall rise 
of 32502.816 per cent over the year 1983-84 with a rate 
of growth of 237.51 per cent per annum. The percentage 
of growth rate in production was lowest in 1991-92 
showing a decrease of -0.762 per cent over previous 
year. 
TABLE NO. 5.14 
PRODUCTION OF VEHICLES IN NUMBERS 
Year Production % increase/decrease 
over previous year 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
852 
22372 
51580 
80150 
92630 
105547 
117400 
122828 
121891 
128002 
155780 
277776 
2525.82 
130.55 
55.38 
15.57 
13.94 
11.23 
4.62 
- 9.762 
5.01 
21.70 
34.87 
SOURCE: 1. Compiled from various is^uses of PE surveys 
2. Financial Express, New Delhi, April 2, 1990 
3. Assocham Parliament Digest. . 
4. ACMA. 
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SALE : 
The sales of the company increased to 2,75,411 
units in 1995-96 against 22048 units in 1984-85 which 
works out to an increase of 1149.142 per cent over the 
year 1984-85 with an average rate of growth 29.36 per 
cent as seen from Table No. 5.15 given below : 
TABLE NO. 5.15 
SALES OF VEHICLES IN NUMBERS 
Year Sales Growth % over previous 
year 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
22048 
47694 
82308 
94033 
105592 
117335 
120802 
122438 
127230 
160132 
205987 
275411 
116.32 
72.58 
14.25 
12.29 
11.12 
2.95 
1,35 
3.91 
25.86 
28.63 
33.70 
SOURCE: Same as for Table 5.14 
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As will be clear from the figures, the lowest 
percentage growth of sale was 1.35 per cent in 1991-92 
while highest growth was 116.32 per cent in 1985-86 
over the previous year. 
The company sold over 15900 MUL vehicles (All 
Models) during 1995-96 which formed 6.4 per cent of the 
total domestic sales of Maruti Udyog Ltd. It is indeed 
a matter of pride that company sold the highest number 
of vehicles for the fifth consecutive year in a row of 
all the dealers of Maruti Udyog Ltd. in the country. 
The company has once again bagged the award for 'BEST 
DEALER' for sale of maximum number of cars (all Models) 
& spare parts, from Maruti Udyog Ltd. for the year 
1995-96. The company has also received a special award 
from SUZUKI Motors Corporation, Japan, in appreciation 
of its contribution to the overall achievements. 
Table No. 5.16 shows the growth of export 
earnings by the MUL between 1986-87 to 1995-96. It is 
clear from tedsle that MUL had started its exports in 
1986-87 by exporting 102 vehicles and touched the 
figure of 26,103 vehicles in 1995-96. Showing a rise of 
25491.176 per cent over the year 1986-87. The export of 
22,921 vehicles, during 1991-92 registered an increase 
of 367 per cent over the year 1990-91. Out of this. 
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TABLE NO. 5.16 
EXPORT OF MARUTI VEHICLES 
Year Vehicles Rs.in crores 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1994-95 
1995-96 
102 
713 
1408 
5100 
-
22921 
3200 
26103 
(First quarter) 
0.55 
3.62 
9.46 
41.37 
61.82 
244.58 
-
3731 
SOURCE: 1. Annual reports of various years. 
2. Day after (monthly). New Delhi, May 1990, 
p. 58. 
3. Public Enterprises Survey, Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, Govt, of India, New Delhi, 1995-
96. 
21,881 vehicles were sold to the competitive markets of 
Europe. Exports to Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungry and 
Portugal showed considerable increase. In addition, 
repeated orders were received from Australia, 
Mauritius, Tanzania, France, Malta and other countries. 
The company achieved an export of 26,103 
vehicles of the value of Rs. 3731 crores. The Suzuki 
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Auto (Zen) was launched in 19 new countries including 
Italy, Denmark, France, Portugal, Australia and Chile. 
The Suzuki Auto was rated the best car in its category 
in the Netherland's market. Ten new markets were 
developed during the year 1995-96 for exports. 
PROFIT AFTER TAX (PAT) : The profit is the backbone of any 
company. The data set out in Table No. 5.17 indicate 
that the Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) posted profit after 
taxt (PAT) from 1983-84 to 1996-97 except for the years 
1992-93 and 1993-94. It is also clear from the table 
that the percentage growth rate moved up and down 
during these years. It is also seen that PAT has 
increased to Rs. 501 crores in 1996-97 against Rs. 1.7 
crores in 1983-84 showing an overall rise of 29370.588 
per cent over the year 1983-84. The percentage of 
growth rate in PAT was lowest in 1984-85 showing a 
decrease of -47.05 per cent while it was higher in 
1986-87 showing an increase of 240 per cent over 
previous year. 
The company earned net profit of Rs. 29.07 
crores during 1991-92 as against Rs. 48.33 crores in 
the previous year. The decline in profit was on account 
of sharp fall in the value of rupee required to buy 
304 
TABLE NO. 5.17 
PROFIT AFTER TAXT (PAT) OF MUL IN DIFFERENT YEARS 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year Retained profits % growth over 
previous years 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1.7 
0.9 
3.0 
10.2 
18.4 
20.8 
40.00 
48.33 
20.07 
448 
428 
501 
47.05 
233.33 
240.00 
80.39 
13.04 
101.92 
15.07 
-39.85 
-4.46 
17.05 
SOURCE: 1. Public Enterprises Survey, Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, Ministry of Industry, Government 
of India, New Delhi, various issues. 
2. Annual Report of MUL 1988-89. 
3. The Financial Express, New Delhi, April 1, 
1997, p. 1. 
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Eximscrips to make imports, needed to provide margin 
money for imports and increasing inflation. Due to 
recession in passenger car industry domestic sale of 
vehicles was about 14 per cent lower than domestic 
sales in the previous year. Also, the company earned 
net profit of Rs. 427.65 crores during 1995-96 as 
against Rs. 447.60 crores in the previous year. The 
production registered an increase of 34.6 per cent from 
206330 vehicles in 1994-95 to a record of 277776 
vehicles in 1995-96 
The PAT posted by MUL of Rs. 501 crores for 
1996-97, shows an increase of 17.05 per cent over the 
PAT of Rs. 428 crores for the previous year. 
MUL's profit before tax (PBT) increased to 
Rs.801 crores in 1996-97 showing an increase of 23 per 
cent from Rs. 652 crores in 1995-96. Total income of 
MUL was Rs. 7,916 crores, an increase of 18 per cent as 
compared to Rs. 6,685 crores in the previous year. 
Sale of vehicles by MUL increased from 2,75,411 in 
1995-96 to 338,690 in 1996-97 showing an increase of 23 
per cent. However, competition is on the increase and 
MUL cannot sit idle and be complacent on its past 
performance. Mr. R.C. Bhargava managing director was 
right when he remarked 'there was a great degree of 
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concern on how the year 1996-97 would turn out for MUL. 
Competition was increasing and there were apprehensions 
on how we will survive in the market.' 
TABLE NO. 5.18 
ACTUAL PRODUCTION OF MARUTI VEHICLES 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Production 
(Y) 
852 
22372 
51580 
80150 
92630 
105547 
117400 
122828 
121891 
128002 
155780 
205948 
277776 
Taking 
deviations 
from 90(X) 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
XV 
-5112 
-111860 
-206320 
-240450 
-185260 
-105547 
0 
122828 
243782 
384006 
623120 
1029740 
1666656 
X2 
36 
25 
16 
9 
4 
1 
0 
1 
4 
9 
16 
25 
36 
N = 1 3 , 2 Y = 1482756 ZX = 0, SIXY = 3215583 , SX^ = 182 
XY = N a + b ^ X ( i ) 
ZXY = a ' 2 . X + b 2 l X 2 ( i i ) 
307 
' Y = a + bx (iii) 
a = X y From equation (i) After putting the 
N value of x = 0 
a = >148|256_ ^ 114058.15 
b = - ^ ^y From equation (ii) after the 
Zx2 
putting value of x = 0 
V, _ 3215583 
° ~ = 17668.038 
182 
a = 114058.15, b = 17668.038 
y = 114058.15 + 17668.038 x 
It is the equation of straight line. By putting 
the values of X (7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14.15) we calculate 
estimated production of MUL from 1997 to 2005 as given 
below : 
It is clear from Table No. 5.19 that the 
estimated production of Maruti vehicles will be 379079 
units in 2005 as against 237734 units in 1997. It means 
an increase of 59.455 per cent over the year 1997 and a 
growth rate of 6 per cent per annum. But as time will 
come / the rate of growth of Maruti vehicles in 
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TABLE NO. 5.19 
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MARUTI VEHICLES (EXTRAPOLATED) 
Year Production % growth rate of estimated 
(in Numbers) production 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
237734 
255403 
273071 
290739 
308407 
326075 
343743 
361411 
379079 
7.43 
6.91 
6.47 
6.07 
5.72 
5.41 
5.13 
4.88 
production is likely to shrink because of a large 
number of other competitors with their fuel efficient 
vehicles that will be available at more economical 
prices. But the number of Maruti Vehicles will increase 
year by year due to increase in demand. 
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TABLE NO. 5 . 2 0 
ACTUAL SALES OF B4ARUTI VEHICLES 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 6 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Sales (Y) 
22048 
47694 
82308 
94033 
105592 
117335 
120802 
122438 
127230 
160132 
205987 
275411 
Taking 
deviation 
from 90.5(X) 
-5.5 
-4.5 
-3.4 
-2.5 
-1.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
2X 
-11 
- 9 
- 7 
- 5 
- 3 
- 1 
1 
3 
5 
7 
9 
11 
XY 
-242528 
-429246 
-576156 
-470165 
-316776 
-117335 
120802 
367314 
636150 
1120924 
1853883 
3029521 
X2 
121 
81 
49 
25 
9 
1 
1 
9 
25 
49 
81 
121 
N = 12 ^ = 1481010 2.x = 0 , z x y = 4976388. 2.x^=572 
2 . Y = Na + b Z.X ( i ) 
,2 21xy = aXx + b^X ' 
Y = a + b X 
( i i ) 
( i i i ) 
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a = 
T Y 
•^=^— From equation (i) after the putting value 
of 2.^ = 0 than we have got-. 
1481010 _ i,,.n c a = rr = 123417.5 
From equation (ii) after the 
putting value of x = 0 than we have got 
^ ^ 4976388 ^ 8699.979 
572 
Y = 123417.5 + 8699.979 x (iv) 
It is the straight line equation which we get after 
putting the value of x and y in equation (iii) by 
putting the values of x (13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 
27, 29) in equation (iv) we calculate estimated sales 
of MUL from 1997 to 2005 as given below : 
It is clear from Table No. 5.21 that the 
estimated sales of Maruti Vehicles will increase to 
375717 vehicles in 2005 against 236517 units in 1997. 
It means an increase of 58.854 per cent over the year 
1997 and a growth rate of 5.958 per cent per annum. But 
with the passage of time the rate of growth of sales of 
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TABLE NO. 5 . 2 1 
ESTIMATED SALES OF MARUTI VEHICLES (EXTRAPOLATED) 
Year Sales % growth of es t imated 
sales 
1997 236517 
1998 253917 7.356 
1999 271217 6.852 
2000 288717 6.413 
2001 306117 6.026 
2002 323517 5.684 
2003 358317 5.103 
2005 ;-35517 4.856 
Maruti vehicles is likely to shrink though its figures 
of sales will increase year by year. It will be due to 
the fact that with the induction of several new 
technologies, component suppliers are likely to face 
problems of standardisation. It will also be due to the 
fact that product quality could pose problem since very 
often production . depends on old and obsolete plants 
bought from international suppliers. There is also a 
possibility of domestic components being increasingly 
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substituted by imported components. 
Thus, when the production as well as sales both 
of MUL will marginally come down in the years to come, 
they will leave an adverse effect on profit also. In 
the ultimate analysis, MUL will have to face cut-throat 
competition from other international competitors * who 
are likely to offer their fuel-efficient vehicles at 
more economical prices. 
OVERALL : The company commissioned Blanking lines in , 
December, 1991 by which steel can be imported in the 
form of coils and converted into blanks. The company 
entered into a joint venture with M/s Ford Motor 
Company to make Aluminium Radiators. The company has 
started implementing the project for expanding 
production capacity to two lakhs units a year. Orders 
for equipments are being placed to create an additional 
production capacity of 70,000 units. A new model car 
(YE2) which has been designed by BMC to conform to the 
EEC standards applicable from 01.01.1993 will be 
produced in India and shall be sold to Europe and 
elsewhere through SMC's marketing channels. With the 
introduction of YE2 in 1993, the entire European market 
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will be available for sales. 
* TELCO, Daewoo, Toyota, among others - are drawing up 
plans to enter the segment, and it is expected that by 
1998 some of these cars will be on the roads. 
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The company has also obtained ENISO 9002:1994. 
Quality system certificate. Granted AIB VINCOTTEINTER 
(A non-profit Association & Member of EQNET) having its 
Headquarters at Brussels, Belgium on February 5, 1996. 
The certificate is from one of the prestigious ISO 9000 
series. The certificate represents a model for quality 
assurance in production, installation & 
servicing, for sale of Maruti Vehicles, Maruti Genuine 
spares and servicing of Maruti range of vehicles 
manufactured by Maruti Udyog Ltd., under collaboration 
from SUZUKI Motor Corporation, Japan. 
Though Maruti Udyog Ltd.'s board gave it the go 
ahead to begin work on a third plant for one lakh 
vehicles near its existing site at Gurgaon over a 
fortnight ago, it is unlikely that Suzuki will put in 
its share of the Rs. 1,100 crore required for the 
plant unless it is given control of the company's 
board. 
PERSONNEL POLICY OF MUL : 
The personnel policy is one of the primary 
functions of an organisation's management. Its aim of 
purposeful and effective personnel policy is to create 
and maintain a committed and disciplined personnel for 
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the organisation. Also its aim is to create wide oppor-
tunities for advancement within the organisation. By 
giving encouragement to good workers, by stimulating 
action in the recruits of basic grades and by 
motivating individuals to stay in the organisation for 
a long period, the personnel policy of MUL has been 
very successful so far. The component parts of MUL's 
personnel policy are as follows : 
(i) Manpower Deveopment 
( i i ) Re^j-uitment 
(iii) Promotion 
(iv) Training 
(v) Performance Appraisal 
(vi) Working Conditions 
(vii) Welfare facilities and amenities. 
(i) MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT : The employees are primary 
organ of an organisation. Without these, other 
resources can not be effectively geared for achieving 
organisational goals. It is also a fact that producti-
vity of man depends largely on motivation and proper 
training. A consistent effort was made by the MUL to 
meet the employees expectations through incentives and 
facilities. As will be seen from Table No. 5.22, given 
below, the number of employees increased to 4968 in 
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1995-96 as against 883 in 1983-84 showing an increase 
of 462.627 per cent over the year 1983-84. In fact, the 
number of employees are increasing day by day due to 
expansion of working load in the organisation. 
TABLE NO. 5.22 
NO. OP EMPLOYEES IN MUL 
Year No. of Employees 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1991-92 
1993-94 
1995-96 
883 
2176 
2815 
3497 
3526 
3629 
3993 
4588 
4968 
SOURCE : 1. Various issues of Public Enterprises Survey. 
2. Annual Report of MUL, 1988-89. 
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(ii) RECRDITMENT : The posts of Technicians, Supervi-
sors and Executives filled t^by the direct recruitment 
and promotion of employees already in the service of 
the organisation are niade internally. 
(iii) PROMOTION : It is of the individual to a job of 
higher position involving a charge of duties with a 
difficult type of work, greater responsibility and 
change of title and usually an increase in pay. The MUL 
acts upon the following principles for promotion : 
(a) Promotion should be done solely on the basis of 
merit. 
(b) Promotion is based on punctuality, efficiency 
and behaviour of the employee. 
(c) Officers committee consisting of not less than 
three officers, recommends promotion of 
employees after analysing the performance by 
using performance appraisal form. In each case 
the committee should record in writing the 
grounds on which claims of person or persons if 
any, senior to the persons selected, were over 
looked. 
(iv) TRAINING : It is a device for the knowledge and 
skill of people for a definite purpose and systematical 
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work. Persons connected with all types of jobs in the 
organisation usually require some type of training for 
their efficient performance. It is primary chapter for 
newly appointed employees in an organisation. Without 
its systematic programme of training, employees' 
talents are not fully developed. Systematic training is 
always necessary because of constant technological 
changes which take place with the passage of time. 
The MUL has adopted Japanese technology. So, 
it is necessary to provide a special programme of 
initial training and education for newly appointed 
employees. Every trainee is exposed to production and 
to the function in every other department during a 
period of about six months. The training process is on 
the basis of lectures given by Japanese work culture as 
well as company executives (by the executives). The 
next six months are spent on, 'on the job training' 
depending upon the availability of vacancy and choice 
of the candidate. On the job training (OJT) is 
respected through formal class room training. Exposure 
is very important element during the period of training 
in the MUL. The MUL has organised a programmes for 
reinforce Maruti Culture and to promote the Quality 
Circle Movement during'the house training. Technical 
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Training includes industrial engineering, manufacturing 
quality control, statistical analysis, computer 
programming etc. It is continuously offered to all 
levels of employees. The programmes of training of 
employees at the works of SMC in Japan also continues. 
(v) PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL : The performance appraisal 
is a tool to measure relative worth or ability of an 
employee in performing his task. In MUL, performance 
appraisal of an employee is done by a committee 
consisting of not less than three members which 
include: (i) The immediate supervisor of the employee 
called initiating officer, (ii) The next superior called 
Reviewing Authority, (iii) One or more officers who are 
considered competent to assess the worth of the 
employee, i.e. recommending authority. 
In fact, two appraisals are conducted by the 
organisation one of them in January for the purpose of 
giving increments and promotions and the other in July 
for the purpose of counselling to its workers. The 
performance appraisal is divided into two parts. Part I 
deals with the performance of the employees during the 
year while Part II deals with the potential and 
capability of the individuals and kept confidential. 
Part I includes skill, knowledge, quality of work. 
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quantity of work and discipline and discussed with the 
employee in a free and frank manner by the initiating 
officer. 
The MUL does not have any transfer policy. 
However, a permanent employee can resign from his job 
but for doing so he has to give a three months prior 
notice to the organisation. 
(vi) WORKING CONDITIONS : It is an important factor in 
a company for the efficiency and satisfaction of 
employees. In MUL, working day is six days in week with 
three full shifts. The effective work shift is of 7 
hours 45 minutes excluding half an hour for launch and 
two seven and a half minute rest periods. The MUL, has 
provided sufficient space to every employee for 
performing his/her work easily with comfort. The MUL 
also provides essential requirements such as suppresses 
dust levels, improve aesthetics and land escaping to 
every employee for effective and scientific work. 
(vii) WELFARE FACILITIES AND AMENITIES : The welfare 
facilities and amenities both are mainly as follows : 
Facilities : 
The employees of MUL are entitled to get 
medical as well as reimbursement of expenses incurred 
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by any employee only on production of bills. This is 
done through a systematic channel of Doctors/shop 
clinical labs / x-rays and clinics established by the 
company. Dispensary-cum-first aid centre with adequate 
number of highly skilled Doctors provides the necessary 
treatment to the sick employees. Ambulances are made 
available in need of hour to shift the patients to 
hospital so that the patients may very soon overcome 
the fatal disease. 
Canteen : A canteen with all modern amenities is 
established within the periphery of the company to 
serve the employees with subsidised meals at a uniform 
pattern. The canteen plays a very vital role in 
nourishing the physical as well mental capabilities of 
the employees. 
Advance for Vehicle : The company also grants 
conveyance advances in terms of loans to its employees 
for purchasing the sophisticated vehicles which provide 
the necessary comforts to the employees. These loans 
are repayable in monthly, half yearly or annual 
instalments. 
Hashing Allowances : The allowance is made available to 
all the employees. This allowance helps the employees 
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keep the uniform neat and clean and causes a daazling 
reflection of the presence of employees within the 
premises of the company. 
Creche Facility : The company has also established a 
creche with in the premises of the company to 
facilitate the women employees having small children or 
kids. 
Education : The company provides better educational facilities 
for the children of their employees so that they can 
plan their career. Maruti provides education facilities 
to the children of its employee in two good schools in 
Delhi and Gurgaon. 
Attendance Bonus : Every sincere and industrious employ« 
is entitled to entertain an extra cash for full or 
nearly full attendance record. This bonus reflects the 
sincerity of its employee. 
Leave Encashment : The company pays wages to its 
employees for the utilization of leave for company work 
at the end of every year. 
Conclusively, it may be observed that the 
efficient utilization of adequate resources related to 
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production, productivity, profits, ample contribution 
to government's exchequer etc. has always been one way 
the MUL is seeking to discharge its debt to the nation. 
MUL always thinks for the betterment and welfare of its 
employees by providing substantial amenities and 
facilities. It provides several incentives to its 
employees for their hard work/ courtesy and loyality 
towards the organisation and never ignores the demanour 
exhibited by its employees. 
Problems of Maruti Udyog Limited : 
The MUL failed to achieve its own projections 
to produce a small family's car due to some problems 
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which are mainly as follows : 
(i) Entry of new Dealers : Entry of four more dealers 
of Maruti Udyog Ltd. in Delhi. 
(ii) Entry of new Manufacturers : Due to the entry of 
new Manufacturers, Maruti dealers were compelled to 
give substantial discount on sale of Esteem. 
(iii) Delay : Delay in implementation of project is due 
to intervention of DDA under urban ceiling Act. 
However, Hon. Delhi High Court ordered on May 27, 1996 
for settlement of the matter within 60 days. 
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( iv) Indigenisation : So f a r , the MUL failed t o 
achieved i t s indigenisat ion t a r g e t . Low level of 
ind igenisa t ion is major problem of the organisation 
because a l l other problems are adjoined d i rec t ly or 
indirectly ' with ind igen i sa t ion . The MUL does not have 
command over the domestic a n c i l l a r y indust r ies to 
secure supplies of components and equipments of 
reasonable qual i ty . Ind igenisa t ion t a rge t s were not 
achieved by the company due t o non-supply of domestic 
p a r t s in conformity with s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 
(v) Lack of Well-Developed Vendors : The Vendors play 
an important role in developing an organisation because 
development of organisat ion l a rge ly depends on t h e i r 
e f f i c i ency . I t means t h a t both of them are cor re la ted . 
The company i s facing some problems to locate and t o 
s e l e c t competent vendors. There i s s t r i c t c r i t e r i a in 
a l l a reas to select vendors, no vendor would be able t o 
qua l i fy and the attainment of indigenisdation would be 
unfeas ib le . I t s vendors have fa i led to supply the 
components in time with q u a l i t y specif icat ion as 
requi red by the MUL. The vendors a re unable to maintain 
t o t a l consis tent ly of q u a l i t y over large numbers and 
over tended periods of time and they are incapable of 
reaching the ta rge ts f ixed by the company. Since 
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vendors are backbone of the company, it is necessary 
for the company to improve its vendors through 
additional incentives and other facilities for the 
company development. 
(vi) Low Level of Production : In the very beginning, 
during 1984-85 and 1985-86, the MUL was not able to 
achieve its fixed targets in production due to lack of 
component suppliers, skilled employees, old modal of 
technology etc. However, production of MUL was raised 
to 80150 units against the fixed target of 80000 units 
in 1986-87. In 1987-88 again the production target was 
fixed at 100000 units but actual production was 92,630 
units. Thus, the trend of MUL production has been 
varying up and down due to component shortages. It is, 
therefore, advisable that the MUL should keep necessary 
stocks for meeting the shortages in components in order 
to ensure scheduled supply. Of course, it will result 
in some extra cost to the company. But definitely it 
will be less than the accumulated looses due to 
conveyor stoppages. 
(vii) Qualit:y : Quality is the summation of all the 
activities which occur in selling products and 
services. The MUL has always been endeavouring to 
maintain high quality standards in their products but 
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several times failed to make the endeavour bear fruits 
and hence the quality of products produced by MUL is 
declining. This decline is eschewing the dazzling 
performance of MUL. The indigenous components due to 
their inaccuracy and indurability relatively to those 
of Japan results in declining standard of products. The 
only remedy to eradicate this decline completely is to 
develop the entire auto-ancillary industry of the 
country. Plants, equipments and manufacturing methods 
must be selected as per international standards of 
performance for the establishment of such industry. 
Highly skiled employees must be selected and proper 
training facilities must be made available for all the 
employees so that they can perform their best. They 
should be taught how to deal with modern management 
system and achieve the quality. The sophistication of 
management at all levels should be enhanced. A morable 
boostup among the employees as a team member must be 
introduced. 
(viii) Tax Structure : Though the government has taken 
several stringent steps to help MUL meet its 
requirements but still all its efforts are futile. The 
highly volatile tax structure with mid-year and annual 
increase in customs and excise duty has made the MUL 
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vulnerable. The continuous appreciation of Yen and 
increased input costs have made the manufacturers 
struggle for financial viability. Taxes as custom 
duties on capital goods etc. constitute two-thirds of 
total price. Tax burden is a considerable hindrance to 
its milestone and has crippled the industry. It has, 
indeed, inversely weaken all the strategies of the 
industry. The company needs a comprehensive and clear-
cut policy from the government that would reduce tax 
burden and provide special concessions to those 
enterprises which are working above hundred per cent 
capacity utilisation and hundred per cent indigenisa-
tion. The government must reduce duties and taxes on 
imported machinery required for modernising and 
developing the auto-ancillary industry. The government 
should also clear all those projects which will not 
harm the country's foreign exchange position, the 
industry should be allowed to meet its foreign exchange 
by exporting its products. 
Future Prospects of Indian Automobiles Industry : 
A major achievement of the component or 
ancillary industry is that Indian entrepreneurs have 
made remarkable strides in product localisation. This 
import substitute-led model has today resulted in an 
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industry output of Rs. 6500 crores (in 1994) with an 
asset base of Rs. 2,800 crores and an employee force of 
nearly two lakhs. As regards quality levels of the 
industry, while a sea change has taken place with the 
advent of Maruti Udyog it is still a far cry from the 
expectations of the global players targeting India, the 
Mercedes, the Fords and the Vokswagons. The extrapola-
ted demands on the auto component industry would mean a 
turnover of about Rs. 2/000 crores by the year 2000 
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with a capital outlay of around Rs. 9,000 crores. 
According to the Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association (ACMA), export of auto components industry 
is projected to increase to Rs. 18,000 million in 1999-
2000.^^ 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e 
I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n i n West European C o u n t r i e s , came 
t o be r e c o g n i s e d a s a means of modern l i v i n g . T h e r e u p o n 
a number of c o u n t r i e s s t a r t e d making p l a n n e d e f f o r t s 
t o w a r d s a t t a i n i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e of b e t t e r ways of 
l i v i n g . I n d u s t r i a l p o l i c i e s were evo lved by v a r i o u s 
c o u n t r i e s . The I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y of any n a t i o n i s 
b a s i c a l l y composed of two components - one i s t h e 
p h i l o s o p h y of g iven s o c i e t y t o s h a p e i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h 
and t h e o t h e r i s t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n which g i v e s 
p r a c t i c a l shape t o t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s o c i e t y . The 
f i r s t component of i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y i s t h e p h i l o s o p h y 
c o n s i s t s of an app roach t o and o b j e c t i v e s of i n d u s t r i a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t . I t can b r o a d l y be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o ( i ) 
C a p i t a l i s t System ( i i ) S o c i a l i s t i c Approach and ( i i i ) 
Mixed Economy Approach . 
P r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y i n I n d i a was 
t h e c o n s c i o u s a d o p t i o n of a mixed economy t h a t 
r e p r e s e n t e d , i n g e n e r a l , t h e c o n t i n u i t y of B r i t i s h and 
P r e - B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n . The e a r l y i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y o f 
t h e B r i t i s h Government h a s b e e n a p t l y summed up by V e r a 
A n s t e y a s f o l l o w s : ' I t was t h o u g h t i n e v i t a b l e t h a t 
I n d i a shou ld remain p r e d o m i n a n t l y a g r i c u l t u r a l , w h i l s t 
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the government wished to avoid both the active 
encouragement of industries (like the cotton mill 
industry) that competed with powerful English interests 
and increased State expenditure. Hence, even at the end 
of the nineteenth century, all that the government did, 
was to provide a certain amount of technical and 
industrial education and attempted to collect in 
industrial information* . 
The First World War caused vulnerability to the 
Indian economy and the government resolved to examine 
the industrial policy. Lord Hardinge, on 26th November 
1915, wrote to the Secretary of the State : 'It is 
becoming increasingly clear that a definite and 
self-conscious policy of improving the industrial 
capabilities of India will have to be pursued after the 
war. This led to the appointment of the Indian 
Industrial Commission in 1916. 
The slow pace of industrialization was not upto 
the mark to face the grave challenges posed by the 
increasing population of the country and low per capita 
income. Infrastructure needed the pivotal concern of 
the policy makers. The National Government, after 
Independence in 1947, contemplated faster rates of 
growth of industrialisation. In doing so, the 
government of India, following Russian pattern of 
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development, took all such steps which brought all 
important economic activities under effective 
government control and regulation. 
In terms of the IPR of 1956, the field for the 
operation of the private sector was confined to the 
unorganized small and tiny sector where individuals 
could engage themselves in petty shop keeping or 
trading and manufacturing on a very small-scale. For 
encouraging SSI Sector the Government reserved certain 
items which could be produced only by the small-scale 
sector. 
The people of Asian, African and Latin American 
continents started their freedom movements in mid-
twentieth century. The national movements in different 
countries had been educating the masses against the 
exploitation by the colonial powers as well as merits 
of socialistic pattern of society. The same philosophy 
was put forTi^ ard by Indian leadership before the masses 
during its freedom struggle. All national leaders were 
ideologically convinced that it is only the Russian 
pattern of development which can bring about rapid 
industrial growth of the country and can successfully 
tackle with ail problems of mass poverty, unemployment, 
etc. The leadership was also of the view, as in many 
other countries, that the State alone had the entrepre-
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neurial ab i l i ty to c rea te such a dynamic sector in the 
core and in f ras t ruc tu ra l f i e ld as would boost up 
development of the whole economy. 
Accumulation of c a p i t a l was considered t o be 
the route for accelerated growth and therefore major 
investments were d i rec ted towards cap i ta l i n t e n s i v e 
indus t r ies l i ke , heavy indus t ry , o i l , mines, petroleum, 
heavy chemicals, and a host of other areas through 
planned programmes. This was legitimized through the 
Indus t r ia l Policy Resolution of 1956 in which the 
Pr iva te Sector was kept away from taking pa r t in such 
major industr ia l a c t i v i t i e s . 
This i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t approach was a l s o 
supported by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l aid agencies in one form 
or the other. Thus, the s t a t e intervent ion was not 
r e s t r i c t e d to the c rea t ion of new asse t s in bas ic 
i ndus t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s only but i t spread, in the form 
of nat ional iza t ion, towards Financial I n s t i t u t i o n s , 
General Insurance, Coal I n d u s t r i e s , a number of heavy 
and l igh t engineering i n d u s t r i e s , ju te indus t r i e s and a 
host of others l i k e , s t e e l , minerals , metals, power and 
petroleum e t c . While in most of the basic areas the 
S ta te enjoyed monopoly, in other f ie lds the s take of 
the State was heavy. The IPR of 1956 accorded 
commanding heights to the PSUs and the growth of 
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private sector was restricted, with strictest tariff 
measures. The growth of large industrial houses was 
restricted through the operations of MRTP Act 1969 and 
foreign equity participation was restricted to 40 per 
cent. The concept of mixed economy was allowed to 
function under stringent control and in conformity with 
plan objectives. 
To provide large scale employment opportunities 
and make large quantities of consumer goods available, 
development of small scale industry was encouraged by 
reserving items for the SSI Sector, by providing price 
advantage and a number of other fiscal incentives. The 
overall industrial structure of the country was divided 
between the organized sector consisting of the Private 
and Public Sectors, with dominance of the latter and 
unorganized small scale industrial sector with a large 
number of items reserved for it. 
The main contribution of the 1977 Indian 
Industrial Policy Statement was to expand the list of 
180 items reserved for the SSI Sector to 807 items. It 
failed to impose a ban on multinationals or Indian big 
business houses to produce items of common consumption 
such as breads, biscuits, toffees, footwear, leather 
products etc. Further, the large industrial houses also 
did not relish the idea that such units would have to 
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rely on their internally generated resources for 
financing new projects or expansion of their existing 
units. This proved to be a big blow to them as they had 
built up their empires by using the funds provided by 
the financial institutions and banks. After three years 
in 1980, the Congress (I) Party dethroned the Janata 
Party which led to the announcement of the new 
Industrial Policy Statement in 1980. 
In terms of the 1980 Industrial Policy 
Statement the task of raising the pillars of economic 
infrastructure in the country was entrusted to the 
public sector for reasons of its greater reliability, 
for the very large investments required and the longer 
gestation period of the projects crucial for economic 
development. It was guided merely by considerations of 
growth. It liberalized licensing for large and big 
business houses but by blurring the distinction between 
small scale and large scale industries it sought to 
promote the latter at the cost of the former. Broadly 
speaking, the Industrial policy choose a more capital-
intensive path of development and thus, it underplayed 
the employment objective. 
Upto the beginning of the 1980s a number of 
industrial policy statements were issued but, in fact, 
all of them contained special features of the IPR of 
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1956. It was only late Mr. Rajeev Gandhi who initiated 
some liberalization measures in 1985 which marked the 
beginning of liberalization of Indian economy. The end 
of 'Eighties' and beginning of the 'Nineties' witnessed 
the changes of so far reaching consequences, which, a 
few years back, no body could have even dreamt of. 
Disintegration of the Soviet Union, re-unification of 
two Germanies and giving up of the centralized 
planning by all the countries which were under 
earstwhile Russian influence giving way to the market 
orientation of their economies are but a few examples. 
The upshot of the entire criticism of the 1990 
Industrial policy was that whereas it aimed to promote 
small scale and agro-based industries, it did not 
provide adequate safeguards against encroachment by the 
large business houses and multinationals which grabbed 
the market share of small-scale sector in mass 
consumption goods and seriously jeopardised the 
employment generation of the SSI. 
A sweeping change in the form of 'New 
Industrial Policy' was announced by Indian Government 
on July 24, 1991. The basic philosophy hidden behind 
this policy is summarized as 'continuity with change'. 
The government took a series of initiatives in respect 
of the policies related to the following areas : 
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(a) Industrial Licensing (b) Foreign Investment (c) 
Foreign Technology Agreement (d) Public Sector Policy 
(e) MRTP Act.(f) Small and Tiny Sector. Later economic 
reforms include policy measures regarding location of 
industrial units, foreign direct investment/ 
disinvestment of PSU shares, export and import, 
taxation and capital market. 
The terms 'Public Sector', Public Enterprises' 
Government Undertakings', 'State-Owned Enterprises' and 
'Public Undertakings' are used synonymously. In France, 
Public Enterprises mean industrial and commercial 
undertakings of the Government. In USA, Public Sector 
means all government agencies which are engaged in 
providing specific goods and services. In U.K. Public 
Corporations are the public enterprises. In Italy, 
Public Enterprises are those which are run either by 
local bodies or by State Government. 
We have concentrated on the performance and 
problems of non-departmental undertakings of the 
Central Government which are named as industrial and 
commercial undertakings though they have entered the 
field of production and distribution of consumer goods 
as well. 
The expansion of PSUs started from 1956 
Industrial Policy Resolution. It was, indeed, the IPR 
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of 1956 which assigned the role of 'commanding heights' 
to the PSUs and continued to be considered as the 
'Economic Constitution of India' and dominated the 
economic scense of the country atleast upto 1985 when 
late Mr. Rajeev Gandhi initiated the process of libera-
lization. 
The worthwhileness of the PSUs had been a bone 
of contention from the very beginning. Some of the PSUs 
which earned huge profits were actually monopoly 
profits and due to inter government departmental 
transfers rather than their efficient performance in 
the real sense of term while the aggregate sum of money 
invested in them amounted to Rs. 1,78,628 crores as on 
march 31, 1996. Again with the poor record of 
performance Indian PSUs had practically covered all 
segments of the Indian economy leaving no room for the 
growth of private sector. Fortunately, with the 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union almost all the 
socialist countries said goodbye to the government 
management and control of Public Corporations and 
resorted to the market-oriented mechanism. The 
Government of India also, for the first time after 
independence, announced liberalization measures and 
integration of Indian economy with the world economy in 
July 1991. 
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The Department of Public Enterprises, set up in 
1979, monitors half-yearly performance of PSUs based on 
flash results reported by them. It informs the 
Government about their consolidated performance so that 
early action could be taken for improving the 
performance of loss-making PSUs as well as other PSUs 
wherever needed. The Department's early warning system 
of reporting on performance has the twin objectives of 
(a) creating an awareness among the Public Enterprises 
to establish benchmarks for their own performance 
appraisal and (b) keeping the Government informed well 
in time of the state of affairs in the PSUs so that 
suitable corrective measures are taken- when needed. 
While commenting on the performance of any 
business organisation financial aspect comes to the 
fore. Though a number of PSUs are not business concerns 
in the strict sense of the term but their financial 
aspect cannot be ignored. In a mixed economy where 
private sector is also allowed to operate and compete 
with PSUs simultaneously* This aspect occupies all the 
more importance. Judging against this background, 
financial performance of a large number of PSUs has not 
only been not satisfactory but many of them have proved 
to be an utter failure. 
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Another factor for their profits is the export 
income from a number of developing countries to which 
these PSUs supply goods at much higher rates than the 
domestic prices. Except for these factors applicable 
only to many PSUS/ the performance of other PSUs, in 
general/ has been very dismal. To add fuel to the fire, 
Indian PSUs did not confine themselves strictly to the 
areas specified for them in the IPR of 1956. They 
entered the field of consumer goods and services and 
took over a large number of sick units which increased 
their losses. The government of India on July 24, 1991 
made a clear-cut statement about the PSUs but the speed 
of liberalization is very slow. 
The ratio of losses of loss-incurring PSUs to 
the profits of profit-making PSUs worked out at 73.0 in 
1978-79 which declined to 70.4 in 1979-90. This 
situation was worst during the first year of the Sixth 
Five Year Plan as the ratio of losses of loss-making 
PSUs to profits of profit-making PSUs increased to 
137.4. During the next two successive years of the plan 
the situation improved. However during 1983-1984 this 
situation again worsened and the afore-mentioned ratio 
became as high as 86.5. During Seventh Five Year Plan 
period, the PSUs faired well as the ratio of losses of 
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loss-incurring PSUs to the profits of profit-making PSUs 
came down from 58.0 to 34.1. 
The afore-mentioned trend was quite healthy and 
should have been sustained. But unfortunately, a serious 
reversal of trend occurred during 1991-92 and this ratio 
again jumped to 61 per cent. With marginal improvement 
in 1992-93, this ratio has again jumped to 54.4 per cent 
in 1993-94. This is rather disappointing that nearly 
half of the total number of enterprises continue to 
incur losses year after year. The need of the hour is to 
make a case-by-case study of the enterprises so as to 
determine the factors responsible for the persisting 
situation so that remedial action can be initiated. 
A very narrow range of profit-making PSUs 
account for bulk of the total net profit earned by them. 
During 1993-94, about 67 per cent of the net profit of 
profit-making enterprises (Rs. 9,722 crores) was 
contributed by Petroleum Rs. 3,948 crores (40.6%), Power 
Rs. 1,013 crores (10.4%), Financial Services Rs. 546 
crores (5.6%), Telecommunications Rs. 520 crores (5.3%) 
and coal Rs. 511 crores (5.3%). Among the Principal 
loss-incurring enterprises were in the areas of 
textiles, consumer goods, engineering goods, fertilizers 
contract and consultancy services. 
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In the manufacturing sector except for 
Petroleum, power, minerals and metals, coal and lignite 
and only a few other manufacturing units, others have 
been resulting in constant financial losses to the 
government. 
Gross profit ratio to capital employed serves as 
an invaluable clue to the pricing policy of an 
organisation in addition to serving as a useful means of 
verifying the accuracy of the trading results 
ascertained in respect of each accounting period. The 
gross profit to capital employed ratios show a divergent 
trend over the period. It means that the PSUs have not 
followed any consistent policy of gross margins. 
After the implementation of a number of libera-
lisation measures, situation has radically changed even 
for those PSOs which had been earning profit mostly 
either because of their monopoly rights or undue govern-
ment protection. Again, the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 
were the boom years for the Indian economy as a whole. 
During these two years many of the loss-making 
undertaking have also shown profits. The situation for 
1995-96 and 1996-97, for which the data are not 
available, will surely be quite different. 
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In order to be fair and objective it would be 
necessary to take into account the obligation of Public 
Enterprises which transcends the concepts of production 
and profits. Given that/ the performance of public 
enterprises either at micro or at macro level/ has to be 
evaluated keeping in view the contributions made by them 
in discharging their socio-economic obligations, 
development of backward regions, provision of public 
utility services, selling basic inputs or products at 
administered prices etc. There is no denying the fact 
that all this has been possible despite several 
handicaps from which Public Enterprises suffer such as 
locational disadvantages in some cases, very high 
initial disadvantages in some cases, very high initial 
capital investments in others, having to do with 
technology which was not necessarily among the best 
available, cost of learning and development and presence 
of a large nxniber of sickunits taken over f rem the private sector 
etc. 
The results of the foregoing planning pattern 
were, however, not encouraging. In majority of the cases 
the laid down targets could not be achieved. A nvimber of 
projects could not be implemented on time causing 
significant cost overruns and the lack of satisfactory 
performance of the PSUs in generating adequate surpluses 
to plough back for sustained economic development 
created serious problems. 
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Under the circumstances/ Government had no 
option but to borrow money from internal as well as 
external markets. To reduce such gaps year after year, 
the sources of soft loan, available earlier, dried up 
and most of the borrowing was available only on 
commercial terms. The intensity of debt burden can be 
imagined from the fact that it has gone up to the level 
of over Rupees 2,02,972 crores upto September 1992 and 
the internal burden exceeds at about Rupees 3,55,800 
crores. It takes more than one-fourth of the GDP to 
service our external debt. The Government of India had 
no option but to tighten its belts on PSUs losses and 
non-essential expenditures simultaneously. International 
eid agencies have been pressing hard for structural 
adjustment in the economy so that the country may be 
able to pay its external debt without much difficulty. 
Whatever happened in India, the same situation 
prevailed, with the difference of degree only, in a host 
of other countries. The failure of the perception of 
planned development gave way to market-oriented develop 
ment policy. The philosophy is gaining ground in 
developed as well as developing countries that the 
economies of the nations should be liberalised from 
Government Control, restrictions and regulations, to 
allow market forces to play their role in reshaping the 
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economy of a country. The U.K. during the last decade, 
with conservative rulers, successfully privatized a 
number of its Public Enterprises. 
Convinced by its success, a number of countries 
from different continents have either started 
implementing privatization scheme as a measure of 
economic recovery or are committed to do so. It may also 
be mentioned here that dismemberment of earstwhile USSR 
has led all its allies to say good bye to the Government 
control of industrial licensing and to adopt market 
orientation of their economies so much so that the 
communist China has also opened the doors of its closed 
economy to international competition. 
In India changes of far reaching consequences 
were taking place. On July 24, 1991, the Government of 
India declared New Industrial Policy wich opted for 
radical changes from the policy pursued until then. The 
NIP, in fact, scraped control through licensing, except 
in some strategic areas like defence, production of 
coal, petroleum, oil, drugs and a few luxurious items. 
It diluted the MRTP Act, 1969 to enable large industrial 
houses to invest their surpluses and enhance foreign 
equity participation from 40 per cent to 51 per cent, 
proposed divestiture of 20 percent of public shares in 
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some of the PSUs / announced deregulation of a large 
number industries to free them from the shackles of 
bureaucratic control, deserved a large number of items 
so far reserved for small scale industrial sector and 
opened its doors to the foreign firms to encourage 
competition- Considering the protective measures 
followed in the past four decades of development/ these 
measures were really a good step. It invited a lot of 
criticism from different quarters, some of the people 
calling it a complete 'sale out' to the private sector 
while others supported the initiatives whole heartedly. 
A number of developing countries, in many parts 
of the world, firstly under the influence of the 
earstwhile Soviet Union and later on that of China 
followed socialistic policies and took over the existing 
efficient and growing undertakings and setting up the 
new ones either as government monopolies or under the 
effective government control. All such countries spent 
huge public funds on the PSUs and some of them claimed 
to be the 'model employer' of huge working force. 
With the passage of time all the PSUs in all the 
countries became inefficient because these countries 
reacted legislations favouring the work force. In the 
ultimate analysis, the governments lost millions and 
billions of dollars in the forms of not getting 
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adequate returns on the capital invested because of 
under-utilisation of capacities, strikes, manhours lost, 
low productivity, shrinkage in excise duty and tax 
income to the exchequer etc. Besides, the SOEs created 
structural distortions in the economies of a number of 
countries, leading to many crises. Involvement of 
political parties made things so complicated that almost 
all the SOEs, except for a few, for reasons explained 
elsewhere, became white elephants for their respective 
governments which ultimately placed them into private 
hands* Indeed, the process of privatisation has been 
crisis-driven all over the world though the reasons 
behind objectives to be attained and concern of the 
political parties in different countries have not been 
very much different. 
The objectives of privatisation have been to 
attain optimum efficiency by removing various hurdles 
through competition for enhancing revenues for the 
governments, reducing budgetary deficits, widening 
ownership of economic assets and eliminating political 
interference. 
This sweeping process has now emerged as one of 
the policy instruments internationally in more than 
fifty countries ranging over from industrialised nations 
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of the West, centrally planned economies of Eastern 
Europe/ newly industrialised nations of Asia Pacific 
Region to the debt-ridden countries of Latin America, 
South Asian sub-continent including India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and a host of other Third World 
Countries. 
Just as the main concerns of policy makers, 
their objectives and the reasons behind privatization 
have differed from country to country, the modes of 
privatization have also varied from country to country. 
Although privatization seems to have been 
gaining world-wide recognition as many countries of the 
world have implemented rigorous reform programmes of 
liberalization, delicensing and privatization of PSUs no 
uniform definition of the world 'Privatization' appears 
to exist. The term has been so widely and variedly used 
that it conveys different meanings from case to case and 
country to country. It is to be understood not merely in 
the substantive sense of how far the operations of an 
enterprise are brought within the description of market 
forces. 
In strict sense of the term, privatization is 
specifically defined as the government-initiated 
transfer of assets, operations, rights and activities 
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from the public to the private sector through a variety 
of means. On the other hand, the divestiture of small 
equity stakes to private sector investors or the sale of 
shares to mutual funds or other institutions controlled 
by the government without any significant change in the 
level of government control or managerial freedom does 
not constitute privatization. But the process does 
include contracting out to the private sector those 
services which had, historically, been performed by the 
public sector and the provision and financing of new 
infrastructure projects. 
To facilitate sector-wise comparisons an 
achievement rating was derived from the four criteria, 
evaluated on a five-point scale where 1 stood for 
completely regulated and 5 for completely competitive. 
The four critical factors considered were : (i) Market 
Structure : Are there barriers to entry? Are prices 
State-controlled? (iii) Ownership: what is the level of 
private ownership in the public sector? (iii) 
Management: What is the level of freedom the managers of 
the PSU enjoy? (iv) Financial : What is the level of 
freedom the PSU has in terms of raising funds? 
The foregoing privatization paradigms indicate 
towards the fact that what was been happening in India 
over the last five years can only be described as 
creeping privatization, with pieces of state monopoly 
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being liberalised from time to time. During the four rounds 
of disinvestment that has taken place since 1992, it has 
auctioned off only 0.65 per cent of Government's investments 
in the public sector and has realised a meagre amount of $ 3 
billion only/ through C. Rangarajan Committee appointed by 
the Government had recommended, as early as in 1992, that the 
Government's share in the PSUs be brought dovm to less than 
51 per cent. It means that the government never seems to have 
made up its mind on the subject. 
f 
' As a matter of fact privatization reform programmes 
require strong political will and preparedness and specific 
timescales on the part of the government of a country. 
Unfortunately, in India, these things are lacking. But, half 
hearted measures will not do. Thailand, for example, which 
undertook privatization task long ago has failed only because 
of lukewarm measures adopted by it. In India, whatever has 
been done so far is not, in fact, privatization as it has not 
brought about any significant change either in ownership 
pattern or management freedoms which are necessary if 
privatization programme is to succeed in the country.^ 
It will not be proper to abruptly state that all 
public enterprises have absolutely failed to achieve their 
designed objectives and thus recc^ nmend their 
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elimination at a stretch by privatising them. It has 
been rightly observed that on account of peculiar socio-
political and economic environment and social systems 
some of the Public Enterprises are indispensible. 
Different environmental sets of the social system call 
for different techniques to be used for privatising the 
PSUs. 
In Programme for structural Reforms submitted to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on November 31, 
1991 to secure its financial assistance for the ongoing 
process stated that India's severely constrained 
budgetary circumstances create both the need and 
opportunity for rationalising the scope of public sector 
activity and for placing greater reliance on the private 
sector for resource mobilization and investment. Public 
enterprises have absorbed large amounts of budgetary 
support for their expansion or operations, but in many 
cases they have failed to generate adequate returns on 
the investment of public money and contributed 
significantly to the public sector saving gap and fiscal 
deficit. 
RBI made large drawings from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) which amounted to US $ 2.4 billion 
in July 1990 and January 1991. Even then there was a 
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sharp reduction in the foreign exchange reserve during 
1990-91. As of July 1991, their level was at a little 
over US $ one billion which was barely sufficient to 
finance imports for a fortnight. As inflation accelera-
ted to almost 14 per cent and foreign exchange reserves 
dwindled, international default by India seemed to be a 
real possibility. It was in this atmosphere of crisis 
that a newly elected government launched a programme of 
economic reforms in June 1991. 
The Arjun Sengupta Committee, set up to review 
the Government policy for PSUs, divided the entire 
spectrum of PSUs into core and non-core sectors. The 
non-core sector enterprises were further sub-divided 
into financially viable and non-viable enterprises. The 
core sector included coal and lignite, crude oil, 
petroleum and natural gas, power, primary steel 
production, primary production of aluminium, copper 
lead, fine-nickle, fertilizers and primary production of 
petro-chemical intermediaries. The committee suggested 
closure of non-viable PEs in non-core sector. It 
recommended special studies of such enterprises in the 
core sector to put them back on rails. 
The Government has been trying to rehabilitate 
workers affected by the industrial sickness. The Golden 
Handshake policy or Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) 
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has been implemented in a large number of PSUs like Coal 
India, MAMC, FCI, MMTC, CCl, Heavy Engineering Corpora-
tion, Indian Oil Corporation, Calcutta Port Trust etc. 
The result of VRS has been that young and 
skilled managers left the organization to join in 
private sector export-import houses as senior managers. 
The redundant staff at lower levels however, remained in 
their positions in PSUs. The introduction of the VRS was 
baseless. It was open to all and resulted in rapid 
depletion of technical and managerial cadres in PSUs. In 
other words, mostly cream workers of the organization 
were taken by private sector, leaving the public sector 
with employees whose opportunity cost in the market was 
lower than their present wage level. It is true that the 
entire NRF was used to finance the VRS only and even 
then it produced adverse effect on output and 
efficiency. It is, therefore, suggested that in future 
the entire fund should not be exhausted on VRS alone. 
The origin of the automobile industry in India 
can be traced back to 1942, when Hindustan Motor Limited 
(HML) was established in Baroda. In 1949 the first 
partially manufactured car rolled out of the assembly 
line of the Hindustan Motors Limited. The establishment 
was followed by Premier Automobiles Limited (PAL) and 
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Standard Motor Products Limited (SMPL) . Both of these 
car manufacturing units were set up in Bombay and Madras 
respectively. 
Most of the manufacturing units started 
production in 1953-54. They were compelled to work at a 
loss as the small Indian market was, at that "ime, 
overflooded with the imported cars of various designs. 
Ashok Leyland and Tata Engineering and Locomotive 
Company (TELCO) too up the production of Heavy Commercial 
Vehicles in 1957 and in 1962 respectively while Mahindra 
and Mahindra was promoted in 1965 in the Jeep Line. 
The late 'Eighties' witnessed breath-taking 
developments. During this period a number of automobile 
manufacturing units were set up which included, 
Hindustan Motors Limited, Maruti Udyog Limited, Swaraj 
Mazda Limited, D.C.M. Daewoo Motor Ltd. etc., for manufac-
turing of Light Commercial Vehicles, Heavy Commercial 
Vehicles and Two-Wheelers. It opened up a chapter in the 
history of Indian Automobile Industry. 
Telco-the market leader in HCV-also commands 60 
per cent of the Light Commercial Vehicle (LCVs) market, 
followed by Bajaj Tempo, which holds 22 per cent of the 
market its Matador brand. The remaining segment is 
shared betweed six other manufacturers, all of whom will 
be trying desparately to break Telco's monopoly. 
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In the international markets, the ratio of LCV 
to HCV is around 60:40 while in Indian market it is 
around 45:55 and therefore LCV segment is likely to grow 
the fastest. Scooters continue to dominate the market 
with as high as 46.8 per cent share. This is perhaps 
because it is considered to be a family vehicle. The 
remaining market is shared by motorcycles and mopeds. 
During the 'Eighties' India became the seventh 
largest producer of automobiles and the industry is not 
only able to meet the country's requirement but also has 
some exportable surplus. With about 12 lakh vehicles of 
all types being manufactured every year in India, the 
country currently ranks ninth among the automobile 
manufacturing countries in the world. In the production 
of two wheelers, India stands second in the world after 
Japan. 
The Maruti 800 model holds around 80 pe cent of 
the car segment in India and still has the privilege of 
having a waiting list of about two-to-three weeks 
despite a number of automobiles MNCs tropping into the 
Indian market. 
In the very beginning, equity participation bet-
ween government of India and SMC was decided 74 per cent 
and 26 per cent respectively. But during the 1990, the 
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equity shares of the SMC was raised form 26 per cent to 
40 per cent. Legal Status of Maruti Udyog Limited has 
changed w.e.f. 20.06.1992 from a Government Company to a 
company without direct responsibility to the Government 
when Maruti alloted and issued 22,04,860 additional 
equity shares of Rs. 100 each to Suzuki Motor 
Corporation, Japan. With the aforesaid arid issue allotment 
of shares to Suzuki, Government's equity has come down 
to less than 51 per cent in the total paid up capital of 
the company. 
Three distinct segments are visible in the 
industry. The largest is the small car segment (approxi-
mately 60 per cent of industry sales) comprising a 
single manufacturer, Maruti, with its 800 CC car and Van 
priced around Rs. 0.2 million. The premier Padmini (From 
Premier Automobiles) and the Ambassador (from Hindustan 
Motors) make up the medixim segment (below 20 per cent of 
industry sales) with a price range of between Rs. 0.2 to 
0.3 million, followed by the luxury car segment priced 
at a over Rs.0.3 million. 
Two companies manufacture Jeeps in the country. 
Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) dominates with a market shares 
of 87.4 per cent followed by Maruti with share of 12.6 
per cent. M&M's dominance in the Jeep market is 
attributed to its diesel powered vehicles. 
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As in any other industrial concerns. Board of 
Directors of MUL is the top administrative organ as well 
as the Supreme policy making body of the company. The 
directors hold responsibility for management. 
The present size of MUL board is nine of which 
six are full time directors while three of them are 
part-time. The Chairman of the Board is appointed by the 
Government of India who also acts as part-time director 
of the company. Two other part-time directors are 
secretaries of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
heavy Industry (Department of Public Enterprises) 
respectively. 
Sale of vehicles by MUL increased from 2/75/411 
in 1995-96 to 3/38,690 in 1996-97 showing an increase of 
23 per cent. However/ competition is on the increase and 
MUL cannot sit idle and be complacent on its past 
performance. 
The estimated sales of Maruti Vehicles will 
increase to 3/75/717 vehicles in 2005 against 2/36,517 
units in 1997. It means an increase of 58,854 per cent 
over the year 1997 and a growth rate of 5.958 per cent 
per annum. But with the passage of time the rate of 
growth of sales of Maruti Vehicles is likely to shrink 
though its figures of sales will increase year by year. 
359 
It will be due to the fact that with the induction of 
several new technologies, component suppliers are likely 
to face problems of standardisation. It will also be due 
to the fact that product quality could pose problem 
since very often production is depend on old and 
absolete plants bought from international suppliers 
There is also a possibility of domestic components being 
increasingly substituted by imported components. 
When the production as well as sales both of MUL 
will marginally come down in the years to come, they 
will leave an adverse effect on profit also.In the 
ultimate analysis, MUL will have to face cut-throat 
competition from other international competitors who are 
likely to offer their fuel-efficient vehicles at more 
economical prices. 
The personnel policy is one of the primary 
functions of an organisation's management. Its aim of 
purposeful and effective personnel policy is to create 
and maintain a conmitted and disciplined personnel for 
the organisation. Also its aim is to create wide 
opportunities for advancement within the organisation. 
By giving encouragement to good workers, by stimulating 
action in the recruits of basic grades and by motivating 
individuals to stay in the organisation for a long 
period, the personnel policy of MUL has been very 
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successful so far. The component parts of MUL's 
personnel policy are as follows : 
The MUL acts upon the following principles for 
promotion: 
(a) Promotion should be done solely on the basis of 
merit. 
(b) Promotion is based on punctuality, efficiency 
and behaviour of the employee. 
(c) Officers committee consisting of not less than 
three officers, recommends promotion of 
employees after analysing the performance by 
using performance appraisal form. In each case 
the committee should record in writing the 
grounds on which claims of person or persons if 
any, senior to be persons selected, were over 
looked. 
So far, the MUL failed to achieve its indigeni-
sation target. Low level of indigenisation is a major 
problem of the organisation and all other problems are 
adjoined directly or indirectly with indigenisation. The 
MUL, does not have command over the domestic ancillary 
industries to secure supplies of components and 
equipments of reasonable equality. Indigenisation 
targets were not achieved by the company due to non-
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supply of domestic parts in conformity with 
specifications. 
The indigenous components due to their 
inaccuracy and indurability relatively to those of Japan 
adversely affect standard of products. The only remedy 
to eradicate this decline completely is to develop the 
entire auto-ancillary industry of the country. Plants, 
equipments and manufacturing methods must be selected as 
per international standards of performance for the 
establishment of such industry. Highly skilled employees 
must be selected and proper training facilities must be 
made available for all the employees so that they can 
perform theii; best. They should be taught how to deal 
with modern management system and achieve the quality. 
The sophistication of management at all levels should be 
enhanced. A morale boost up among the employees as a 
team member must be introduced. 
The trend of MUL production has been varying up 
and down due to component shortages. It is, therefore, 
suggested that the MUL should keep necessary stocks for 
meeting the shortages in components in order to ensure 
scheduled supply. Of course, it will result in some 
extra cost to the company. But will result in some extra 
cost to the company. But definitely it will be less than 
the accumulated losses due to conveyor stoppages. 
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The government must reduce duties and taxes on 
imported machinery required for modernizing and 
developing the auto-ancillary industry. The government 
should also clear all those project which will not harm 
the country's foreign exchange position and the industry 
should be allowed to meet its foreign exchange by 
exporting its products. 
A major achievement of the component or 
ancillary industry is that Indian entrepreneurs have 
made remarkable strides in product localisation. This 
import substitute-led model has today resulted in an 
industry output of Rs. 6,500 crores (1994) with an asset 
base of Rs. 2,800 crores and an employee force of nearly 
two lakhs. As regards quality levels of the industry, 
while a sea change has taken place with the advent of 
Maruti Udyog it is still a far cry from the expectations 
of the global players targetting India such as the 
Mercedes, the Ford and the Vokswagons. The extrapolated 
demands on the auto component industry would mean a 
turnover of about Rs. 20,000 crores by the year 2000 
with a capital outlay of around Rs. 9,000 crores. 
According to the Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association (ACMA), export of auto components industry 
is projected to increase to Rs. 18,000 million in 
1999-2000. 
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